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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the role of a group of Cape colonists who rose in rebellion against
the colonial government and allied themselves to the Boer Republics during the South African War of
1899-1902.
The decision of the Griqualand West colonists to join the Republican forces took place against a
background of severe deprivation in the agricultural sector due to the losses sustained in the rinderpest
pandemic of 1896/1897. It also coincided with the invasion of Griqualand West by Transvaal forces. The
failure of the Schreiner Government to defend its borders encouraged rebellion, as there were no armed
forces to oppose either the invasion or the rebellion.
While some of the Cape rebels fought on the side of the Republicans during major battles along
the Modder River, others were commandeered to gather and transport supplies to the laagers. Four months
after the surrender of Gen P Cronje at Paardeberg the majority of these rebels had laid down arms except
for those under Gen Piet de Villiers who fought on in the Transvaal. After a second rebellion in 1901, far
fewer rebels fought a war of attrition north of the Orange River; eventually about 700 men leaving the
Cape Colony to avoid laying down arms.
South of the Orange River Free State forces commandeered the disaffected colonists of the
Stormberg and Colesberg regions in November 1899. Because the Republicans had not occupied these
regions earlier in the war, British reinforcements and the Colonial Division took to the field against them
almost immediately. The victory gained at Stormberg in December 1899 by the Boer forces was not
followed up. Olivier failed to integrate his forces; unlike those at Colesberg where the Boers were far
better led and scored some notable successes. The Republican burghers withdrew from the Cape Colony
in March 1901, which in turn led to a mass surrender of rebels. Those that were captured under arms were
sent as POWs to Ceylon and India, while those that surrendered were held in colonial gaols until they
were bailed or given passes. Only a few hundred continued to wage war in the Boer Republics for the
remainder of 1900.
The second invasion by Free State forces into the Cape Colony consisted of mobile commandos
that criss-crossed the interior. For the first few months they sowed havoc, but after June 1901 the military
used mass tactics against those who were forced into the isolated northwest Cape. In 1902, unknown to
them, the Boer republics signed the Treaty of Vereeniging and ceased to exist as sovereign states. The
Cape rebels were not signatories to the treaty. According to an agreement between the Boer leaders and
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the Colonial Office, if a rebel surrendered and pleaded guilty to High Treason under Proclamation 100 of
1902 he would receive a partial amnesty and be disfranchised. However rebel officers were charged in
court and fines and prison sentences would be handed down.
After the first invasion rebels who were captured or surrendered were tried under the Indemnity
and Special Tribunals Act that was in force for six months until April 1901. Martial Law was then again in
vogue from 22 April until Peace at the end of May 1902, and under this act 44 Cape colonists,
Republicans and aliens were executed, and hundreds .of others, whose death sentences were commuted to
penal servitude for life, were shipped to POW camps on Bermuda and St Helena. The surrenders 00,442
rebels were accepted under Proclamation 100 of 1902. Rebel officers or those facing serious charges were
tried under the Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act in Special High Treason Courts. The general amnesty
announced in 1905 brought to an end the prosecutions for High Treason ofCape rebels. In 1906 the names
of disfranchised colonists were. replaced on the Voters' Roll.
The final official return of Cape rebels for 1903 is 12,205 or 0.5% of the total population, while
the return according to the database is 16,198 rebels or 0.7%. Strategically the rebellions played a limited
role in the overall Republican war effort despite the individual rebel's self-sacrifice to the cause. However,
although small in numbers, the rebellion had an enormous impact on colonial life (especially in 1901) as it
led to a thinly disguised civil war and enmity between the Afrikaner and English colonists, which took
years to disappear.
vOPSOMMING
In hierdie verhandeling word die rol nagevors van 'n groep Kaapse koloniste wat teen die
koloniale regering gerebelleer en hulle as bondgenote by die Boererepublieke geskaar het gedurende die
Suid-Afrikaanse Oorlog van 1899-1902.
Die besluit van die koloniste van Griekwaland-Wes om by die Republikeinse magte aan te sluit
het p~asgevind teen die agtergrond van emstige ontbering in die landbousektor weens verliese gely met
die runderpes-pandemie van 189611897, Dit het ook saamgeval met die inval van Griekwaland-Wes deur
Transvaalse magte. Die versuim van die Schreiner-regering om sy grense te verdedig het rebellie
bevorder, aangesien daar geen gewapende magte was om Of die inval6f die tebellie teen te staan nie.
Somrnige van die Kaapse rebelle het aan die kant van die Republikeine geveg tydens belangrike
veldslae langs die Modderrivier, terwyl ander opgekomrnandeer is om voorrade te versamel en na die laers
te vervoer. Vier maande na die oorgawe Van Gen. P, Cronje by Paardeberg het die meeste van hierdie
rebelle die wapens neergele, behalwe diegene onder Gen, Piet de Villiers wat aanhou veg het in die
Transvaal. Na 'n tweede rebelJie in 190I het 'n veel k1einer getal rebelle 'n uitputtingsoorlog noord van
die Oranjerivier gevoer; uiteindelik ongeveer 700 mans wat die Kaapkolonie verlaat het sodat hulle nie hul
wapens hoef neer te Ie nie.
Suid van die Oranjerivier het Vrystaatse magte die ontevrede koloniste van die Stormberg- en
Colesberg-streke in November 1899 opgekommandeer. Omdatdie Republikeine nie vroeer in die oorlog
hierdie gebiede beset het nie, het Britse versterkings en die Koloniale Divisie feitlik dadelik teen hulle te
velde getrek. Die Boeremagte se oorwinning by Stormberg in Desember 1899 is nie opgevolg nie. Olivier
het nie daarin geslaag om sy magte te integreer nie, anders as by Colesberg waar die Boere veer beter
aangevoer was en aansienlike suksesse behaal het Die Republikeinse burgers het in Maart 190I uit die
Kaapkolonie onttrek, wat 'n massa-oorgawe van rebelle tot gevolg gehad het Diegene wat onder die
wapens gevange geneem is, is as krygsgevangenes na Ceylon en Indie gestuur terwyl die wat hul oorgegee
het, in koloniale tronke aangehou is totdat hulle onder borg vrygestel is of passe gegee is, Slegs 'n paar
honderd het voortgegaan om vir die res van 1901 in die Boererepublieke oorlog te voer.
Die tweede inval van Vrystaatse magte in die Kaapkolonie het bestaan uit mobiele kornmando's
wat kruis en dwars in die binneland rondbeweeg het Die eerste paar maande het hulle verwoesting
aangerig, maar na Junie 1901 het die militere massataktieke gebruik teen diegene wat in die gei'soleerde
noordwes-Kaap vasgekeer was. In 1902 het die Boererepublieke sonder die wete van die rebelle die
Verdrag van Vereeniging onderteken en nie langer as soewereine state bestaan nie. Die Kaapse rebelle
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was nie ondertekenaars van die verdrag nie. Volgens 'n ooreenkoms tussen die Boereleiers en die
Koloniale Kantoor sou 'n rebel gedeeltelike amnestie ontvang en ontburger word indien hy hom oorgee en
skuldig pIeit aan Hoogverraad kragtens Proklamasie 100 van 1902. Rebelle-offisiere is egter in die hof
aangekla en boetes en tronkstraf sou opgele word.
Na die eerste inval is rebelle wat gevange geneem is of hulle oorgegee het, verhoor ingevolge die
"Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act" wat van krag was vir ses maande tot April 1901. Krygswet was toe
weer in swang vanaf 22 April tot Vrede teen die einde van Mei 1902, en ingevolge hierdie wet is 44
Kaapse koloniste, Republikeine en uitlanders tereggestel en honderde ander, wie se doodsvonnise na
lewenslange dwangarbeid verander is, na krygsgevangenekampe op Bermuda en St. Helena verskeep. Die
oorgawe van 3,442 rebelle is kragtens Proklamasie 100 van 1902 aanvaar. Rebelle-offisiere of diegene
wat op ernstige aanklagte tereggestaan het, is ingevo1ge die "Indemnity and Special Tribunals Act" in
Spesiale Hoogverraadhowe verhoor. Die a1gemene amnestie wat in 1905 aangekondig is, het ' n einde
gebring aan die vervo1gings van Kaapse rebelle weens Hoogverraad. In 1906 is die name van ontburgerde
koloniste op die Kieserslys teruggep1aas.
Die finale ampte1ike terugkeersyfer van Kaapse rebelle vir 1903 is 12,205 of 0.5% van die tota1e
bevolking, terwyl die terugkeersyfer vo1gens die navorser se databasis 16,198 rebelle of 0.7% is. In
strategiese sin het die rebellie 'n beperkte rol gespeel in die algehele Republikeinse oorlogspoging
ondanks die individuele rebel se se1fopoffering vir die saak. Hoewel klein getalle betrokke was, het die
rebellie egter'n enorme impak op die ko1onia1e 1ewe gehad (vera1 in 1901) aangesien dit aanleiding gegee
het tot 'n skaars verb10emde burgeroorlog en vyandskap tussen die Afrikaner- en Enge1se ko1oniste wat
jare lank voortgeduur het.
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INTRODUCTION
The centenary of the South African War has presented an opportunity to re-examine the many
different views of the hostilities of 1899 to 1902 between the Transvaal and Orange Free State and
Great Britain. Among the contentious aspects of the war is the rebellion by British citizens of the
Cape Colony who took up arms on the side of the Boer Republics. What led them to rebel against a
colonial government to whom they had previously showed no animosity?
The actions of the colonists in Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, the first group to rebel,
should be viewed objectively in terms of the huinanitarian and ecological disaster they suffered in the
aftermath of the rinderpest pandemic, which resulted in a collapse of the rural economy just prior to
the war. In T Gutsche's There was a Man. The Life and Times of Sir Arnold Theiler KCMG of
Onderstepoort, Theiler was among the first to discuss the implication of the domino effect of the
rinderpest catastrophe. CF Gronum's Transportry Runderpes en Poskoetse gives chilling eyewitness
accounts of the pandemic's catastrophes. Another articles by A Theiler, 'De Runderpest', R Mack,
'The Great African Cattle Plague Epidemic of the I890s', PB Rossiter, 'Rinderpest' and C van
Onselen, 'Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa' make compelling reading.'
The initial study of the pandemic has helped flesh out the origins of the Cape Rebel during
the South African War; establish his roots, his socio-economic standing and his family ties. It is
through his family bonds that attempts will be made to delineate the implications for the Cape
Afrikaner of the ambiguity implicit in being a Cape Afrikaner as well as a British citizen in a British
Colony.
The centenary of the conflict and ten years of democracy has opened long-closed windows to
the past so that, through this study, the sufferings of all people, not only the Cape rebel but also
others, especially the black people and coloured people, can be fully acknowledged. Part of the
process is to see the other side of the fighting men, Boer and British, not just as heroes, but also as
enemies and adversaries who were rightly feared. While the British and Colonial Forces have long
been castigated for their scorched-earth policy in the Orange Free State, there is time now and place to
accept that the Republican forces descended on their neighbouring Afrikaner Cape colonists over the
border in November 1899, and coerced those who did not want to join their forces into submission.
1 Thelma Gutsche, There was a Man. The Life and Times ofSir Arnold TheUer KCMG ofOnderstepoorr, CF
Gromun, Transporttry Runderpest en Poskoetse; A Theiler, 'De Runderpest', in BP8 of Archives Library, R
Mack, The Great African Cattle Plague Epidemic of the 1890s' in Tropicai Animal Health and Production, 11;
PB Rossiter, 'Rinderpest', in Coetzer et al (eds), Infectious Diseases ofLivestock, 11; C Van Onslen, 'Reactions
to Rinderpest inSouthem Africa' in The Journal ofAfrican History, XIIl.3.
r '·". ,•....
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Introduction 2
This dissertation is based on a database on each rebel, which started as cards in a shoebox.
From this information fed into the database, referred to as 'The Rebel Record', a profile of the
colonial rebel has emerged. The original intention of this researcher was to make this database
available as an addendum to this thesis; however due to its size, 756 pages of information on 16,198
rebels, it was judged too extensive to be presented as such. Only the statistics from the database,
numbers of Cape rebels per district, are included with the relevant census figures of 1891 and 1904; in
this way the percentage of rebel support for the Boer forces can be compared on a regional basis,
These statistics, like icebergs, serve as pointers to the' bulk of the work that is out of sight They
indicate that the Cape rebel of the South African War,. for all his bravery and endurance, played a
minor role that, in later years, would assume larger proportions.
There is no remembered reason why this researcher, a South African with a British
background, became interested and felt empathy for the Cape rebels and the extraordinary fates that
life threw at them in the South African War. Except perhaps that a childhood in a Somerset East of
the 1940s was a curious place full of no-go areas for English-speaking children, starting with the
Voortrekker hall around the comer where 'the others' played volkspele, and those who went to
Brownies did not.
This researcher came from a world of Soldiers of the Queen, but also lived in a society where
these same soldiers were blamed for Annie in the concentration camp, the poor little waif behind the
wire. After living in a South Africa with many contending views of the past, it is warming to find that
it is possible now to break away from a statutory views of history and embrace a less partisan view of
the South African War?
For over thirty years we farmed on Layton in the Beaufort West district, and while my
husband, David Shearing, studied the local flora (which cuhninated in Karoo, Wild Flower Guide 6,
illustrated by artist Katryn van Heerden) there was time to study other facets of the environment. A
Karoo and Roggeveld past redolent with fossils, rock gongs and battles between the San and Khoi and
the early trekboers, merged into to the transhumance of the Roggeveld into the Tanqua Karoo each
autumo, An abiding memory of a detailed study of the Karoo and Roggeveld loan farmers of the
Dutch East India Company period is how few they were. It is thanks to the help of the late Dr JH
Heese, author ofSlagtersnek en sy Mense, that it all made sense.'
2 G Cuthbertson, A Grundlingh, and M Suttie (eds), Writing a Wider War, pix. This anthology on the South
African Wa:r, 1899-1902 de-emphasizes political economy and explores new resea:rch into gender, health,
nationalism, identities, ethics and morality.
, JH Heese, Siagtersnek en sy Mense.
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It was the discovery of a forgotten British war memorial on De Pannen on the Nuweveld in
the Beaufort West district dating back to February 1902 that became the spur to an investigation of
the South African War in the Cape Colony, and why the Boer commandos briefly held sway over the
Karoo. One small mystery was never unravelled. Boy de Bruin, a 16-year old from Abrahamskraal,
Victoria West, left home to join the Boers on the spur of the moment, riding a horse he had stolen
from a neighbour. All he took with him was a spare pair of socks and half a bottle of Rooi Lavental (a
Dutch remedy). He was never heard of again. His brother Hugo, said in 1961, that the family had long
given up hope of his return, and thought he had drowned crossing the flooded Orange River.
This researcher chose the topic of the Cape rebel of the South African War for this
dissertation because it was a continuation of Cape colonial, Karoo and Ghoup history. The official
history of the Cape rebels might lie in the archives, but the folk history lived on through Eddie
Bezuidenhout, our neighbour next door, at the meetings of the Agricultural Association, at Onse Rust,
Fraserburg and stories told by farmers to this researcher at the Show grounds during annual
agricultural shows.
The story of the first rebellion that lasted a brief five months has still to be fully told. A rich
and apparently as yet untapped source of material on this invasion is to be found in the Cape Archives
in the Attorney General 3387 to 3421 files, which contain statements made by Class I rebels during
preliminary investigations into charges of High Treason. This type of material has its limitations as
the people concerned were defendants under examination, but by using this source at least a picture is
built up of the duties of those Cape colonists who led the rebellion"
Secondary material on the Cape rebel, especiaily during the 1930s, portrayed the rebel as a
hero or a martyr, and can be associated with the development of Afrikaans and its need for suitable
literature during the era of growing Afrikaner nationalism. Issues germane to the theme will be
addressed within the general context of inter.play between pre-existing social configurations, state
power and the exigencies 0 f war.
What conditions are considered necessary for the successful pursuit of a people's war? Carl
von Clausewitz, director of the Prussian War School, who wrote the seminal study on the theory of
modern warfare, On War, in 1833, is remembered for his formula: 'war is the continuation of policy
by other means'. Discussing a successful people's war, he pointed out that it must have popular
support and be carried out in the interior of a country, and to a great extent over broken, inaccessible
terrain.'
Despite their often-violent records, the rebels have a place as the great folk heroes of the
western world. Why then do many literary figures, like Robin Hood and William Tell, vanish like a
4 CAR, AG 3387-3421, PrelIminary Investigations into Class 1 rebels of Allwal North, Barkly East, Barkly West,
Cradock, Gordonia, Herbert, Hay, Kenhardt, Kuruman, Mafeking, Vryburg and Wodehouse.
mirage on closer examination? Whether in a real sense or only in dreams, common people have kept
alive through the centuries the stories of the powerful hero, the outstanding leader and the tragic
martyr. He came from the powerless masses and either led a rebellion against one or other tyrant, or
laid down his life for his fellows. The legendary hero (like Cmdt Gideon Jacobus Scheepers) never
really dies, because there is something meaningful in the story that appeals anew to each generation.6
The historiography of the South African War has concentrated mainly on the Boer Republics
or Britain, and understandably less on the Cape Colony. The exceptions are Die Afrikaner in
Kaapland, which discusses the invidious position of the Cape Afrikaner when the border districts
were not protected against invasion, and they were commandeered under duress and on a pretext.7
Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog met speciale verwysing na die
Militere Howe, 1899-1902, refers to Martial Law, Class 1 and Class 2 rebels, and the dispute in the
Cape Cabinet over the Amnesty question and Special and Military Courts.' In general literature such
as The Boer War by Thomas Packenham, the Dutch Cape colonists are featured initially as a group
teetering on the brink of a mass uprising. However when the invasion of Griqualand West and the
northern districts did take place, there is a dearth of motivation in the existing historiography on the
short-lived rebellion, except for family ties. In keeping with all other general literature, the executions
of rebels under Martial Law, such as that of Cmdt Lotter, are dealt with in detail. 9
The military aspects of the war are detailed in the Times History, the official History of rhe
War in South Africa and Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog. In them the rebel is cast as
an unquestioning recruit of the Boer forces, and during 190 I as a local insurgent under a Free State
commandant in the gIlerilla commandos. 1O Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog deals with the
political aspect of the war in the Cape Colony."
The suffering of the coloured people has been highlighted in Bill Nasson's Abraham Esau's
War. 12 Many of them lie in unmarked graves in the Karoo and northwest Cape. However they are also
remembered as brave and doughty fighters in HN and DA Kotz"'s Oorlog sonder Oorwinning. 13 As
Town Guards they played a large part in the defence of various small villages; see 'The attack on
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5 John Keegan, A History of Warfare, p3; Weiss, Guerrilla Warfare, On-line Encyclopaedia,
http://encarta.msn.com/find/Concise.asp?oz;=l&pg='2&ti=761560222&hs~insurgency.
6 Harvey, The Oxford Companion to English Literature, p700 (Robin Hood), p806 (William Tell).
7 Snyman, JR, Die Afrikaner in Kaapland 1899-1902, Archives Yearbook 1962, pp68-70.
8 Snyman, JR, Rebelle- verhoor in Kaaplond gedurende die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, Archives Year Book 1962,
fP21, 46-65.
Packenham, Thomas, The Boer War, Paperback edition, pp58, 527-28; executions, p561.
10 LS Amery (ed), The Times History ofthe War in South Africa 1899-1902, I to VII; Captain Maurice Harold
Grant, History ofthe War in South Africa, 1899-1902; JR Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede
Vryheidsoorlog in SuidAfrika, 1899-1902, I to VI.
11 CJ Scheepers Strydom, Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog.
12 Bill Nasson, Abraham Esau's War. A Black South African War in the Cape, pp120-141.
]] HN Katz'; and DA Katz';, Ooriog sonder oorwinning: Die Anglo-Boereoorlog in die omgewing van Kakamas,
KenhardJ. Keirnoes en Upington, p73-85
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Willowmore' by Don Diespecker, in Military History Journal and in Shearing's article, 'Coloured
Involvement in the Boer War' in Quarterly Journal ofthe South African Librar/4
The emotional anti-war book, G Jordaan's Hoe zij Stierven, deals with the last hours of
members of the Boer forces and colonial rebels prior to execution. It was translated into Afrikaans as
So het Hulle Gesterf A new title, by G Jooste and A Oosthuizen, So het Hulle Gesterf, which includes
twenty other executions, which occurred in the Transvaal and Orange Free State under British
administration, has recently been published. According to an Africana book dealer, Jordaan's titles,
especially the Dutch title, seldom reach the second-hand market, because they are too worn from
constant handling, Their enduring popularity reflects the powerful needs of ordinary people to have
heroes and martyrs."
M Tamarkin's Cecil John Rhodes and the Cape Afrikaner deals with Rhodes' interaction with
the Cape Afrikaner and the growth of the Afrikaner Bond. While his thesis does not extend into the
war years, it does give valuable background into the under-researched Cape Afrikaner. There is much
documentation ofpolitical matters, but little sense of social geography and the divide between the rich
and the poor. Neither is there discussion on the rinderpest pandemic or the economic chaos that
followed. 16
Evan Heyningen's dissertation, The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner and WP Schreiner's
Ministry deals with the activities of the Cape Government in the run-up to the South African War.17
The unpublished masters' dissertations of this researcher and that of Rodney Constantine both cover
the Second Invasion of the Cape Colony. Constantine's thesis deals with the Cape Colony both north
and south of the Orange River, while this researcher's deals with the war from both the point of view
of the rebel and the colonial forces, but only south of the Orange River. TA Botha's dissertation,
'Graaff-Reinet tydens die Anglo-Boereoorlog, 1899-1902' covers a more restricted area, but one of
importance because a Military Court was established thereY Eben Nel's Die Kaapse Rebelle van die
14 Don Diespecker, 'The Attack on Willowmore, 1 June 1901', in Military History Journal, IX, No 4, 1993;
TaffY Shearing, 'Coloured Involvement in the South African War in the Cape Colony', in Quarterly Bulletin of
the South African Library, XL No I, 1985,
15 G Jordaan, Hoe zij stierven; G Jordaan, S6 he! hulle Gesterf, Laaste ure van Diegene oar wie die Doodvonnis
Uifgespreek en Vo/trek is in die Kaapkolonie Gedurende die Oorlog van 1899-1902; Graham Joosle and Abrie
Oosthuizen, So Het Hulle Gesterj: Gedenkboek van Teregstellings van Kaapse Rebelie en Repub/ikeinse Burgers
Tydens die Angio-Boereaorlog 1899-1902.
16 M Tamarkin, Cecil John Rhades and the Cape Afrikaner, pp69,239.
17 Van Heyningen, E, The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner and WP Schreiner's Ministry, /899-1900,
Archives Year Book 1976.
18 Rodney James Constantine, 'The Guerrilla War in the Cape Colony during the South African War of 1899-
1902: A case study of the Republican and Rebel Commando Movement', unpublished dissertation for the degree
of Master of Arts, University of Cape Town, 1996; HA Shearing, 'Second Invasion of the Cape Colony during
the Second Anglo-Boer War, 1901-02', unpUblished dissertation for the degree ofMaster of Arts, Natal
University, 1989; TA Botho, .Graaff-Reinet tydens die Anglo-Boereoor1og, 1899-1902', unpublished dissertation
fot the degree of Maste' of Arts, University of Port Elizabeth, 1991.
Hantam-Karoa, 1899-1902 is a repository of archival sources on this period, especially on the tragic
case ofAbraham Esau of Calvinia.!9
Sources for this thesis include memoirs and diaries. De Villiers' Met Steyn en de Wet in het
Veld, which appeared in 1903 and has certain immediacy. Die Oarlogsherinerinneringe van
Kommandant Jacob Petrus Neser is the only memoir of a Cape rebel that covers the war from 1899-
1902. Bosman's Sloan en Vlug gives a rare glimpse into the rebellion in the Albert district. Latter
sections of the memoir are confused, probably due to the malaria he was suffering' which was
discovered when he was left behind by Gen JC Smuts in the Cradock district." Other published
rebels' memoirs that deal with the second rebellion in the Cape Colony include Smith's Ek Rebeleer
and Du Plessis' Oomblikke van Spanning, which appeared in the 1940's and are uncritical adventure
stories.2! Daniel Scheepers of Upsai, Somerset East handed his Memoirs to the Editor of the Somerset
Budget in the 1930s, to be published after his death. They revealed the tensions between the Free
Staters and the rebels, and highlighted the strengths and weaknesses ofthe commandos in 190\.22
Further publications that explore the Cape rebel in a changing situation include FR Dave!'s
Herinneringe van Francois Retief Davel, and AV Oosthuizen's Rebelle van die Stormberge. The
members of Lotter's and Scheepers' Commandos are listed in Commandant Johannes Lotter and his
Rebels and Commandant Gideon Scheepers and the Search for his Grave by this researcher and her
husband. New material about the suffering of rebels convicted by Military Courts came to light in the
unpublished story of Willem Steyn, 'Kaapse Rebel te Bermuda'. Willem Steyn dictated the original
memoir in 1929, which his son, Charl Steyn, reworked. The original material is identified by the
phrase, "Pappa het gese".23
Most of the Boer commandahts and generals who invaded the Cape Colony feature in one
book or another, including Die Oorlogsavonture van 'Genl Wynand Malan by Pieterse, De Kersauson
de Pennedreff, Ek en die Vierkleur and Scheepers se Dagboek by Preller. All of them contain general
material on Cape rebels of the 2nd Invasion." It would be impossible to contemplate a study ofthis
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19 Eben Nel, Die Kaapse Rebelle van die Hantam-Koroo, Anglo-Boereoorlog 1899·1902, pre-publication digital
copy.
20 OT de Villiers, Met De Wet en Steyn in Het Veld; Andre Wessels (ed), Die Oorlogsherinneringe van
Kommandant Jacob Petrus Neser, Christiaan de Wet-Annale, VII; JP Bosman, Sloan en Vlug, pp4, 58-59.
21 JA Smith, Ek Rebeleer,joined the Boer forces in July 1901, PH du Plessis, Oomblikke van Spanning, joined
the Boer forces in January 1901.
22 Cmdt D du P Scheepers' Memoirs were published in instalments in the Somerset Budget, Somerset East from
23 May to 23 June 1962.
23 W Steyn, 'Kaapse Rebel te Bermuda', unpublished memoir, private archives ofC Steyn, Glentana.
24 HJC Pieterse, Die Ooriogsavonture van Genl Wynand Malan, led a small commando of Free Staters and rebels
in the Midlands and later, as a combat general appointed by Smuts, returned to the Midlands in March 1902. R
de Kersauson de Pennendreft: Ek en die Vierkleur. Robert the Frenchman was a boon companion to Manie
Maritz and his account deals with guerilla warfare in the Midlands and in the northwest Cape; Dr Gustav S
Preller, Scheepers se Dagboek en die Stryd in Kaapland, (1 Okt 1901 -18 Jan 1902). Numerous Rebels were
mentioned by Scheepers and Preller in this study.
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kind without Official Sources such as the Prisoner-of-War lists, surrender documents and absconded
rebel lists.
The question remains: how then does this work differ from what went before it, and what is
there that is significant in the light of current scholarship? The contemporary tendency is to examine a
group in some depth, as most subjects can supply fresh insights when they are viewed from diverse
angles. In this case a fresh picture emerges when the rebels are viewed as Cape colonists first, then as
Cape rebels and finally as colonial volunteers in the Boer forces.
Other researchers can claim that they have followed a similar approach, but this dissertation
seeks to unpack the dynamics of the rebellion in depth and aims to demonstrate the counter forces that
impinged on the rebels. This study has not been approached in a genre of a family or group saga.
Essentially the cyclical responses of the Imperial and Colonial forces to the insurgents were
largely conditional on the current military situation between the SA Field Force and the Transvaal and
Orange Free State forces. It was the lack of political will by the Cape Colonial Government that gave
the Free State forces the initial opportunity to raise insurgents in the Cape Colony to bolster the Boer
forces. As the civil service and the Cape Police withdrew from the border villages, under orders from
the Government, the rebels, recruited and armed by the Orange Free State forces, left their farms and
began the cycle by moving into armed laagers on the outskirts of villages. Through the
commandeering of shops, livestock and wagons from Afrikaner colonists, supplies were built up.
Many English-speaking farmers were forced to vacate their properties and their livestock and a variety
ofgoods from these farms were also brought into the laagers.
The rebel insurgents, mainly led by the Free Staters, underwent a process of adaptation once
the Colonial Volunteers, plus British forces, established rival armed camps, resulting in skirmisbes
between the two groups. The government forces, with better artillery and mOre experienced gunners,
succeeded in driving the rebel forces out of the villages. However the collapse of the first invasion in
March 1900 was not caused by a military victory over the insurgents in the Cape Colony, but by the
defeat of Transvaal and Free State forces at Paardeberg, which led to a domino effect resulting in the
surrender of the majority of the insurgents.
A de-escalation of the conflict occurred in the Cape Colony during the remainder of 1900.
The following cycle in the insurgency movement occurred when the invasion of fast-moving
commandos from the Free State into the Cape Colony evoked an all-out response from the military
and Colonial Government. In this phase the civilian population became involved in the battlefield as
Town Guards and District Mounted Troops. Using a process defined as 'invasive harassment', the
insurgents kept on the move, foraging as they rode. These widespread raids resulted in an increasingly
stringent response from the counter-insurgents. The profound psychological consequences of the
reprisals, such as executions of captured insurgents by government forces, resulted in long-standing
hostility between the Afrikaner and English pro-government forces. However the Free Staters
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weakened their forces by splitting them up, leading to their defeat in the Boer Republics by the SA
Field Force who had forced the insurgents in the Cape Colony into a region that was not strategically
important.
The questions this researcher has asked and tried supply some answers is what lasting impact
the rinderpest pandemic had on the colonists of Griqualand West and Bechuanaland, and why a
prosperous colony under Responsible Government failed to defend itselffrom invasion by Republican
forces. The colonial government had at their dfsposal the Cape Mounted Riflemen to take the lead,
and supported by trained Volunteers with an excellent chain of command, should have been quite
capable of making a strong defensive showing along the frontiers with the Transvaal and the Orange
Free State.25 The thesis documents evidence of the lack of political will on the part of the Prime
Minister,' WP Schreiner, and that his policy of neutrality was pursued to the advantage of the Boer
Republics at the cost of the Cape Afrikaner living in the border regions. 26 The first rebellion,
following the invasion of the Cape Colony by Republican forces, was partly a protest at the
breakdown in colonial Government. Contemporary reports in the press and statements by Class I
rebels support this point of view.
Previous researchers have found the development of political, ethnic self-consciousness to be
the dominant reason for the Cape Afrikaner's support of the Boer Republics. However when types of
internal war are analysed, the first rebellion also has elements of a civil insurgency; discontent with
the policies of the regime, inadequate communication between the regime and the masses, existence
of groups ready to capitalize on anti-regime sentiments and channel discontent into action, and the
emergence of an attractive ideology incompatible with the existing social and political system."
The two worlds, that of the Boer Republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, and the
colonial world, flowed and breathed together. The greatest numbers of rebels would come from the
districts that share a common boundary with the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The family
trees of the majority of Dutch republicans were rooted in the Old Colony near the graves of their
ancestors. Cape Afrikaner and Boer shared the same strong family bonds, attended the same churches
and had largely the same surnames. They read and wrote Dutch, talked Afrikaans widely, admired
President Steyn and some referred to themselves as 'Steyn manne'. It is not surprising that a certain
number of colonists on the border made common cause with the Free State when there was a
breakdown in orderly colonial government.
25 CAR, CCP 10/15, Cape ofOood Hope, Statistical Register, 1900, No 3: Cape Mounted Riflemen; No 4:
Volunteers; No 5: Number of Officers and Men belonging to Volunteer and Cadet Corps and Mounted Rifle
clubs, plus number of arms etc, pp23-24.
26 Eric Walker, WP Schreiner, A South African, ppI99-203; OHL Ie May, British Supremacy in South Africa,
1899-1907, pp40-41.
27 Andrew M Scott, el aI, Insurgency, p17.
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This thesis is also mindful of the tendency of informants to exaggerate the support that
rebellion enj oyed in the Cape Colony; and that the many who remained neutral or who did not support
the war have been forgotten. Much of the information has been culled from official documents when
it has not been possible to find any olber sources. Unless a document or diary remains in family
hands, the context in which the event took place becomes woven into legend and folklore by lbe
second generation, and oral accounts also tend to reflect current trends and feelings.
The most formidable problem militarily was the slowness of the Government forces in
dealing with the challenge and adjusting to it. In 1901 it took Kitchener some time to realise that
insurgency had become a real problem, and could not just be dealt with by defensive melbods such as
driVing horses into camps. He had to suppress rebellion or it would delay the end of the war. The
lenient treatment of Class 2 rebels was clearly a factor in the recruitment of young rebels during 190 I.
A lack of coordination on lbe side of lbe Free Staters and the rebel commandants was strategically
detrimental to Boer forces. Once the commandos were reduced in number, the tactic of Government
forces was to seal off the area and hunt lbe commandos down.
The war ended with a few thousand rebels laying down arms in areas oflittle strategic value.
Because the Free State forces were unable to give material support to lbe rebels of lbe Cape Colony,
lbe number of rebels dwindled, but they fought on and laid down their lives in a wasted effort to fulfil
Presidents Steyn's dream .of victory and independence for lbe Orange Free State, long after lbe war
there and in the Transvaal was irretrievably lost.
When lbe two rebellions in the Cape Colony are examined in terms of insurgency strategies,
lbere was never any doubt that the Government of the Cape Colony would retain its political power.
The establishment of a base area for the rebels, the most vital objective of guerilla forces, was never a
factor except in a few isolated areas along the Orange River. Because lbe rebel forces had to fight
each day, escape their pursuers, and also find food and fodder as well as ammunition, they were
eventually worn down. The rebels were impoverished by their support of lbe Boer Republics, and
many, in the aftermath of -the war, remained bitter and complained that lbeir former allies had
abandoned them.
UNMRSfTET smt.l!l!OD
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Chapter 1
CHAPTERl
CALLING THE BROTHERHOOD TO ARMS
10
The South African War, 1899-1902 has enjoyed much academic discussion, however the
arguments generally concentrate on the perspectives of the main belligerents, the Boer Republics and
Great Britain. Rarely 'do you find studies examining the conflict from the perspectives of tbe colonists of
the Cape of Good Hope and Natal.I In this dissertation though, the protagonists are the British citizens of
the Cape Colony who sided with the Boer Republics - minor players in the historiography of the South
African War2 These rebels rose in support ofthe republican forces invading tbe Cape Colony and waged
war, not only against tbe British, but were involved in civil conflicts with the colonial loyalists, Dutch-
and English-speaking.
As the complexity of interaction between man and his surroundings becomes increasingly
evident, this study will also focus on the enormous change in the environment of Southern Africa due to
the Rinderpest pandemic and the impact tbe catastrophe had on tbe events that followed. 3 Recently the
rebel has lost further ground as the research into the black South Africans' role in the conflict receives
long overdue attention following the multiparty elections of 1994.4
Opinions were divided over the disaffected Cape colonists or rebels. To tbe burghers oftbe South
African Republic and Orange Free State, he was at best a brother,' a valuable ally, sometimes an unsteady
fighter, and later a martyr to the Boer cause.6 To the British and the colonial loyalists, he was a traitor
who had risen in rebellion against his sovereigns, Queen Victoria and King Edward VII.' Previous studies
IM Coghlan, 'Brother vs Brother', New Contree, No 46 (November 1999).
2 Standard source books on this era are Snyman, Rebelle-verhoor in Kaapland and Die Afrikaner in Kaapland;
Scheepers Strydom, Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog.
3 Gutsche, There Was a Man, pp35-104; PB Rossiter, 'Rinderpest', pp738-757; Mack, 'The Great African Cattle
Plague Epidemic' , pp210-217.
4 Peter Warwick, Black People and the South African War, 1899-1902; Bill Nasson, Abraham Esau's War; JL
Comaroff(ed), The Boer War Diary olSol T Plaatje, An African at Maleking; T Shearing, 'Coloured Involvement in
the South African War', pp7-11.
'Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenls van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog in Suld Afrika, II, p91, Letter from Steyn pleading to
the burghers to stand firm.
6 Jordaan (ed), So Het Hulle Gesterf Gives details of the executions of34 Cape rebels.
'British Intelligence, Military Notes on the Dutch Republics olSouth Africa, Compiled in Section B, Intelligence
Division, War Office, revised June 1899, Secret, p46; T Barclay, 'Laws ofWar' , Encyclopedia Britannica, Tenth
Edition, XXXIII, p751.
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argue that these Cape colonists rose in rebellion because of family ties with republicans.' While this point
is valid, this inquiry will scrutinize additional reasons for the rebellion in the Cape Colony during the
South African War.
Relationships between English and Dutch in mid Victorian times
Forty years earlier the relationships between the English- and Dutch-speaking colonists were
generally frank and warm. By the mid 19th Century three quarters of the white rural population consisted
of Dutch fanners while the English-speaking colonists, clustered in the small towns and villages, were
generally, shopkeepers, civil servants and artisans. The colonists were peaceful and loyal subjects, and
many Dutch prospered under colonial rule and came from traditional white communities who were proud
of being British citizens. According to Tamarkin, "they exploited the economic spaces that opened up
with the expansion of the capitalist economy. They valued the stability and security provided by the
colonial State. They were prominent on municipal boards and in divisional councils. They controlled
most Afrikaner Bond branches and ultimately their representatives became the arbiters of power in
Parliament".9
Although there were inherent tensions between the English and Afrikaner, in the 19th Century the
tyranny of distance helped bind many inhabitants of isolated villages together. It was common custom for
the Kerkraad to give pennission for the English people to hold services in Dutch Refonned Churches. lo
The early Afrikaans letters of Samuel Zwartrnan about life in Fraserburg, founded in 1851, revealed just
how closely knit the English and the Afrikaner could become. So united was this community that
members of the Dutch Refonned Church were outraged when their Rev CA Bamberger did not pay the
customary courtesy call on Bishop Robert Gray when he visited Fraserburg in 1872 to consecrate St
Augustines, the newly erected Anglican Church. ll
The gossipy letters about goings-on in Fraserburg, which appeared unexpectedly in the Het
Volksblad in early Afrikaans in the 1870s, created a sensation, and as the suspected author, H Cooper,
took care to poke fun at himself, his identity remained hidden. l2 While some people wrote to the paper
complaining that the letters created ill feeling, nobody said they should have been written in Dutch or
'Scheepers Strydom, Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p65 states that' through ties ofblood relationships
they [the Colonists] resolved to defend the fighting burghers against a mighty enemy'. (Loose translation).
9 Tarnarkin, Cecil John Rhodes and the Cape Afrikaner, p69.
10 GR Nesemarm, Our Heritage ofEarly Stone Churches. Built by Scottish Stone-Masons Bern and Lawrence, p24.
II DA Scholtz, Fraserburg en sy Kerk 1851-1976, p36.
12 GS Nienaber, Die Afrikaanse Geskrifte van Samuel Zwartman. A series of humorous letters written in secret,
apparently by law agent HWA Cooper, in a form of early Afrikaans, appeared in the Het Volksblad between 1870 and
1873.
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English, instead they were enjoyed for their lively style and sly humour; and even today they have not lost
their charm.
Still, In the 1870s, colonists who were truly bilingual were rare. Francois Retief Davel, a
volunteer from Nieu Bethesda in the ·Sneeuberg Rangers in the 9th Frontier War of 1878, described the
confusion on commando where "many recruits could not understand English, the Lieutenant could not
speak Dutch and Afrikaans had not been born".1J Despite the language difficulties the oldest binding
factors that drew the different racial groups together in the Cape Colony remained those periodic hazards:
commando duty and drought.
Because of its diversity, the economic and environmental factors in the Cape Colony should be
inspected below the usual political level for the initial rebellion to make sense. Other social factors
leading to the war, frequently overlooked, emerge. These include a crisis in the economy and intense
competition for dwindling food resources in Griqualand West and Bechuanaland that accelerated the
conflict and influenced its impact.
This discussion will first deal with the rise and dramatic fall of the transport industry, and then
the diplomatic/political aspects such as the Jameson Raid in the run-up to the war.
Northward expansion and the growth of the transport industry
While the dramatic discovery of diamonds and gold led to industrialization of South Africa in the
late 19th Century, the rural economy in Southern Africa was still dependant on the agricultural sector.
From the Karoo to Bechuanaland it was the ownership of sheep, goats and cattle that underpinned the
prosperity of the rural districts. An economy dependent on animals revolved around the landowner, the
tenant farmer who worked for him and ran stock on the side, and the transport rider who carted
merchandise and farm products to and from markets. Due to outbreaks of horse sickness, the transport
industry relied heavily on the ox-wagon.
Kimberley rose overnight out ofthe veld following the discovery of diamonds, and by 1871 had a
population of50,000. The reality of the diamond rush, said De Kiewiet, was "if the diamonds were evenly
distributed each digger would get only a pittance for reward".14 Those who had no luck turned to
supplying food and goods and, until the railways reached Kimberley in 1886, it became a farmers' and
t3 FR Davel, Herinneringe van Francois RetiefDovel 1856-1946: 'n Boer van Nieu-Bethesda Distrik, Graaff-Reinet,
Graaff-Reinet Museum Archives, p27.
14 CW de Kiewiet, A History ofSouth Africa, Social and Economic, pp 89-90; Louis Cohen, Reminiscences of
Kimberley, facsimile edition, p27.
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transport riders' mecca. t5 Griqualand West was incorporated into the Cape Colony in 1877. Sir John
Molteno, the Cape Prime Minister, had reluctantly agreed with the British government to this measure.
He was not alone; many Free Staters did not wish to be Cape colonists either. 16
In 1880 Cecil Rhodes, the diamond magnate, had floated the De Beers mining company, which
paid an astonishing dividend of 25% on a capital of two and a third million pounds in 1888. By 1899
Kimberley's population had reached 64,000 and was second only to Cape Town in size.17 About 23,000
whites lived in Barkly West, Herbert (Douglas and Campbell) and Hay (Griquatown and Postmasburg).
They were mostly Afrikaans fanners or diamond diggers from a variety of backgrounds. t8
The direct route to the diamond fields from the Cape was through Mossel Bay, but from all
directions the roads converged on Kimberley, thronged with heavy wagons. The farmers sold cattle, sheep
and goats, fruit and vegetables, butter and fat on the market. At that stage all tinned meats and condensed
milk, as well as most ofthe wheat and oats, were imported. The transportation of wood at £40 a load for
the mine was highly lucrative and Gronum said the best 18-foot Grahamstown wagon with eighteen red
Afrikander oxen could be paid off in just six months. 19
In 1886 the railway line from Cape Town reached Kimberley, cutting off the long haul loads from
the Cape for the wagoners. Transport drivers then found that merchants were paying £1-10-0 per 100lbs
for loads transported from Kimberley to the newly discovered Witwatersrand gold fields. The route
through Warrenton, Christiana and Bloemhof became heavily congested as togryers and their sons
transported everything from mine to building equipment, food and eager fortune hunters to the
goldfields?O
In 1890 when Rhodes took office as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony he demanded that the
Cape railway proceed northwards instead of in an easterly direction?! Ten years before local forces had
seized Tswana land proclaiming the Republics of Stellaland and Goshen, but Rhodes viewed the two new
Boer republics as a hindrance to northward progress. The region was annexed by the Cape Colony in
January 1885, though many Stellalanders petitioned against the absorption of the region into the Cape
Colony.22 When the railway line reached Vryburg the following year, transport drivers relocated and
15 Eric A Walker, A History ofSouihern Africa, p34.
l6 Walker, A History ofSouthern Africa, p367; Sarah Gertrude Millin, Rhodes, ppI2-13; The Hon Alex Wilmot, The
Life and Times ofSir Richard Southey KCMG etc, ppI88-235.
17 Millin, Rhodes, p 84; S Lunderstedt (ed), The Summer of1899, p74. Quote from a Mayor'S minute.
IS CAR, CCP 10/15, Cape of Good Hope, Statistical Register, 1900, pp25-26.
19 Gronum, Transportry, Runderpes en Poskoetse, ppl0, 19.
20 Gronum, Transportry. Runderpes en Poskoetse, pp48-49; Millin, Rhodes, p25, describes a journey by ox-wagon
that emphasises just how tedious such a journey could be.
21 Millin, Rhodes, p354.
22 Walker, A History ofSouthern Africa, pp 369,403.
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started moving goods by wagon to the Witwatersrand. There were eventually 30 registered carriers on the
vryburg Voters' roll, and probably many other non-voters. A boom era followed."
In 1892 the Transvaal and Cape railway lines met at Vereeniging and the dominance of ox-wagon
transport as the major carrier to the goldfields ceased.24 Transport riders, then began carting loads into the
Chartered Company's territories of Matebele and Mashonaland, racing against the platelayers putting
down the train tracks to Lobatsi. By the end of 1895 they were loading over 2,000 wagons at the bonded
stores at Mafeking, bound for Bulawayo and beyond. The wagons could carry up to 10,0001bs in weight
and the price rose to £1-12-6 per 1001bs. Goods were also being carted from the coast at Beira to
Salisbury. Small wonder that farmers from the Cape and the Boer republics converged from all quarters to
the lucrative routes, and families put their savings into wagons and oxen and fathers stood surety for their
son's debts. Travelling with up to 30 wagons in extended units, the transport drivers dealt with rutted
tracks, rivers in flood and attacks from lions, knowing .that only by working together could they deliver
their loads in good order and prosper; and many did.15
This whole vibrant economy that had brought prosperity to Griqualand West and Bechuanaland,
collapsed overnight in March and April 1896 as a result of the greatest pandemic to devastate Africa's
animals: the great Rinderpest disaster.
Buchanan questions today why we are unable to understand why wars break out when they do.
His argument is that nothing reaches a critical point by itself. Maladjustment, and the human distress that
goes with it, has to reach a threshold of severity before the social fabric will give way.26 Gutsche states, " -
The great rinderpest pandemic was to change all that; while its impact has been ignored in the
historiography of the Anglo-Boer War. Like the Irish famine, the devastation ofthe rinderpest has not
been fully assessed. As much as the Jameson Raid veiled the approaching pandemic, so the Boer War
obscured the changes it wrought".17
Rinderpest pandemic
Rinderpest is the common name for an acute to sub-acute, contagious viral disease of cattle and
wildlife. In the Cape of Good Hope Agricultural Journal of May 1896 it was described as "the most
23 Gronum, Transportry, Runderpes en Poskoetse, p83; CAR, AG 3500, List ofPersons residing in the Electoral
Division ofVryburg, whose names have been registered in 1899.
24. Jose Buunnan, Early Railways at the Cape, p140.
2' Gronum, Transportry, Runderpes en Poskoetse, pp90-99.
26Mark Buchanan, Ubiquity: the Science ofHistory ... Or Why the World is Simpler than we Think, pp86, 168.
27 Gutsche, There was a Man. pl04. Gives detailed observations on the spread of the rinderpest pandemic and
highlights the economic and social implications.
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virulent disease in the history of the world that appears principally in bovine species, in the form of a
rapidly spreading epidemic, and destroys all the animals in the region it attacks"." The disease is akin to
measles and canine distemper in dogs, and its mortality rate can exceed 90% at times. Endemic around
the Caspian Sea, outbreaks of rinderpest have been traced to as early as 4 BC, to slaughter cattle driven
behind armies on the march.29 The British Army were said to have brought infected cattle to Khartoum in
1884, the Italian Army to Eritrea in 1887 and a German military expedition brought sick cattle into East
Africa in 1889. The result was a catastrophic outbreak of rinderpest in the local cattle and vaste herds of
game. About 98% ofthe wildlife in East Africa was wiped out as Africa's cloven hoofed antelope species
also had no immunity to the disease. The disease reached the Zambezi in 1892, and began moving
westward into Angola.30 By 1895 the rinderpest pandemic crossed the Zambezi River and lurched
southwards, cutting a deadly swathe through Mashonaland and then Matebeleland.
In March 1896 Dr Arnold Theiler, a Transvaal veterinary surgeon, was ordered by President Paul
Kruger to Bulawayo to investigate alarming reports of widespread cattle deaths around Bulawayo. There
he met CE Gray, a trained veterinarian and together they confIrmed that the disease was rinderpest." The
epidemic soon spread south from Matabeleland via the transport oxen at a rate of twenty miles (32 lans) a
week into Bechuanaland. In the wake of the pandemic were scenes of devastation; hundreds of fully
loaded wagons were stranded, surrounded by thousands of stinking oxen lying dead, many still in their
traces. The wagon trail and environs reeked with the stench of dead animals. Only 10% of the oxen
survived. The shattered drivers, facing ruin as they had failed to deliver their loads, abandoned their
wagons to the veld and the scavengers and struggled back to Griqualand West on foot, to [md when they
reached home that the disease had gone before them and the stock on their farms was dying as well.
Overnight they were deprived not only of their income, transport and livelihood, but their meat, fat, butter
and sour milk, and the game for the pot had vanished as well. The economy was paralyzed. Hundreds of
colonists slid from being prosperous landowners to despised and landless poor whites overnight.
Mafeking and Vryburg were by far the hardest hit in the first wave of the epidemic as about 97%
of Colonial Bechuanaland cattle died; only 2,450 head of large stock survived in Mafeking. The Cape
Government promulgated the Rinderpest Act in July 1896, and introduced drastic quarantine and
stamping out measures, which created further hardship although the mortality rate of the cattle did drop
somewhat.32 In Barkly West 62%, or 26,374, cattle died, while Herbert and Hay districts lost 48%, or
28 CAR, Cape ofGood Hope, Agricultural Journal, 14 May 1896, Dr A Edington, 'Rinderpest', 18 April 1896.
29 CAR, Theiler, De Runderpest. Theiler pointed out that rinderpest was fIrst reported in 4 AD. It was fonnerly
usually referred to as 'the dreaded murrain. '
30 Rossiter, 'Rinderpest', in Infectious Diseases ofLivestock, pp735-757.
31 Gutsche, There was a Man, p84.
32 CAR, Cape of Good Hope Statutes and Indexes, IV, 1896-1900, pp361l-3613.
some 14,000 cattle, and Prieska lost 46%, or 4,983 head of cattle to the pandemic.33 Under the Animal
Diseases Act all districts in Griqualand West and Bechuanaland were placed in quarantine from
September or October 1896, a total of 70 districts or regions all over the Cape Colony were quarantined;
and this was only lifted in either April or May of 1898.34
In the Transvaal Kruger had issued a Proclamation on II March 1896 prohibiting the movement
of cattle into the Transvaal, but transport drivers, trying to reach their homes, carried rinderpest into
Zeerust.35 Gutsche stated, "Draconian laws were inflicted, and the wholesale destruction of infected
animals was ordered, with minimal compensation. Before the disease ran its course in Bechuanaland
Protectorate, blacks postponed death from starvation by eating caterpillars, bark, roots and long-decayed
corpses. The rinderpest raged uncontrollably, it was here that the Boer War was lost".36 Two thirds of the
cattle, or 1,002,297, and untold numbers of game, died in the Transvaal. Not an ox survived in the
Zoutpansberg. In the Waterberg people of all races, who had endured drought and swarms of locust,
starved or died of fever. The donkeys contracted foot rot and mules, anthrax. Horses succumbed to horse
sickness. Across the Transvaal animal-drawn transport was paralyzed in 1896 for many months.37
Transvaal Districts that suffered heavily included Lydenburg, Piet Retief, Rustenburg, Pretoria, and
Wolmaransstad.38 As the Transvaal Boers mainly grew tobacco and not vegetables the sudden loss of
cattle, game and dairy products, including animal fat, was a disaster for the rural population. The
quarantine and stamping out methods also caused a political revolt in Southern Rhodesia and further
south in the Langeberg. Blacks and whites blamed each other for the spread of the disease.39
Hastily erected fences stopped the movement of cattle and meat and protected the Orange Free
State and Natal until the disease broke through in 1897 and caused further havoc. Nicolson, writing in
1898, advised British immigrants not to come to the Transvaal. "The year 1897 has been of frightful
suffering to the poor Boers; thousands have lost everything from rinderpest, locust and drought. Hundreds
of these people have died of sheer starvation; thousands succumbed to fever and other diseases due to a
poor diet composed of wild roots. The quality of silent suffering is wonderfully developed in the Boer
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race".40
33 CAR, CCP 1/2/1/106, G72, Rinderpest statistics for Cape Colony, compiled May 1898.
34 Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, No 610 of 1898, 15 July 1898. Areas under Quarantine; Van Onselen,
'Reactions to Rinderpest in Sl>uthem Africa', pp473-488.
" CAR, Cape of Good Hope, Journal ofAgriculture, issues from April to December 1896 published articles on many
aspects ofilie pandemic.
36 Gutsche, There Was a Man, pp85, 87, 92.
37 Walker, A History ofSouthern Africa, p462. Quoted from British Parliamentary Papers, C9093.
38 British Intelligence, Military Notes on the Dutch Republtcs ofSouth Africa, pp58-66.
39 Gronum, Transportry Runderpes en Poskoetse, ppI15-128.
'" G Nicholson, Fifty Years in South Africa, pp235-236.
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The pandemic had moved south through Kimberley to the Orange River where it was halted by a
hastily erected 1,000-mile (1,609 km) fence. Although the barrier was breached in 1897, the 'bile' method
of immunization and then the serum-virus method developed by Dr Theiler and others, had resulted in the
inoculation of defibrinated blood from salted cattle into healthy herds, which reduced the high mortality.41
Once the serums became more effective only about 50% of infected cattle later died. The Graaff-Reinet
district was fortunate: about 2,000 cattle died from the 11,000 inoculated. The disease eventually reached
as far as Uniondale.42 The rinderpest killed over 500,000 cattle in the Cape Colony, mainly north of the
Orange River, and the Department of Agriculture spent £1,115,844 combating the pandemic. The districts
of Aliwal North, Colesberg, the Karoo, southern and eastern Cape and west of the Cape Town-De Aar
railway line were the least affected. Two thirds of the cattle in the Cape Colony survived, and from this
stock cattle herds bred up again.43
In the Cape Colony unrest due to the stringent quarantine enforced on the blacks led to three
tribal uprisings in Pokwane in the Langeberg in December 1896. Sir Gordon Sprigg the Prime Minster
immediately called out the Cape Mounted Riflemen under Col EH Dalgety to assist the Cape Police. The
Griqualand West Brigade and the Cape Volunteers, plus the burgher forces of Gordonia and Vryburg,
were in the field for six months and 1600 men were called out to do duty until August 1897.44
The result of the rinderpest pandemic in Griqualand West and Bechuanaland was that these rural
communities were reduced to a state of absolute poverty and many drifted to the gold fields and the
diamond diggings. In a report of April 1899 on Hay it was stated that the death rate had increased while
the birthrate had fallen following the pandemic. The population, suffering from malaria, influenza and
diarrhea, were trekking around trying to find grazing for their remaining livestock and the younger
members of the families were dying from lack of medical care.45
The depression that followed the rinderpest affected every facet of farming society from the
stockman to the man who made the whips the teamsters used. Many ruined and desperate men were angry
at the quarantine measures, angry with any official from the Cape Colony, and were ripe for rebellion. As
the talk of war in the Transvaal got louder, there were many bankrupt and desperate people who were
ready to grasp any straw.
41 CAR, The Cape of Good Hope, Government Gazette, No 971 of 1897, explains how to prepare defibrinated blood;
Rossiter, 'Rinderpest', in Infectious Diseases ofLivestock, II, p736.
42 Smith, Kenneth Wyndham, From Frontier to Midiands, A History ofthe Graaff-Reinet District, 1786-1910, p92;
CAR, Cape of Good Hope, Government Gazette, Notice 610 of 1898 lists divisions and portions of divisions
~uarantined from September 1896; George and ](nysna Herald, 26 January 1898.
4 CAR, CCP 112111106, Rinderpest Statistics of the Cape Colony, compiled May 18118. Report ofK Anderson.
44 CAR, Cape of Good Hope, Official Publications, CCP 112/1/10303, Final Report of Col EH Dalgety to Secretary
for Defence, October 1897; Dr HH Curson, The History ofthe Kimberley Regiment, pp140-141.
The customary causes of the South African War relating to political developments and
expansionistic Imperial policies, are listed in parliamentary papers, correspondence between the High
Commissioner and the Secretary of State at Whitehall, and in official correspondence between the
Imperial Powers and Presidents JSP Kruger of the South African Republic and Marthinus Steyn of the
Orange Free State.
A long-standing quarrel over Great Britain's claim to a right of suzerainty over the Transvaal's
internal affairs followed the first South African War of 1881. The discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand
in 1886 brought about a welcomed improvement in the economy of the once poverty-stricken Boer
Republic. Not so welcomed were the thousands of foreigners, known as Uitlanders who, though they
brought capital and enterprise to the Transvaal, were increasingly rejected by President Kruger for
interfering in his country's internal affairs.46 By 1894 the 70,000 Transvalers and Free Stater~ on the gold
fields were outnumbered by the 78,000 newcomers. Kruger feared that when these aliens were naturalized
the Boers would loose control of the government. The result was that the Valksraad extended the
naturalization procedures from two to an effective fourteen years.47 The issue of the Uitlanders' voting
rights became a fertile source of tension between a group of immigrants and the Transvaal Government.48
Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1895, was determined to maintain
British interests and pressed the Transvaal for franchise reform. At the same time the so-called
'Reformers', a group of Johannesburg businessmen, dissatisfied with the franchise laws and the dynamite
monopoly, schemed to overthrow the Kruger Government. They turned to Rhodes, the Cape Prime
Minister and head of the British South Africa Charter Company, who had ambitious plans for Great
Britain to be the dominant force in Africa. At New Year in 1896 Dr Leander Jameson led 500 Rhodesian
Mounted Police into the Transvaal from the Bechuanaland Border on Rhodes' instigation to support a
rising. The Reformers wavered at the last moment, and Jameson's force surrendered ignominiously to a
Boer commando under General Petrus Cronje. The Raid was seen as "one of the most notorious incidents
in the history of the British Empire", and cast doubts on the good faith of the British Government towards
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The Jameson Raid and political causes of the South African War
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45 CAR, CCP 1/2/1/106 A 67 -1899, Agricultural distress in Griqualand West; CAR, CCP 1/2/1/106, G 72 ofl898,
Rinderpest Statistics.
46 1Smith, The Origins ofthe South African War, pp45, 173; De Kiewiel, A History ofSouth Africa, p1l9.
47 Scheepers Strydom, Kaapland en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, p21; AN Porter, The Origins ofthe South African
War, pp125-131.
48 ET Cook, The Rights and Wrongs ofthe Transvaal War, pl6 states that citizenships could be obtained in the
Orange Free State after two years, but in the Cape Colony it was required only to take the oath and go through a few
formalities to become a British citizen.
the Transvaal, which reacted by arming itself. It thrust men into opposing camps, justifying their
prejudices and confirming their antagonisms.49 As a notable cause of the South African War, the Jameson
Raid has ridden deep ruts in South African history.5o
When the news of the Raid reached the Cape Colony, Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, the moderate
Afrikaner Bond leader who had enjoyed a long-standing political alliance with Rhodes, was shocked at
Rhodes' fraudulent dealings and broke with him when he refused to repudiate Jameson.51 Rhodes
resigned from the British South Africa Charter Company and as Cape Premier, but the damage was done.
An inquiry into the conspiracy revealed little, though Joseph Chamberlain's name was cleared, but
suspicion lingered that many leading politicians from the Colonial Secretary to the Cape Governor, Sir
Hercules Robinson, were either implicated in some way or had prior knowledge of the impending raid.
An impression spread that the Imperial Government was aware of an imminent rebellion and regretted its
failure. 52
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After the raid President Kruger got what he had been calling for smce 1886 - an
offensive/defensive alliance with the Orange Free State. The OFS Government had previously turned the
request down as a defensive alliance already existed. Fraser, Chairman of the Free State Volksraad, said
Kruger cherished bitter hostility towards Great Britain, but because the OFS was a small republic, they
wanted to remain at peace with the Cape Colony. Under the leadership of President Steyn however, not
only was an offensive alliance granted to the Transvaal, but the Free State also gave protocol to a political
alliance and placed their burghers at the disposal of the South African Republic. Fraser saw it as a
betrayal of their State, and said that it could only end in its destruction.53
In the wake of the Rhodes debacle, Sir Gordon Sprigg, a progressive Kaffrarian, was asked to
form a new ministry in the Cape, and took office in a Legislature wracked with animosity. In May 1897
Sir Alfred Milner, newly appointed Governor of the Cape Colony and High Commissioner, arrived at the
Cape. His appointment was received with much acclaim.54
49 De Kiewiet, A History ofSouth Africa, pl30; Walker, A History ofSouthern Africa, pp454-460.
so Smith, The Origins ofthe South African War, pp70-100; Amery (ed), The Times History ofthe War in South Africa
1899-1902,1, ppI62-193; ProfCFJ Muller (ed), 500 Years, A History ofSouth Africa, p192; GL Kepper, Zuid
Afrikaansche Oorlog Historisch Gedenkboek, p55.
" Hofineyr, JH, in collaboration with Senator the Hon FW Reitz, The Life ofJan Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze Jan), p499.
52 Tamarkin, Cecil Rhodes and the Cape Afrikaner, p239; Phyllis Lewsen, John X Merriman, Paradoxical South
African Statesman, pp173-6; Deryck Schreuder and Jeffrey Butler, Sir Graham Bower's Secret History ofthe
Jameson Raid and the South African Crisis, 1895-1902, Van Riebeeck Society, 11-33, pp95, makes pointed
references to the whitewashing ofChamberlain and Sir Hercules Robinson.
" John George Fraser, Episodes in my Life, pp84, Ill, 113, 121, 187,205,210,218; SF Malan, Die Rol van J aeo
Fraser in die Vrystaat, 1863-1927, Archives Year Book 1974, pp272-273.
54 Porter, The Origins ofthe South African War, p138; Lord Selboume, Under Secretary for the Colonies described
Milner, .as the best man in the British Empire for the toughest job in the British Empire'.
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Prior to the Jameson Raid the colonists in the Cape had united in condemning Kruger's economic
policies, which excluded the Cape from the lucrative Transvaal trade. In 1895 Kruger attempted to divert
traffic to the recently opened railway line from Delagoa Bay to the Witwatersrand by raising tariffs on the
Cape Colony lines. When merchants refused to use the railway and went back to wagons as carriers,
Kruger closed the drifts over the Vaal River, which they were using. Rhodes, the Colonial Premier,
backed by Chamberlain and supported by the Cape Attorney General, William Philip Schreiner, sent an
ultimatum to the SA Republic, who gave way, creating an impression that they would acquiesce under
pressure in the future. 55 When Milner arrived in the Cape he found the English and Afrikaner now
divided, shocked by the Jameson Raid and the allegations of corruption, which tainted the once admired
Cecil Rhodes.56 Milner spent a year travelling around and listening to people and then consulted the
Secretary of State, Joseph Chamberlain, in London. Returning to the Cape he made a pointed statement
that the Transvaal should adopt a constitution at least as liberal as that of the Free State in order to end
interstate friction. 57
The Progressive Party lost the next election, fIrst in the Cape Legislature in which two political
parties opposed one another and Sprigg resigned. William Philip Schreiner, leader of the newly formed
South African Party, became the new Cape Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary. John X Merriman
became treasurer and JW Sauer Commissioner of Lands. Dr TNG te Water, a leading Bondsman, was
Minister Without Portfolio, as was AJ Herholdt, who was Secretary for Agriculture. Richard Solomon, an
Independent, became Attorney General.58 They were a mixed group untried and divided from the outset,
and only Te Water and Herholdt were members of the Afrikaner Bond. This ministry though was referred
to as a Bond Government, because, due to its rural support, the Afrikaner Bond was in the driving seat.59
Schreiner, brother of the famous writer, Olive Schreiner, and brother-in-law of Frank W Reitz,
Secretary to the South African Republic, had strong ties with the Afrikaner community and was closely
associated with Hofmeyr, leader of the Afrikaner Bond. Van Heyningen remarked that William Schreiner
and Alfred Milner were both idealists with ~trong convictions.6o However Schreiner was indecisive and
impractical. JT Molteno, who knew him, said he had a unique ethical and metaphysical outlook on life
55 Smith, The Origins 0/the South African War, p62; Schreuder and Butler, Sir Graham Bower's Secret History 0/
the Jameson Raid and the South African Crisis, p56.
56 Van Heyningen, The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner and WP Schreiner's Ministry 1899-1900, pp203-204.
57 Walker, A History o/Southern Africa, p474.
58 Walker, A History o/Southern Africa, p473.
59 Kepper, Zuid Afrikaansche Oorlog Historisch Gedenkboek, p55 stated, 'De verkiezen van 1898 in de Kaap-ko1onie
waren voor de Afrikanerpaerlij een overwinning'.
60 Van Heyningen, The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner and WP Schreiner's Ministry, 1898-1900, p206.
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and his vision was obscured by mysticism. He was also cocksure and so certain that he was right that he
would never admit that he might be wrong on any occasion, he said.61
As Milner revealed his innate hostility to the Kruger Government and his determination that
British paramountcy should prevail, tensions rose between Milner and Schreiner.62 The crisis between
Great Britain and the Kruger Government had deepened over British demands for franchise reform in the
Transvaal. Milner warned Schreiner, in April 1899, that the situation in the Transvaal had become
intolerable, and that he would do anything in his power to prevent the opportunity passing without
attaining radical reforms. Schreiner feared that the continued intervention of the British Government in
the affairs of the SA Republic would lead to disaster:'
On the suggestion of Merriman and the Chief Justice, Sir John Henry de Villiers, Schreiner
suggested a conference between President Kruger and the High Commissioner to resolve the contentious
Uitlander voting rights. There was widespread anxiety about holding such a meeting, and De Villiers
wrote to President Steyn, hoping to keep the peace, and urged him to bring his influence to bear on
Milner.64 However the Trarisvaal Volksraad had already voted to shelve the publication of a draft
amendment to the franchise that Kruger wanted to have published for public consideration for a year -
even before the start of the conference.65 Consequently the five-day Bloemfontein Conference, which
maintained the status quo, was condemned a failure, but blame was heaped on Milner's shoulders whose
manner towards President Kruger had been cold and arrogant.66 Worse still the meeting coincided with
the publication of a Blue Book that was virtually a declaration of intent by the British Government. It
contained Milner's 'helot' dispatch, which maintained that the case for intervention was overwhehning,
as well as Chamberlain's reply to the Uitlander petition, which contained a vigorous indictment of the
Transvaal administration:'
Steyn dispatched a large order to Germany for Mausers and cartridges, and an amendment to
Ordinance No 6 (Military Service) was proposed in the Free State Volksroad that, because medical
certificates were often obtained by those who wished to escape commando duty, they should be strictly
61 JT Molteno, The Dominion ofAfrikanderdom, pp39-40.
62 Hofmeyr, The Life ofJan Hendrik Hofmeyr (Onze Jan), p530.
63 Van Heyningen, The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner and WP Schreiner's Ministry, 1898-1900, p222.
64 EA Walker, Lord De Villiers and his Times: South Africa 1842-1914, p337, Letter from De Villiers to President
Steyn.
6' Midland News and Karoo Farmer, 25 May 1899. Franchise debate in Volksraad, proposals Shelved for a year.
66 Smith, The Origins ofthe South African War, pp272-89; NJ van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn. 'n
Lewensbeskrywing, II, pp 163-193; Van Heyningen, The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner and WP Schreiner's
Ministry, 1898-1900, p227.
67 Van Heyningen, The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner and WP Schreiner's Ministry, 1898-1900, p229.
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monitored as "war clouds are hanging over US".68 The German Official History estimated that the SA
Republic alone had a reserve of 80,000 rifles and 80 million cartridges, of which 25 million were known
to have come through Delagoa Bay, and the remainder through colonial ports to the republics:9
An alarmed Natal cabinet submitted a strong minute to Chamberlain on 17 June, offering their
help in trying to prevent a war, while Schreiner only asked the Governor verbally on II June 1899 to
inform Chamberlain that the offer about the franchise made by President Kruger was practical, reasonable
and a considerable step in the right direction.70
A tremor ofnervousness went through the Colony, and pleas appeared in the press asking that the
opening of parliament in July 1899 be delayed so as not to embarrass the two contending parties in the
negotiations." Sections of the colonial press were alarmed that Schreiner appeared to be intervening in
international affairs and advised him "to keep out of the quarrel as everybody knows the usual results that
flow from that... as it needs little to provoke warlike measures".72 Would Schreiner, with little or no
diplomatic skills and less knowledge of strategy, weather the crisis? It was not to be. His statement in the
South African News sent further shock waves rippling out; "This Government is convinced that no
grounds whatever exist for active interference in the internal concerns of the republic". The Cape Times
pointed out the anomaly in a leader stating that the Cape Cabinet had thrown itself into active opposition
to Sir Alfred Milner in his role of High Commissioner, while it remained in accord with him in his other
role as Governor of the Cape of Good Hope. The Oudtshoorn Courant warned that a critical position in
colonial politics had been reached." Chamberlain considered the situation sufficiently dangerous to
contemplate the possibility of dismissing the Schreiner ministry and dissolving parliament. When he
contacted Milner, he found he was unwilling to break with the Schreiner ministry because he thought that
a new ministry would produce a cabinet very like the present one.74
At this critical point the experienced Merriman, who had been a parliamentarian for two decades,
fell strangely silent and did nothing. A Davey referred later to Merriman's 'sensitive conscience' relating
to his membership of the Schreiner ministry at the outbreak of the war. Merriman wrote to Lord De
Villiers years later and said he regretted that he did not take the bold step of resigning.75
68 Van der Merwe, Marthinus Theunis Steyn, pp 191-195, Resolution by the Orange Free State Volksraad 7-6-1899;
The Midland News, 8 June 1899, 'Free State Road keeps its cool'.
69 General Staff; Berlin, The German Official Account ofthe War in South Africa, Translation by Col WHH Waters,
I, October 1899 to February 1900, p20.
70 Lewsen, John X Merriman, Paradoxical South African Statesman, p21O.
71 Oudtshoorn Courant, 22 June 1899.
72 Oudtshoorn Courant, 22 June 1899, Leader.
" Cape Times, 11 July 1899; Oudtshoorn Courant, 10 July 1899, Leader pages.
74 C Headlam (ed), The Milner Papers, South Africa, 1897-1902, I, p461.
75 Arthur Davey, The British Pro-Boers, 1877-1902, pl04, JH de Villiers Papers, Merriman-Lord de Villiers, 9
January 1916.
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Schreiner now detennined to keep the Cape Colony out of the war proposed to Milner that the
Colony should not be used as a base for operations against the Transvaal provided they did not invade the
Cape Colony. Milner pointed out that in the event of war the fighting would then be confined to the
northern borders of Natal (who had requested military reinforcements to guard its northern border), and
the Imperial and colonial forces had to be under a single command.76
Walker and Van Heyningen emphasize Schreiner's dealings with Milner and his attempts to
soften the Governor's strident attitude towards the SA Republic and keep the peace. However the
measures he took to undennine the defenses of the Cape Colony have not been examined in depth.
Schreiner and the Cape Colonial forces
Commando service in the Cape of Good Hope had a long history. Gilomee states that as early as
1739 in the Dutch East India Company period, it was compulsory for every burgher with an interest in the
outlying districts to do commando service." When the Colonial Government drifted into the Frontier War
of 1877 the commando system, according to Walker, had "become rusty, it had no transport, supplies or
regulations for controlling volunteers".78 A power struggle over the control of the colonial forces resulted
in the Governor, Sir Bartle Frere, dismissing Sir John Molteno, the Colony's first Premier under
Responsible Government. According to Wilmot, Frere took exception to the interference of John X
Merriman in military affairs.79 From then on Merriman, bitterly resented Imperial interference in colonial
affairs."O
Frere then turned to Gordon Sprigg, a Kaffrarian, and asked him to fonn the next ministry. He
promulgated in 1878 the 'Peace Preservation Act' and 'The Burgher Force and Levies Act' but these acts
stated that colonial troops could only be called out by the Governor "acting by and with the advice of
Executive Council"."!
In 1899 the Cape Colony had a first class colonial defenses; trained soldiers, field guns, excellent
officers, arms and ammunition. The standing regiment the Cape Mounted Riflemen, the successors to the
Frontier Police, fielded 928 men and was a crack British regiment in all but name, ran its own recruiting
office in London. It was pennanently stationed in Umtata and Kokstad to keep the peace on the Eastern
76 E Walker, WP Schreiner, A South African, p176.
77 Hennann Giliomee, The Afrikaners, p59.
78 Walker, A History ofSouthem Africa, pp 369,371.
79 Wihnol, The Life and Times ofSir Richard Southey, pp294-297, Frere called Merriman an irresponsible military
dictator in a letterto Southey on 6 February 1878.
80 Lewsen, John X Merriman, Paradoxical South African Statesman, pp76-77. Merriman entered politics as member
for Aliwal North in 1869 and eventually became Cape Prime Minister in 1908.
81 CAR, Cape ofGood Hope Statutes, Act 7 of 1878, ppI546-1555.
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frontier and to do policing duties. It was armed with Martini-Henry carbines and rifles. The artillery
section fielded eight 7-pdr-field guns, three 12-pdr-field guns and six machine guns. However this
regiment fell under the control of the Prime Minister's Office and they were called out on his direct
orders.82 The 26 Volunteer Corps had an authorized strength of 3,703 all ranks and the Cape Garrison
Artillery fielded eight 7-pdr field guns and twelve 3-pdr guns. The 900 strong Cape Police fell under the
control of the Secretary of the Law Department. Act 32 of 1892 and its Amendment in 1893 had
consolidated the defense of the Cape Colony. Under the act any portion of the colonial forces should be
deemed to be on active service when it was called out under the Act for service against the enemy or for
service in a country or place wholly or partly occupied by an enemy. Training camps for Volunteers and
Rifle Clubs also fell under military service.83
In addition to the Cape Volunteers there were 26 Mounted Rifle Clubs with an enrolled strength
of 2,500, and 30 Cadet Corps with an enrolled strength of 2,189.84 Finally under the 'Burgher Force and
Levies Act' all the able-bodied men between eighteen and 50 years were liable for commando duty in
times of emergency. The Field Comet of each of the six wards in the division had to supply a list to the
magistrate annually." As recently as 1897 the Cape Mounted Riflemen and Colonial Volunteers saw
active service in Griqualand West during the Pokwane rebellion and earlier in the Warren expedition of
1896. 86
All through 1899 the Schreiner Ministry, convinced that the Transvaal cause was just, blocked
Milner's preparation in case of war, by delaying military manreuvres and holding up the acquisition of
arms." Merriman clearly supported Schreiner, and in March 1899 was in dispute with the Knysna
Rangers. Although he was Colonial treasurer he refused to pay the funds voted by Parliament for the
Volunteer's Easter camp. The Rangers were convinced he was trying to provoke them into disbanding.88
Merriman was convinced that if the Cape Ministry remained neutral in case of war, the frontier
farmers would not rise in rebellion and join the Boer forces. He visited Dordrecht on 6 May 1899 and
stated, "The Bond is the chief supporter of the SA Party, which, as a government in power, relies on the
Bond for its support. As the Bond members are farmers they will prove to be the last people in the world
82 CAR, CCP 10/15, Cape of Good Hope, Statistical Register ofColonial Forcesfor 1898, Cape Mounted Riflemen
and Volunteers, p24.
83 Cape of Good Hope, Statutes, The Colonial Forces Amendment Act, Act 4 of 1893, under which the Cape
Mounted Riflemen could act both as a military and a police forces.
84 CAR, Cape of Good Hope, Statistical Register, 1898, p24.
" CAR, Cape of Good Hope, Statutes, Act 7 of 1878, pp1546.
86 Curson, The History ofthe Kimberley Regiment, ppI18-119.
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to be revolutionaries".89 If Schreiner and Merriman thought that the Dutch farmer would fit into their
flabby stereotype and stay at home and plough, they were in for a surprise.
However Schreiner was quite aware of the risk he was running. He wrote to Sir Henry de Villiers
and said it was possible that British Territory would be attacked and that the Cape Colony should help
repel such an attack, he said. However he had decided, "the labouring oar must be the Imperial
Government as they [the Cape Colony] were not equal to taking up such a quarrel":o
At the opening of Parliament in July 1899 Schreiner stated that he did not expect an attack on the
Colony by the SA Republic, neither did he fear a so-called Native rising:! Not so many colonists; as there
was a public outcry when it came to light that large quantities of arms were passing through through the
Cape to the Orange Free State. The Cape Times 14 July stated that the Cape, a British colony, was
allowing its ports to remain open for in transit arms shipments to the Dutch Republics. Lewsen states that
under a customs convention the Cape could not interfere with the passage of armaments over the Cape
Railways to the Free State:2 However Gordon Sprigg, leader of the Opposition, stated on 28 August 1899
that in the present circumstances the Cape Ministry was justified in suspending shipments.93 While
Schreiner made various disclaimers on the passage of arms to the republics to the north, but he also tabled
a defense budget in Parliament in July 1899 that was almost half the previous estimates; £12,000 less was
to be spent on ordnance and arms; £9,000 less on the Cape Mounted Riflemen; £50,000 less on the
Colonial Volunteers:4 What was not widely known was that the colonial government held fairly large
consi~ents of Martini-Henry rifles with the correct caliber ammunition, as well as Lee-Metford
ammunition was stored in magazines in towns along the colonial border in the charge of the local
magistrate. These towns included Vryburg, Lady Grey, Aliwal North, Barkly East and Douglas.
Events were moving so quickly that apart from the Opposition under Sir Gordon Sprigg, nobody
openly opposed Schreiner except Col David Harris of the Griqualand West Command in Kimberley, who
was certain that the Boers were going to fight and was determined not to surrender the diamond industry
to the republican forces without firing a shot. Convinced in 1896 that war was inevitable, he had
persuaded the De Beers Company to buy a battery of six maxims and 750 Lee-Metfords, plus
89 George and Knysna Herald, 17 May 1899, 'Merriman at Dordrecht'; Lewsen, John X Merriman, Paradoxical
South African Statesman, p207, refers only to Merriman's Wodehouse visit stating that that political feeling seemed
much quieter in this area.
90 Walker, Lord de Villiers and his Times, p363. Letter from Schreiner to De Villiers.
91 Midland News, 18 July 1899, 'The Estimates'.
92 Lewsen, John X Merriman; Paradoxical South African Statesman, p213.
93 Oudtshoorn Courant, 31 August 1899, 'Parliament. Ammunition Question'.
94 Midland News, 18 July 1899, 'The Estimates'.
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ammunition, and also organized a survey of the town's defensive capacity." In 1897 he warned the
Colonial Defence Commission that the adjoining Republic's armaments were far superior to local
artillery, but nothing was done.9"
The Mayor of Kimberley then telegraphed Schreiner on 12 June 1899 saying that the they were
hoping that hostilities would be averted, but in the meanwhile they and the surrounding country were
defenseless. He requested that the rifles, ammunition, artillery and a battery originally earmarked for
Kimberley in the Government store in King William's Town, be consigned to Griqualand West as a
matter of urgency. Schreiner refused permission, dismissing Kimberley's fears of war as groundless. The
Mayor persisted and pointed out ·that sending the munitions would allay local unrest and insecurity.
Schreiner replied shortly that he could not consider Kimberley's views or meet their wishes.97 At Douglas
Assistant Magistrate S Tilney had 18,000 rounds of Lee-Metford, plus 3,000 rounds of Martini-Henry
ammunition in the local magazine belonging to the Cape Police. Tilney was refused permission to move
the cartridges to safety. He even applied to blow the magazine up, but this was turned down because he
would magnify the danger of war:' Suspicions grew that the Boer forces were going to invade shortly
when a detachment of Transvaal Artillery was seen inspecting the Vaal Bridge north of the city."
Nothing could apparently dissuade Schreiner and his ministry from their appeasement policy, and
the Kimberley people said openly "that the party in power favoured the republican forces" .100 While
Pakenham argues that the conduct of the war was hampered by the British not taking the Boer forces
serio~sly, 101 Schreiner could not or would not realize that all the charming Free Staters he had met on this
or that state occasion were now his possible enemies, and would certainly not take him seriously.
Harris then appealed directly to Milner, who realized it would be a political disaster if the
diamond industry fell into Boer hands. As High Commissioner he ordered Lieut-Col R Kekewich, the CO
ofthe First Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, to Kimberley with a half battalion of the regiment, as well
as gunners and engineers. He was appointed Lieutenant Colonel of colonial forces and Commandant of
Colonial Volunteers in Griqualand West and Bechuanaland on 20 September for defensive purposes
only.102 Milner then insisted Schreiner co-sign the proclamation calling out the volunteers and only six
days before war broke out The Diamond Fields Artillery, Diamond Fields Horse, Kimberley Regiment,
9' Curson, The History ofthe Kimberley Regiment, p145; Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede
Vryheidsoorlog, II, pp361-362.
96 CCP, Resume ofDefence Commission of 1896-1897 (G7 of 1897).
97 Mafeking Mail, Special Siege Slips, 30 April 1900. 'How Kimberley was deserted by the Cape Government'.
98 CAR, CCP 1/2/1/111 Magistrate's report of the Invasion of the Cape Colony by Free State forces.
.. MidlandNews, 27 June 1899.
100 Curson, The History ofthe Kimberley Regiment, p145.
101 Pakenham, The Boer War, p77.
102 CAR, Cd 43, p237, Enclosure 19 in No 99.
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Bechuanaland Rifles and Vryburg Mounted Rifles were mobilized - many weeks after the Boer republics
had raised their forces. Schreiner eventually gave permission that the Kimberley, Modder and Orange
River railway bridges were to be guarded. 103 He issued a strict order, though, that no civil servant be
allowed to defend Kimberley by joining the Kimberley Town Guards or the Volunteers. 104
In early September alarming news spread to Mafeking from the neighbouring Transvaal villages
that arms and ammunition were being distributed by the Field Cornets to the local burghers. The Mayor, F
Whiteley, called a public meeting on 8 September and it was decided that if the Government supplied the
rifles about 500 to 600 colonists could guard the border. lOs When Schreiner ignored their pleas for arms
Whiteley turned to Col RSS Baden-Powell, who had arrived in Bechuanaland in July 1899 and appealed
to him to raise a force in the Protectorate and Rhodesia to defend Mafeking. When Baden-Powell
received permission from the Colonial Government to guard his supplies stored in the town, he moved
into Mafeking with the Protectorate Regiment. By the time war broke out he had built a defensive
perimeter and organized a force of 1,183 men to guard it. They consisted of the British South Africa
Police, the Cape Police, Sechuanaland Rifles and the staff on the railways became the Railway
Contingent. The civilians were organized into the Town Guard and the Cape Boy contingent. The 'Black
Watch' and a Baralong contingent eventually reached about 500 men. Julius Weil's stores in the town
were carrying a large quantity of in-transit goods intended for Matabeleland. He ordered more stock and
eventually supplied over 16,000 tons offood, grain and fodder to the military. 106
For the rest a small detachment of Cape Police was stationed in Vryburg, and the Volunteer Force
of 75 Vryburg Mounted Rifles was called out, while a Maxim gun arrived on 9 October as armament to
defend the town. IO? No attempt was made to defend the Griqualand West villages of Douglas, Campbell,
Postrnasburg, Griquastad or Kuruman from invasion. The only things they received were official
proclamations from the Colonial Government urging them to stay loyal. 108
As the colonists realized that the republicans were arming, public meetings were also held in
Vryburg, Queenstown, Aliwal North, Herschel and Modder River wher.e they all appealed in vain for help
103 Lewsen, John X Merriman, Paradoxical South African Statesman, p213; Curson, The History ofthe Kimberley
Regiment. p145; Cape ofOood Hope Government Gazette, No 2581899,5 October; Walker, WP Schreiner, A South
African, p191.
104 Oudtshoorn Times, 12 October 1899, ·Kimberley'.
lOS The Midland News, 31 August 1899, 'Mafeking agitated'; Colesberg Advertiser and Afrikaansche Boerevriend, 8
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106 B Willan (ed), Edward Ross, Diary ofthe Siege ofMafeking, October 1899-May 1900, p8.
107 CAR, Cape ofOood Hope, Debates ofthe House ofAssembly, 1899, p317; Amery (ed), The Times History ofthe
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from their Government to defend them from invasion. 109 Milner, who was no soldier and suspicious of the
Afrikaners, was expecting a quick and easy victory when reinforcements from England arrived. He did
not take Schreiner's lack of action seriously. Everybody in the ministry seemed oblivious to the reality
that there were too few British forces in South Africa and if the Cape Mounted Riflemen and the
Volunteers were not in the field when war broke out, there would be nothing to stop a commando
crossing the border and recruiting colonists, particularly the Cape Afrikaner, who would be obvious
targets for the Boers. 110
The hnperial Authorities took control of the Colonial Forces on 7 October. Schreiner fmally co-
signed the proclamation under the Colonial Forces Act of 1892 provided that the volunteers were called
out only for the defence of the districts in which they were enrolled. By this move Schreiner stopped the
Colonies own forces from defending the frontiers. The Cape Mounted Riflemen remained standing at
Queenstown, Cofimvaba and Lady Frere until the arrival of Gen Sir Redvers Buller in South Africa. The
Cape Garrison Artillery, Prince Alfred's Own Cape Artillery, the Duke of Edinburgh Own Volunteer
Rifles, Cape Highlanders, 'B' Coy of Cape Medical Staff Corps, Prince Alfred's Volunteer Guard, Port
Elizabeth, First City (Grahamstown Volunteers), Queenstown Rifle Volunteers and the Frontier Mounted
Rifles (Cathcart) had to wait until a senior British officer arrived and superseded Schreiner. Walter
Stanford, Head of Native Affairs had repeatedly assured Schreiner and Milner that black policy would be
to watch events and not take sides. It made rjO difference; Schreiner was not releasing troops to defend the
colony from invasion. I II It was said that Schreiner was "mesmerized into a feeling of false security" and
amazed General Sir Redvers Buller complained that "Schreiner just stood and did nothing, his
Government folded its arms and allowed rebellion to walk unchecked".112
Consequently the First City Regiment (Marshalls Horse) only left Grahamstown 420 strong at the
end of November, while the 522 strong Prince Alfred's Guard was kept in camp on the Port Elizabeth
Racecourse until as late as 2 December 1899.113 The Dukes (Duke of Edinburgh Own Volunteer Rifles)
who had mobilized 652 all ranks on 16 October stationed at Matjesfontein, south of Beaufort West, to
guard the railway lineY4 Schreiner refused to allow Lee-Metfords in the stores to be issued to the
109 Cape Times Weekly Edition, 18 October 1899.
110 Amery (ed), The Times History, II, pliO.
III Basil Willams, Record ofthe Cope Mounted Riflemen, p59; Grocott 's Daily Mail Weekry War Summary, 23
March 1900, for comment on !he CMR; JW Macquarrie (ed), The Reminiscences ofSir Walter Stanford, Van
Riebeeck Society 1I-43, p201.
112 Cape of Good Hope, House of Assembly, 1902. Statement by Dr TW Smartt of Ca!hcart during a debate on !he
role of Afrikaner Bond, p25; Van Heyningen, The Relations between Sir Alfred Milner and WP Schreiner's Ministry,
1898-1900, p262.
113 CAR, Cape of God Hope Government Gazette, 17 October 1899; R Griffiths, First City, A Saga ofService, p64;
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114 A McKenzie, The History ofthe Duke ofEdinburgh's Own Rifles, pp40-44.
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Volunteers and announced that Maj HT.Tamplin, OC of First City Volunteers since 1896, had been
retired. 115
After war was declared the Mayor of Grahamstown, Henry Wood, and others called on the Prime
Minister on 24 October 1899 to guard his borders, saying that Aliwal North could be defended as there
were plenty of 'Easterns' [presumably Colonial Volunteers] ready to prevent the republican forces
entering the Colony. Schreiner referred the matter to the General Officer Commanding. Nothing
happened.1I6
Consequently the Cape Police and the Volunteer forces in Mafeking and Kimberley were the only
colonial forces on active service during the first month of the war. 117 The Cape Colony's border with the
Transvaal became an open frontier controlled by the republicans, except for two islands of resistance at
Kimberley and Mafeking. Meanwhile the Volunteers remained in training camps, drawing full pay.
That the Cape colonies borders were purposely left undefended by its own Government been
disregarded historically, just as the rebellion of the Dutch-speaking colonists during the invasion by
republican forces has been taken for granted. If the republican forces had been met with strong opposition
from the Cape Garrison Artillery and the Cape Mounted Rifles' artillery at the borders, and if the Cape
Colony had a resolute Premier at this critical period other than the quixotic Schreiner, the war would have
taken another course and the rebellion would have been a damp squib.
The situation
\.
By May 1899 war was already a possibility and was referred to in the newspapers as 'the
situation'. Thousands of foreigners were leaving the Witwatersrand for the Cape and Natal and by
October the fleeing refugees had became a flood. D Carmack quoted from Isabella Lip's description of a
trainload of refugees. "So away they went, poor souls, enduring great hardships on the journey to a place
of refuge in British territory - packed like sardines in carriages".1I8
Schreiner appeared to be alone in his conviction that the long drawn out crisis would not end in
war. His sister, Olive, wrote in June 1899 that war could be justified "if by no other means can we
preserve our own life and freedom from a stronger power, or defend a weaker state or individuals from
II' Grocotts Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 18 November 1899, 'Correspondence'; CAR, Cape of Good Hope
Government Gazette, 31 October 1899.
116 Cape of Good Hope, Official Publications, Telegram C 19-1903.
II? Williams, The Record ofthe Cape Mounted Riflemen, p59.II' Diana Canunack, The Rand at War 1899-1902, The Witwatersrand & the Anglo-Boer War, p57, quoting an extract
from Isabella Lipp, 'My diary: fact fiction and fancy'.
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the stronger".119 Colonial newspapers all reflected increased concern that hostilities might break out. The
Queenstown Daily Representative reported from The Star on I July that the Transvaal Government was
making preparations for all eventualities: Schalk Burger, JC Smuts and D Wolmarans were buying up
large quantities of foodstuffs and several thousand p<:mnds of tinned provisions.'20 An example of the
worry of the ordinary colonist: on 19 August 1899, a Graaff-Reinet fanner, Thomas Murray of
Roodebloem, wrote in his page-a-day diary, "The war news with the Transvaal is serious and it seems as
ifthere must be war now".'21
Not all refugees fled to the Cape or Natal. In August 1899 refugees from Krugersdorp arrived at
Mafeking and warned them that the Veld Cornet in Malmani Ward was distributing anns and ammunition
to burghers.122 Groups ofpeople began arriving in Mafeking from the Free State, saying they were coming
to defend the honour ofthe old flag. 123 Kimberley was also crowded with refugees from the Transvaal and
the Orange Free State.124
There was a feverish purchasing of horses, mules and oxen in the Transvaal, and the newspapers
detailed the profits the contractors were making on bullocks being sold to the Transvaal Government.
Stock fairs were held all over the Free State, including one at Edenburg on 20 September.12S
The confusion reigning on the Cape Colony's borders was of strategic advantage to the Boer
leaders. While members of the Transvaal forces were veterans of tribal wars, the Free State had not been
at war for over 40 years. The Boer forces were largely a burgher force, commandeered in time of war, and
an initial series of bloodless victories just over the border on colonial territory would be an immense
morale builder.
Hofmeyr had warned both houses of the SA Republic's Volksraad in July that there would be no
general rising and anned assistance from the Cape. They were British subjects, he said, and many had
sworn allegiance to the Queen.126 Far more exciting for the Transvaalers were rumours that the colonial
Afrikaner was being recruited for the Boer forces at secret meetings. Free State leaders were also
spreading exaggerated reports. Elias Grobler of the Orange Free State Volksraad sent an inflated report to
Steyn on 8 August 1899. He had gone to Colesberg to gather intelligence and wrote that people there had
119 Midland News and Karoo Farmer, 2 Jooe 1899, 'Word in Season. An English South African's View of the
Situation' .
120 Queenstown Daily Representative, 1 July 1899, repeated from The Star.
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asked the Free State "to proclaim us or make a start", and they were "ready to stand shoulder to shoulder
to throw off the English yoke. Forty thousand Cape Afrikaners promised to support the Republics", he
wrote. 127
Because of family ties over the border, the Cape Afrikaner was an obvious ally for the Boers, but
the hoped for 40,000 recruits (equivalent to the total white population of Griqualand West in 1904) were
to prove a dream and a delusion. Steyn also announced that once Kimberley was captured large numbers
of Afrikaner sympathizers in the northern Cape would join them. 128 Magistrates also reported to the Law
Department in August 1899 that that rumours had spread that the Free State Government planned to
commandeer colonists as Free State burghers, blow up bridges and capture the Cape Colony. The sale of
rifles had gone up but remained very modest for those supposedly rumoured to be on the brink of
rebellion. In Colesberg rifle sales increased from ten to 64 in 1899, at Burghersdorp sales went up from a
modest three in 1898 to thirteen in 1899, at Barkly East sixteen more rifles were sold compared to the
eight of 1898. 129
A pamphlet appeared in the Northern Post and Border News in September 1899 that wamed that
only a Boer victory would save the Afrikaner culture from being wiped out by the English. BJ Viljoen,
later Combat General and author of this propaganda, aimed at filling the Cape Afrikaner with uncertainty
and dread. He claimed that it was only due to the existence of the two independent Afrikaner republics
that the Afrikaner in the English colonies was still recognized and tolerated; that British paramountcy was
threat~ned by the victory of the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape Colony; that if the republics fell into the
hands of England, the Boers in the Cape Colony and Natal would be disarmedYo The pamphlet's true
value was probably to reinforce the convictions of those who intended joining the Boer forces, as it
rationalized their actions. President Steyn, in his Declaration of War, also used the same theme that the
Afrikaner in the Cape Colony would be wiped out. l3l Still the Free State President did not pursue the
threat of Afrikaner extinction with Milner in his many letters before and after the invasion of the Cape
Colony, thus raising doubts whether this was really a valid concern. Milner, as High Commissioner,
127 FAR, MT Steyn Collection, A156, 1/1/1, lener from ER Grobler, 12 August 1899.
12. Amery (ed), The Times History, II, p85; Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, I, p399.
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issued a proclamation objecting to the statement that the Dutch colonist would be deprived of his
constitutional rights. 132
Once the ultimatum had expired, the republican forces were at war with Oreat Britain. While the
main thrust of the Transvaal invasion was into Natal, this thesis will deal only with the republican
invasions into the Cape Colony. When the Boer forces crossed into the Cape Colony in the vicinity of
Mafeking, Schreiner announced in Parliament on 12 October 1899 that he still intended keeping the
Colony aloof from the struggle. He said he had resigned himself to the war with the SA Republic, but was
now trying to avoid conflict with the Free State. He ignored the Free State's announcement of 29
September that it would stand by its allies, and that it had mobilized on 2 October 1899 and the Frere
Bridge at Aliwal North had been closed on the northern side and that a Rouxville Commando had set up
camp at Beestekraal, nine miles (fourteen kIDs) from Aliwal North, on 5 October. 133
There were about 5,000 British troops stationed in the Cape Colony (apart from the forces in
Kimberley); the Royal Berkshire Regiment held Stormberg and Naauwpoort; West Yorkshire Regiment
with Rimington Scouts were at De Aar and the 2nd NorthhamptonshireRegiment were holding the Orange
River Bridges while the 12th Lancers and the Royal Munster Fusiliers reinforced themy4 It would be
-
three weeks before the Army Corps even arrived in Cape Town. However the Schreiner Ministry insisted
that these troops were adequate to deal with the situation.
Rebellion in Bechuanaland
The Transvaal commandos mobilized on 28 September 1899, aware that only Kimberley,
Mafeking and possibly Vryburg would resist them. Oen Piet Cronje with 6,000 men massed at Ottoshoop,
and after the ultimatum expired on 11 October 1899 the commando cut the fences and walked their horses
over the border into the Cape Colony. There was nobody to stop them. The frontier had been left
unguarded and the balance of power tipped in favour of the republicans. First the Boer forces under
Hercules de la Rey of Lichtenburg wrecked the railway line near Maritzani then they derailed a train
returning from Vryburg loaded with the two 7-pdr-guns. According to L Scholtz, De la Rey tried to
persuade Cronje to cross the border into Griqualand West near Fourteen Streams and bypass Mafeking,
132 CAR, Cd 43, Further correspondence relating to affairs in South Africa, Enclosure 18 in No 99 by Sir A Milner,
23 November 1899.
133 Oudtshoorn Courant, 5 October 1899, 'Rouxville Commando'.
134 Amery, The Times History, VII, pp20-21; Williams, Record ofthe Cape Mounted Riflemen, p58.
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but Cronje, known for his obstinacy, refused. Later when Cronje was ordered south against his will, he
left 2,500 burghers behind at Mafeking to continue what Scholtz called 'a pointless siege'. 135
Mafeking was a fairly prosperous centre surrounded by a region barely recovering from the
disaster of the rinderpest. Of the 577 voters of Ward 1, or 73% of the Voter's roll of Mafeking, the vast
majority were paid wages or received salaries and were not dependant on the rural economy for survival.
Many loyal farmers, who warned the magistrate repeatedly since early August that the Transvalers were
boasting that they were coming to take their cattle, entered Mafeking to defend the town. Those that
remained on their farms were left unmolested until Gen JP Snyman took charge. l36 Nobody in Mafeking
itself rebelled. However at least ten men, including a carpenter, Peter Green, and a butcher, Cornelius
Swartz, were retained in the local gaol as suspected spies until "affairs were settled". The accused said
they were quite satisfied being kept in prison. 137
Twelve voters joined the Boers in Wards 2 to 5 and played a minor role on the fringe of events.
David Hermanus Matthysen de Koker, senior, 55, of Mooiplaats, Mafeking boasted he was going to join
the Boer forces in the Transvaal and would return a commandant. He reappeared a Veld Cornet, sporting
a Mauser, two bandoleers and an ammunition waistcoat. He set to work with a will; commandeered men
into the Boers forces, rounded up cattle and wrecked extensive sections of the railway line. 138 Forty rebels
traced to the Vryburg Voters roll were a section of Ward 4 of the Mafeking list. By the end of October C
Bell, the Magistrate, heard that 40 rebels had joined the laager and had elected Johannes Ie Roux of
Rooidammetjie Laager Commandant; Johannes Stephanus Maritz of Woodside was Assistant Veld
Cornet.139
In 1899 370 aliens had been naturalized under the Cape Colonial Aliens Naturalization Acts of
1883 and 1889. More than half were not European immigrants, but had moved into the Cape Colony from
allover the Transvaal and the Orange Free State and taken out British citizenship. Twenty-five former
republicans moved to the Mafeking district, and 22 ofthem became rebels.140 It is intriguing that so many
republicans moved into Bechuanaland just prior to the war, especially as the districts were poverty-
stricken. These new colonists were active rebels, probably because they remained loyal to the republics or
because the pressure to assist the republican forces was too strong to resist.
'35 Leopold Scholtz, Waarom die Boere die Oorlog Verloor het, p57.
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Most of the rebels lived with their families in the laager at Rietfontein twelve miles (nineteen
lans) south of Mafeking. Despite this a pro-British Baralong chief, Saane, who was their prisoner,
organized runners to send intelligence on Boer movements and other news into Mafeking.14l A former
Transvaler from Wolmaranstadt; Arnoldus Mauritius Reinike, of Papiesvlakte, was appointed Veld
Comet and with David de Koker, forcibly commandeered colonists. In the case of Walter and Richard
Kent of Kliparani, they joined after De Koker threatened to shoot them both.142 Another leading rebel
Hendrik Jacobus Bruwer (formerly of Bethlehem) now living at Blinkklip, looted the stores from
Maritzani to as far north as Mochud with a party of rebels on the orders of the Boer officers. Although the
Cape Police in the vicinity had withdrawn to Mafeking, there were rebels who resisted petty crime,
uncertain who would be the victors in the conflict.143
When Cronje left Mafeking au 20 November 1899 an unknown number of rebels went with the
Boer forces, including Abraham Isaac van Niekerk of Rietfontein, later captured at Paardeberg and sent to
St Helena. Not everybody went willingly. Willem Gobey of Setlagoli deserted after three days at the
Modder River and walked back 200 miles (322 kIDs), pretended that he was ill, and then went into hiding
until the reliefforces arrived. l44
Cattle commandeered at Mafeking, as well as the stock removed from the country stores, was sent
by rail to Modder River to feed the republican forces. By this time the morale of the defenders of the
siege was exciting worldwide admiration which was in contrast to the morale of the attacker. F Hill of
KroOlistad wrote to his wife about a letter a friend had written from Mafeking, in which he said, "we
despair of taking the place, it is too well defended and the terrain is too open".145
After Mafeking had been invested for a month Gen Snyman, leader of the Marico and Rustenburg
burghers, took command of the assault on the defences. Between the first week ofNovember and the end
ofDecember the Boer forces shelled and sniped at the defenders in Mafeking at irregular intervals, killing
\40 CAR., Cape of Good Hope, Gavernment Gazette, 17 November 1899, notice 857 of 1899.
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eleven people and wounding ten.l46 Snyman was a ruthless man, heartily despised by many of his own
men. He forced 80 more colonists to join until there were about 120 rebels on commando, and drove what
stock they had into the main laager.147
By the end of January 1900 Sol Plaa1je, interpreter in the Magistrate's Office, reported "All the
Boers in the district, except Mr Vos our Field Comet at Maritzani, have now rebelled. He has been
arrested three times and taken to the laager, and each time he swore he would never take up arms even if
they wanted to shoot him. He has received a final notice that if he stuck to his view all his stock would be
taken and his children sent away from Mafeking".148 A number of black colonists joined the rebels and
were implicated in various acts with them. 149
The Mqfeking Mail, Special Siege Slip of December 1899 states that "to the everlasting shame of
the party the Bond Ministry intended betraying Mafeking into the hands of the Boers.... Pretoria never
dreamed that they would have any more difficulty with Mafeking than they did with Ptetoria".150 The area
under siege was porous and siege slips reached the Boer forces. Who knows just how the rebels construed
the statement. It might possibly even have been seen as a permission to join the Boer forces.
The Boer republics had not been co-signatories to the First Hague Convention signed by Great
Britain and representativesof24 states on 29 July 1899. However Sir John Ardagh, Director of Military
Intelligence during the war, who assisted in drafting the Hague Regulations, stated that "the Boers have
not acceded formally to the Hague Convention and its provisions are not binding technically in a war
betweliln a contracting and a non-contracting power; the consequence is to relegate... what is not
permissible, to the general body of International Law, in which principles identical with the above have
for many years been incorporated. For practical purposes, therefore, the Hague Convention may properly
be appealed to by either side".
Spies states that contemporary assessment of the morality or otherwise of the actions of the
belligerents was based on the principles of International Law, and that the Hague Convention was the
yardstick used to judge the conduct of the war. 151 Was it therefore acceptable for the Boer forces to
compel colonists into their military forces through the practise of commandeering? It appears not, as this
146 Smith (ed), 'Diary Kept during the Siege ofMafeking by Alexander Moffat', in Africana Notes and News, pp50-
51.
147 CAR, CCP 1/2/1/111, A94, Occupation ofthe Cape Colony by Orange Free State forces, Magistrate's report; AP
Sroit and L Mare (eds), Die Beleg van Mafeking, Dagboek van Abraham Stafleu, pp168-169.
14. Coroaroff(ed) The Boer War Diary olSol T Plaatje, p6; CAR, CCP 1/1/39. Refers to either Jan Albertus or
Willem Jacobus Voss ofDuivenhoek.
149 CAR, AG 2117, Class I Rebels charged with High Treason under the Special Tribunals Act of 1900 during
November 1901.
"0 Maleking Mail, Special Siege Slips, 20 December 1900. 'Pretoria Plan ofCampaign'.
lSI SB Spies, 'The Hague Convention 00899 and the Boer Republics' , in Historia, Journal 01the Historical
Association olSouthAfrica, XV (1), March 1970, pp47-48.
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was a direct violation of Article 44, which states "Any compulsion of the population of occupied territory
to take part in operations against its own country is prohibited", while Article 45 also states "Any
pressure on the population to take the oath to the hostile Power is prohibited".m
Blockading Mafeking was a straightforward manreuvre, but Snyman lacked the will and the
tactical skills to bring the besiegers to capitulation. The 155mm Long Tom shells were defective, while
Snyman, apparently unaware of the extent ofthe stocks held in Weil's store, decided to starve the
besiegers into submission.l53 A more pressing problem for the 1,500 Boers was their own supplies.
Although stuff arrived spasmodically via Ottoshoop, food became an ever-increasing problem as only
2,500 head of cattle apparently survived the rinderpest in that district, while the pandemic also decimated
cattle stocks over the border. Patrols combed the surrounding farms for stock, and Abraham Stafleu
mentioned an instance when the Rustenburg patrol brought in 150 slaughter sheep belonging to Thys
Snijman, and David de Koker acted as guide when a Marico patrol went out on a cattle raid only to find
the stock had vanished.!54
Bernard Mbenga has pointed out that black people were active participants in a wider range of
roles during the war. While the role of the Bakgatla and the Derdepoort attack of November 1899 is
beyond the scope of this thesis, it does reveal that the general raiding of 'black' cattle by the Boer forces
and vice versa throughout Bechuanaland and south western Transvaal was extremely widespread. '55 The
blacks commandeered by the Boer forces also had to wait on the men serving in the trenches. They
complained bitterly that they were forced to crawl in an out of the trenches, as the sniping from Mafeking
was so lively. 156
By December 1899 the black civilians in the "Stadt were becoming short of food, and soup
kitchens were started while Baden-Powell, in trying to reduce their numbers, ordered that blacks could be
issued passes to leave. '57 To counteract this Snyman ordered that the women and children had to be
driven back, and on 23 December 1899 commanded that anybody seen leaving Mafeking, whether white
or black, were not to be captured but were to be executed If the burghers did not obey they would be
punished, he stated. His senior officers, including PJ van der Merwe of the State Artillery, were horrified
and objected, calling the order murder. On 6 January 1900 four commandeered burghers - rebels - were
152 The Avalon Project at Yale Law School, 'Laws of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague ll), 29 July
1899, htto://www.yale.edu/lawweh/avalon/lawofwarlhague02.htm.pI3.
153 L Bischoff, The Long Tom Saga, p7. .
154 Smit and Mare, Die Beleg van Maleking, pp164, 187.
155 B Mbenga, 'The Role of the Bakgatla of the Pilansherg in the South African War' in Greg Cuthbertson, Albert
Gruudlingb, and Mary-Lynn Suttle (eds.), Writing a Wider War: Rethinking Gender, Race, and Identity in the South
African War, 1899-1902, p85.
156 Mafeking Mail, Special Siege Slips, 2 December 1899. 'Latest News'.
157 A Smith, Diary Kept During the Siege olMafeking, ppll, 309.
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ordered to act as a firing squad when two blacks, who were reported to have stolen ten cattle, were
executed.158
On 16 January 1900 Snyman telegraphed a local war council's decision to shoot stock thieves on
sight toGen Joubert.159 A Veld Comet had been severely reprimanded for not telling his burghers that
they had to shoot blacks, and Cmdt Botha had also been ordered to visit all the laagers and read the order
to the men. l60 An alarmed Veld Comet from Klein Marico telegraphed President Kruger and asked if they
had pennission to shoot captured blacks. Kruger countennanded the order, and on 21 January 1900
ordered that stock thieves should be sentenced to manual labour or corporal punishment.161 Snyman
deliberately flouted this order as well as the laws and customs of war relating to the treatment of civilians.
Sol Plaatje said Monthuselsi, a Baralong who lived in the Stadt and carried a pass to raid cattle, was shot
dead by rebels.162 Nonetheless cattle raiders from Mafeking continued to loot Boer cattle, and under
Mathakgong captured twelve oxen near Maritzani, losing two in a skirmish with the Boer forces, but
managed to drive the rest back.163
By the end of February 1900 Baden-Powell warned his outposts that he was expecting the Boers
to drive blacks into Mafeking, in order to give them more mouths to feed. A report on the soup kitchen in
the Stadt said the blacks were.starving.164 The desperate war over cattle and food continued. On 23 March
three Baraiong men out looting cattle reported killing three Boers near Jackal tree, one of them was then
wounded in the leg and Boers pursuing the blacks, cut his throat. A rebel, Lottering of Maritzani, who
captured a cattle rustler, wanted the man to be his servant, but his son took him outside and shot him
instead.16S When news spread in early April that a column was on its way to Mafeking the rebels fled
leaving their wives behind, the relief forces then captured some of the men trekking into the Transvaal.
Vryburg was another poverty-stricken district south of Mafeking, dispite this 134 families from
the Boer republics had settled in the district and been naturalized in 1899.166 With numbers swelled by so
many new colonists, it's hardly surprising that the loyalties of the Vryburg inhabitants were divided.
There had been a fresh outbreak of rinderpest in the district in June, and those whose farms were in
158 Smit and Mare, Die Beleg van Mafeking, pp167-182.
'5' Fransjohan Pretorius, Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902, p269.
160 CAR, AG 2038, Correspondence Anglo-Boer War and High Treason, Mafeking 1900-1903, Folio 12, Regina v
BC Lottering and JS Maritz, 4 October, 1901.
161 Pretorius, Life on Commando during the Anglo-Boer War 1899-1902, p269; CAR, Cd 888, Further
correspondence relative to the treatment ofnatives by the Boers, January 1900.
162 CAR, AG 2038, Correspondence Anglo-Boer War and High Treason, Mafeking 1900-1903, Folio 18, Application
for Bail, 5 June 1901, and Preliminary Investigation Class 1, Folio 20, 27 October, 1900.
163 MafekingMail, Special Siege Slips, 16 February 1900. 'Our beefproviders'.
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quarantine verbally abused the police at Dry Hartz. 167 The Mayor, who had left Vryburg when war was
declared, complained that the Town Council sent a string of appeals to the Schreiner Government asking
for assistance to enable them to defend themselves and failed to receive a single reply.168
When the Boer forces reached Vryburg, colonists flocked to join them in large numbers. A
meeting was held at Tweefontein and a deputation was sent to the Transvalers to inform them that the
Vryburgers would join the republican forces under certain conditions:
• that as they all had heavy mortgages on their properties, they requested the Transvaal
Government to cancel these mortgages after the war;
• that properties belonging to the Chartered Company and the English, who had fled across the
border, be granted to people who had no fixed property;
• that their wives be cared for.
According to a loyalist, Mr JJ van der Merwe of Morgenzon, Taung, his proposal that they, as
British colonists, remain neutral in the war, was shouted down at the meeting. He was later told that the
Transvaal leader accepted the proposal to remit mortgages, but the colonists had to drive the English into
the sea first. The decision to join the Transvalers was agreed on at meetings thronghout the district. 169 Of
the 30 transport drivers, 29 rose in rebellion, giving credence to the idea that it was the wretched state of
their economy that drove people to rebellion as much as anything else. l7O A Mr J Oliver of Barkly West
said that many people rose in rebellion spontaneously and young people were promised that they would
receive half the loot. 171
In Kuruman, the commandant of the colonial burgher forces, teacher and secretary of the
Afrikaner Bond, Jacobus Albertus van Zyl, suggested at a meeting they invite the Transvalers into
Griqualand West. 172 Many of those who joined Van Zyl were former Free Staters who had been
naturalized. They included the Vander Merwe family of Langkloof, Celliers of Steenbokkloof, Claasens
ofAarkop, P Bothma, CJ Steyn and the Peens family. 173
At Vryburg loyal inhabitants who had not left the village when war broke out, met and decided
that "the Transvaal troops would not invade a place where there were no troops to fight". Magistrate R
167 Cape Times Weekly Edition, 25 August 1899.
168 Cape Times Weekly Edition, 18 October 1899.
169 Conference ofLoyalists, held at The Paorl on August 29 and 30, 1902, p56. Date ofmeeting given as 31 October
appears to be in error as Transvalers entered Vryburg on 21 October 1899.
170 CAR, ,Cape of Good Hope, Government Gazette, 17 November 1899, Aliens Natora1ization Act No 857, 1899;
CAR, AG 3500, Vryburg voters Roll, 1899.
I7l Conference ofLoyalists, p8.
172 CAR, AG 2037, Folio 15, Statements by surrendered Rebels from May to July 1900.
173 CAR, AG 2035, Folio 35, Document on the Langeberg and Kuruman Rebels, 14 December 1900.
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Tilliard, a recent arrival, agreed that it was impossible to defend the town under the circumstances.'7' The
Cape Police and the Vryburg Volunteers, who were asked to withdraw, moved to Kumman, which they
defended until ammunition ran out. Charles Sonnenberg, MLA for Vryburg, said during the following
session of Parliament that had Vryburg been properly armed they would have defended the place with the
same spirit as Kimberley and Mafeking. Schreiner at that stage continued to insist that at the time there
were no British troops or colonial forces available to establish a fighting frontier. 115
Gen JH de la Rey, with 1,200 burghers and three field pieces, rode unopposed into Vryburg on 21
October, his numbers swel1ed by 102 former republicans who had recently been naturalized, as well as
colonists who had joined the Transvalers at Leeuwspruit.176 De la Rey hoisted the Vierkleur at the Court
House and took possession of Vryburg on behalf of the SA Republic, and announced that the whole of
Bechuanaland and Griqualand West would be incorporated into the Orange Free State. Once the
Vierkleur was raised, it would only be lowered again over their dead bodies, he said. De la Rey promised
that people who remained quietly at home would not be molested, and officials and those who wanted to
leave could do SO.177 The proclamation read by De la Rey did not formally annex the occupied territory or
state that under it colonists were compelled to take up arms as Transvaal or Free State burghers.178
The Boer republics' objective was to destroy British imperialism in South Africa by hoisting the
Transvaal flag; and by proclaiming both Bechuanaland and Griqualand West part of the Orange Free
State, the unity between the republics was emphasised. Loyalists condemned the proclamation as a 'cute'
move aimed at deluding the colonial Boer, but charges of high treason seemed far away after the hasty
withdrawal of the Cape Police and Vryburg Volunteers.179
According to the Magistrate 575 Vryburg men joined the BOers and signed commandeering notes,
which they regarded as legal documents. Many believed that if they were commandeered they could not
be held liable for joining the Boer forces. Among the former Free Staters who took a leading role were
Abraham Paulus Pretorius, formerly of Hoopstad, and Coeuraad Hendrik, Schalk Willem and Wynand
Groenewald, all formerly of Bethulie who had been naturalised that year.180 According to 18-year-old
Lukas J Groenewald of Zoutfontein, a younger member of the Groenewald clan, a Stellaland Commando
174 CAR, CCP 1/2/1/111, A94, Occupation ofthe Cape Colony by Orange Free State forces, Magistrate's report;
Cape Times Weekly Edition, 23 October, 1899.
175 Cape of Good Hope, Debates ofthe House ofAssembly, 1900, pp317-18.
176 CAR, AG 3500, Vryburg Voter's Roll; Cape of Good Hope, Government Gazette, Aliens Naturalization Act 1883
and 1899, No 857 of 1899.
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178 Amery, (ed), The Times History, II, p273.
179 Cape Times Weekly Edition, 25 October 1899.
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was raised. 181 Some of them set off to Kuruman under Cmdt AJ van der Merwe, but the bulk joined De la
Rey's force proceeding towards Kimberley on 11 November 1899.182
Few rebels had any military experience or the extra supplies of food that would prove essential
for survival. The name of the Vryburg rebel commandant has not been ascertained, but they rode ('Iff,
casually mixed in with the Boer forces, and clearly the success or failure of the future campaign would be
in the hands of the burghers of the SA Republic and the Orange Free State. Rebels became involved in
manning the Boer garrison at Vryburg and Kuruman, looting shops such as Colley's, Honey's and
Rouxville's store, and later they also looted the Olifantshoek police station. They were also involved in
commandeering stock and horses, going on patrol, bearing arms at Kumman, Fourteen Streams and
Kimberley, being flag bearers during the expedition to Gordonia and Kenhardt and the shooting of three
Id' . h 183so lers watermg orses.
VIC JA Visser remained behind in Vryburg and organized the recruitment of further forces, set
up administration and commandeered stock, while JA van Zyl was appointed Landdrost of Kuruman.
Newly recruited colonists were part of the new administration,. and as law and order collapsed, De la
Rey's orders forbidding looting were disregarded. On 20 October, Kekewich issued a counter
proclamation to that of Gen De la Rey, declaring any proclamation of arutexation to be null and void, and
warning the rebels of the consequences. l84
Under orders from Gen PJ Joubert 400 English-speaking loyalists were forced to leave Vryburg
on 17 November 1899. They were ordered to travel to the Cape Colony via Christiana, but when some of
the wagons broke down they tried to turn back. The Free State Landdrost at Vryburg put them on the road
again because he said local rebels threatened to resign if they returned.18S Their journey to Hopetown
eventually took six weeks and the Prime Minister was blamed for their situation. A hostile press
complained "Schreiner is morally responsible for the lack of preparedness of the Colony to repel the
invaders, and has openly and in a barefaced maruter sympathised with the enemies of the Queen".186
Taung, a village of trading stores with a population of 2,000 black people, was occupied by 500
men led by Cmdt JF (Tollie) de Beer of the Bloemhof Commando on 16 October. He crossed the frontier
at Pudimoe with 800 men, raised the Vierkleur and occupied the government buildings. vie m van der
181 Bottomley, JoOO, "'Stinkafrikaners" and social stereotypes: The Anglo-Boer War reminiscences ofLJ
Groenewald', in New Contree, No 46 (November 1999). Groenewald's story is related in an authentic warts and all
style shorn ofposturing heroics.
182 CAR, CCP 112/11111, A94, Occupation ofthe Cape Colony by Orange Free State forces, Magistrate's report;
Bottomley, Anglo-Boer War reminiscences ofLJ Groenewald', pi; Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede
Vryheidsoorlog, I, pp395-396.
183 CAR, AG 2037, Folio 35, taken from lists oftreason charges, June and July 1900.
184 Amery (ed), The Times History, II, p276.
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Martial Law
Walt of Sterkfontein, Vryburg leading a party of 35 rebels, read a commandeering proclamation saying
that nobody could remain neutral. The Boers commandeered from loyalist shops, and the Government
herd, inoculated against rinderpest, was taken as valuable booty when local rebels handed these cattle
over to Boer forces. Food was soon scarce, and while black people were forced to live on locusts, needy
rebels were supplied from food depots at Christiana.187
The main Cape Police contingent began to fall back on Kimberley. They were then instructed by
Col Kekewich to reinforce the police post at Kuruman that was being held by Capt A Bates and 35 men.
The combined force held out from 13 November to I January against 1,000 Boers. The siege was a
desultory affair marked by some brisk firing early and late, and quiet during the heat of the day. The
garrison eventually surrendered at New Year after they came under fire from an old 7-pounder gun sent
by President Kruger. The gunner used 90 rounds to fmd the range, but when he did, the damage was
critical and the garrison raised the white flag as their ammunition had also run out. Schalk Groenewald of
Zoutfontein was the only rebel to be wounded. l88 By New Year 1900 the whole of Bechuanaland and
Griqualand West, except for Kimberley and Mafeking, was under republican control. l89
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The British proclaimed Martial Law on 15 October 1899 in Natal, Mafeking, Vryburg, Taung,
Barkly West, Kimberley and Herbert, and it was extended on 15 and 16 November 1899 to the districts of
Colesberg, Steynsburg, Albert, Molteno, Aliwal North, Wodehouse, Glen Grey, Queenstown, Cathcart
and Hay. It was proclaimed in the face of invasion to assist the military, and in cases of rebellion to
enable them to restore order. Sir Redvers Buller's fIrst memorandum on Martial Law dealt with the object
of the proclamation, detailed who would be empowered to administer it, and warned its administrators not
to interfere with the civil rights of peaceful citizens. Principal offences under Martial Law were
treasonable or seditious acts or words, and enlisting or engaging in the military forces of the enemy.
Further offences were aiding and abetting the enemy, and trading with and supplying goods to them. It
186 Grocotts Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 4 November 1899.
187 CAR, AG 2049, Correspondence Anglo-Boer War and High Treason, Vryburg 1900-1903, Preliminary
Investigations on the occupation of Taung, held by R Tillard, RM, 4 August, 1900; CAR, CCP 112111111, A94,
Occupation ofthe Cape Colony by Orange Free State forces, Magistrate's report.
188 CAR, CCP 1/2/11111, A94, Occupation of the Cape Colony by Orange Free State forces, Magistrate's report;
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was also an offence to destroy bridges, railways or the telegraph, and commit acts endangering the safety
of Her Majesty's forces.
Military courts consisted of three members, and a civil magistrate could be nominated as a
member. The procedure laid down was that of the General Field Court Martial under the Army Act. All
evidence, including defence, was to be. written down in full, The death sentence had to be passed
unanimously, and be conftrmed by the General Officer Commanding. Records were to go to the Deputy
Judge Advocate in Cape Town. Martial Law was to be enforced only in proclaimed areas, and all General
Officers Commanding, brigadiers and commandants were given authority to administer it. Magistrates in
the proclaimed districts were warned not to interfere in the work of the military, but the assurance was
given that there was no intention to interfere in the ordinary work of civil administration. I90 Up to January
1900 fourteen cases under Martial Law appear to have been tried by Military Courts. The heaviest
sentence was one of ftve years' penal servitude, commuted to two years' imprisonment with hard labour
for High Treason and rebellion, and aiding and abetting.the Boer forces in the destruction of the Modder
River Bridge. A van Brunton was tried on 29 December 1899 at Modder River, and sentenced to three
years' hard labour for intriguing with the enemy,191
The Orange Free State proclamation, originally issued by President MT Steyn on 15 October, was
reissued by CJ Wessels as Commander of the Orange Free State forces and by other Boer leaders. It
placed the whole of Griqualand West under Martial Law, citing the OFS Act 10 of 1899. Martial Law
was to be enforced over the whole division, and was applicable to every action that could endanger the
safety of the burghers. Under this act non-members of the British Army who took up arms against the
forces of either republics could appear before a military Council, could be sentenced to death or could
undergo imprisonment not exceeding ftfteen years. This punishment was applicable to those who spied
for the enemy or acted as guides and mislead the Boers, or killed, murdered or plundered the forces of the
republics, their followers or servants. It also applied to those who destroyed bridges, damaged telegraph
wires, heliograph apparatus or destroyed railway lines controlled by republican forces. They also
announced a right to requisition goods. All those who refused to submit to the proclamation were to leave
within fourteen days. 192
Great Britain had the sovereign right to proclaim Martial Law in the Cape Colony and Natal, but
appeared powerless to enforce it in many parts of Bechuanaland and Griqualand West. In contrast the
Orange Free State also enforced their Martial Law regulations on the colonists in the same area, although
190 Amery (ed), The Times History, VI, pp544-57.
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they had no sovereign right to do so. Here de facto as opposed to de jure conditions prevailed. The Free
State proclamation implied that they had a legitimate right to govern a colonial town, and convinced those
still wavering that their property would be safe if they joined the Boer forces. The replacement of local
colonial Government by even the most basic de facto Republican Government gave the impression that
civil administration would be ratified as soon as Boer victory was assured.
The Griqoaland West rebellion
The Free State forces crossed the open frontier on 14 October 1899 and advanced on Kimberley.
Their leaders had neither military experience nor the tactics to capture the diamond centre, but the
Transvaal forces that followed were made of sterner stu:ff. Sweeping southwards they destroyed
communications by partially demolishing bridges at both Fourteen Streams and Modder River. When G
van der Merwe of Fauresmith occupied Belmont on 19 October, he had rebel recruits with him. Soon the
railway line all the way to Mafeking was in Boer hands, but the vital bridge over the Orange River
remained in British handS.19'
The news that Free State forces were crossing the border without opposition from the colonial
forces so alarmed the Barkly West Magistrate L Harrison that he made a fruitless appeal for help to the
Under Colonial Secretary, Lord Selboume on 31 October 1899.194
An invitation originating from Gen Joubert had been circulating among the Colonists in the Hay
district. It called on "true brothers and fellow countrymen" to attend a meeting at Moosfontein as the Boer
forces had appointed Kooijie van der Westhuizen to discuss "all good matters and people all had to arrive
with a gnn and antrnunition and as much provisions as they could bring with them". Among the throng of
curious people who went to Moosfontein was the concerned Magistrate, S Tilney, who had heard about
the meeting on I November 1899. Here he met 40 local farmers. He told them that despite the invasion it
was not their war and that they must return home and plough, and if they were obedient, they would be
protected. He reported later that the farmers complained bitterly of being kept in the dark, and said that
their government was not supplying any guidance despite the growing danger of hostilities. Tilney also
192 Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, I, pp479480: Amery (ed), The Times History, II,
p275; Amery, (ed), The Times History, VI, pp544 and 547.
193 Amery (ed), The Times History, II, p273; AG Barlow, A/most in Confidence, p74.
194CAR, CCP 11211/1 II, Occupation ofthe Cape Colony by Orange Free State forces, report L Harrison, 17
November 1899.
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pointed to various conciliatory proclamations from the Prime Minister, but the farmers were very
dissatisfied.19'
Most of the men (apparently all unarmed) dispersed after the Magistrate spoke. About fifteen
stayed behind arguing over yet another letter that arrived from two Free State commandants warning them
that they were all in danger. They were advised to cut the telegraph and declare war. Abraham Maritz of
Steinbokhoom said he objected and that cutting the wire was an act of rebellion. These colonists decided
not to take up arms. But they speculated that ifKimberley was captured, they would be compelled to obey
the Free Staters.l96
Gen CJ Wessels, Commander-in-Chief of Free State forces, declared Martial Law on II
November 1899 in Griqualand West. A commando under Judge JB Hertzog and Cmdt JJ Jordaan,
together with Landdrosts and Clerks, took possession of the villages one by one, ejected the local civil
servants, gave loyalists fourteen days to leave and threatened non-members of the British army who took
up arms with death or fifteen years imprisonment. The Orange Free State then appointed Justices of the
Peace and Veld Comets who systematically enrolled British subjects in republican forces.
At Barkly West on 11 November 1899, Magistrate Harrison was compelled to hand over
buildings, stores and some cash. Wavering loyalists complained that as they had received no help from
the Colonial Government, they joined the republicans to secure life and property.197 Baart Van Aswegen
of Grootfontein, Barkly West became the commandant of the Dronfield Laager. 198 Other important rebels
were Johannes Hendrik Lamprecht of Kameelfontein, Johannes Hendrik Lubbe of Kramersfontein and
Peter Christian Massyn ofDanielskuil. 199
As the Free Staters entered the Herbert district the first act of the invading forces was to cut the
telegraph, 'disorganise' the postal system and proclaim Martial Law. Escorted by a group of eager
colonists, the Free Staters rode into Douglas on 15 November. A trader in Douglas complained that they
were being left like 'rats in a trap' and asked why more was not done for the inhabitants.'oo
More colonial supporters welcomed the Free Staters at Griquatown in the Hay district two days
later. The occupations commenced with the usual reassuring flag-raising ceremonies and the public
reading of a proclamation stating that Griqualand West was now part of the Orange Free State. Colonial
19' CAR, CCP 1/2/1/111, Occupation ofthe Cape Colony by Orange Free State forces, report ofAssistant Magistrate
S Tilney, 2 December 1899.
196 CAR, AG 3407, Preliminary investigation into charges ofHigh Treason ofHermanus Steyo, statement ofA
Maritz 30 August 1899.
197 CAR, CCP 1/2/1/111 Occupation of the Cape Colony by Orange Free State forces, report ofMagistrate Lancelot
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civil servants from magistrates to clerks were expelled after being compelled to hand over the villge
assets. Orange Free State officers appointed Justices of the Peace and Veld Cornets, and, with the aid of
the Voters Rolls, enrolled British subjects into the Boer forces. The colonists were divided and confused
and there was nobody to rally them to the flag, it was up to each individual to resist as best he could or
flee the area. Two Dutch Veld Cornets who refused to join were treated harshly and sent to Pretoria
where they were kept handcuffed for weeks. 201
JP van Niekerk of Griquatown telegraphed Milner and warned him that the Free State forces had
occupied Griquatown. Milner replied a week later, telling Van Niekerk to stay loyal and promised that he
would be compensated for his losses?02 JJ van Broekhuizen from the Winburg Commando stated later
that the Free State forces were invited to come into the Hay district by Ockert Jacobus van Rensburg
(Griquatown), Frans Badenhorst, (Badenhorstfontein), Jan Christoffel Esterhuizen (Zaksdrift), Philip
Snyman (Nek) and some others. Jacobus Andries Jooste of Matsap was elected commandant. All rebels
bore arms with the Free Staters and Transvalers oftheir own free will, said Broekhuizen?03
Charles Pretorius Robus, the Field Cornet of Campbell, reported that a commando of Free Staters
appeared and read a proclamation declaring Campbell Free State property. Hendrik Benkes welcomed
them saying, "As Ruth said, your God is my god and your people my people".204 The republicans seized
the magazine and the Free Staters distributed the ammunition, which had belonged to the Cape Police to
their recruits. Marthinus Louwrens Lotter of Campbell, a blacksmith, described the scene in a poem Een
Gedicht op de Proklamering van Griquland Wes. They were all handed weapons in order to fight for the
rights of the Transvaal, he wrote. The flag-raising ceremony and the reading of the proclamation had
convinced these colonists that they were part ofthe republics, and that 'loyalists' were in the wrong?O'
At Postmasburg Albertus Johannes Viljoen, who was acquainted with President Kruger,
campaigned for the Boer cause.206 However when the commando reached the village the locals claimed
200 Lunderstedt (ed), Summer of1899, Letter by W Luther Searles, 21 October 1899 in Diamond Fields Advertiser.
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that the Free Staters offered them one shilling and sixpence a day to fight on the Boer side. IfHertzog and
Jordaan offered to pay rebels, they didn't do it elsewhere, and neither did they offer to remit mortgages.207
Among the 2,000 rebels raised in Griqualand West, Petrus Jacobus de Villiers (Ou Hartjie) of
Egmont, Herbert later promoted to General, became the foremost fighter?08 He was leader from a young
age - at seventeen he was elected Field-Cornet of Kalkfontein Ward in Hope Town?09 Of the sixteen
leading Herbert rebels the most important were Jacobus Johannes Ludiwicus Scholtz of Sunnyside,
commandant of the Douglas rebels, Edward Minnaar Warden ofPlooysberg and Christian Jacobus Nel of
Douglas.210
During November and December the Free State's Chief Magistrate, JJ Morgendal, controlled
commandeering in Barkly West. He expelled 500 loyalists on 1 January 1900 as they had refused to pay
£37-10-0 war tax or fight on the Boer side; they trekked to the British camp near Modder River as law
and order broke down and the vacated farms were looted. The loyalists were sent down to Cape Town to
refugee camps, which was only the beginning of that sad saga of civilian refugee camps?"
Black colonists, who were forcibly commandeered at gunpoint in December 1899 by Philip
Snyrnan of Nek, included Smeer, Paul and Mattivis Bobeje of Carrinton, Hay. They were lodged in the
Griquatown Gaol and then taken to the Boer Laager at Kareeputs in the Kimberley district. Smeer Bobeje
remained in the laager for seven months, but Paul and Mattivis Bobeje, who were commandeered to look
after horses, ran away about a month later. Jan Pofadder of Carrinton stated that when Snyrnan threatened
to shoot him, he went to Bloemfontein with a wagon and returned with a load of meal and mealies, which
he delivered to the Griquatown Gaol. He was then commandeered to sheer SKJ Venter's sheep. In
February 1900 he went to Christiana and returned with 120 cases of ammunition and four cases of
guns.212 These four cases are documented, but other anecdotal accounts of unarmed blacks working as
grooms, shepherds, wagoners and cook boys indicate that hundreds more black colonists could have been
involved in the battlefront. Commandeered labour was not paid, scrounged for food and was a cheap
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resource.
Maj FWR Albrecht, OFS Artillery, commenced a sporadic bombardment of Kimberley on 6
November, but as the shells carried a low explosive charge, little damage was done. The Bloemhof
207 Snyman, 'Postmasburg en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog', pp204-08.
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209 Malan, Die Boere-offisiere, p28; Dictionary o/SA Bibliography, II, p222; CAR, AG 2029, Correspondence
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Commando occupied Carter's Ridge southeast of the town, and the Transvaal Artillery fIred one of their
guns from this position. When Gen Paul Methuen, in command of the First Division advancing towards
Kimberley sent a message to Col Kekewich that he could arrive on 26 November, Kekewitch ordered 800
mounted troops under Lieut-Col H Scott-Turner to drive the Boer forces from Carter's Ridge. The Boers
reported that eleven men were killed, eighteen wounded and among the 33 captured was J de Wet of
Frijersdal, Gordonia, but the Kimberley garrison did not capture the Boer Krupp gun. Scott-Turner's
second attack on Carter's Ridge was a disaster, as he was killed and his force sustained heavy losses as
they fell back.213 Rebels Christoffel de la Rey of Doornfontein, Schalk Vorster of Warrenton and Gert
Daniel Jacobus Scholtz of Mauritzfontein were killed in action although the exact date and place has not
been established?"
The British army under Methuen had advanced on 21 November from the Orange River With
8,000 men to relieve Kimberley. In three battles lasting more than fIve days, Boer forces clashed with the
British at Belmont o~ 23 November, Graspan on 25 November and Modder River on 28 November. The
Boer forces then entrenched themselves at Magersfontein, where they gained a notable victory on 11
December 1899.215 The comment in the German Official account was that the battles had demonstrated
the great difficulty of mounting pure frontal attacks in a flat region. While Methuen lacked mounted
troops for reconnaissance the Boers were well fitted for fighting on the defensive?16
During the war around Kimberley a number of colonists were commandeered into the
Bloemfontein, Ladybrand and Boshoff Commandos. VIC JHL Bosman recruited at least 50 colonists in
Barkly West. Colonists were also found in the Hoopstad Commando under J Greyling and in D Lubbe's,
WC Steyn's and in H van der Reis's commandos.217 The Boer forces failed to unleash an all-out attack on
Kimberley, and German military observers called the siege a pretence and not a serious military
enterprise.2l8 The blockade stopped supplies getting through, but failed to cut off the town's water supply,
as De Beers provided water from the Wesselton mine. Boer forces were gradually withdrawn from around
Kimberley to the Modder River, although rebels under Baart van Aswegen of Grootfontein, Barkly West
remained at Dronfield?19
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An unknown number of Cape rebels, possibly hundreds, fought on the republican side. The Boer .
record of the fIrst four battles is mute about the part they played. It can be assumed that rebels were
counted among the Boer forces, but probably like the blacks, were simply ignored. The historian
Breytenbach overlooked the role of rebels during the battle of Belmont, in which De Villiers of Egmont,
Herbert fought with such distinction that Gen De la Rey promoted him to Combat General in recognition
of his services.22o A number of rebels in action have been traced through the arms issued to them: Daniel
Jacobs, CJ/son of Belmont was armed with a Martini-Henry, Andries Goosen of Rooilaagte was armed
with a Mauser and Johannes du Preez of Scholtznek, was armed with a ZAR rifle. Jan Christian Lubbe of
B1ackheath and Barend Uys, same address, got leave from Gen Cronje after they had taken part in the
fIghts of Belmont, Scholtz Nek and Magersfontein.221 Petrus Snyders of Barkly West, Christian Johannes
van der Westhuizen and Johannes Christian Venter of Hay were captured at Modder River; Hendrik
Boshof ofHay was killed, possibly at Magersfontein.222
Wars are a system oflogistics and supply. Invading a state and planning that the occupied country
would automatically provide the commissariat for the troops, fails because the army displaces the civilian
population with too great a concentration of men. Successful soldiering is dependant on sufficient food
supplies.223 Griqualand West's economy was stripped to supply huge concentrations of Boer soldiers, and
by January 1900 the large mounted Boer force at Magersfontein had completely overgrazed the veld.
Frans Conradie' account described the dust clouds, the almost unbearable heat and the thousands oflarge
stock struggling to survive.'2'
Jack Lane, an Irish-born Transvaal burgher and Magazijn Meester in Cronje's laager, referred to
incidents of loyal farmers being· brought to the laager en route to Bloemfontein Gaol. He wrote
prophetically that he was afraid the Griqualand West rebel would get into trouble after the war. "The
British will go for them as rebels. A great many were compelled to join...... a Boer commando comes to
your farm ... if you join, so far all well, your wife, your family, all are respected. But ifyou refuse you are
roughly treated. The fIrst thing is a rifle in your ear... everything is taken and your wife and family are
left to starve... so you join and the end is confIscation and punishment".225 By May 1900 about 100
colonists from the Cape and Natal were in gaol in Pretoria for refusing to fIght for the republicans. British
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forces released an unknown number of colonial loyalists, held in the Bloemfontein Gaol, in March
1900.226
New Year 1900 started with a debacle for the Herbert rebels. Friends and relatives were visiting
the laager at Sunnyside, 40 miles (64 kms) northwest of Douglas, when a guard noticed that a span of
oxen approaching the camp were pulling a gun. Col TD Pilcher, who had taken command of the Belmont
camp the week before attacked the laager with a flying column of 700 men, including Australians and 100
Canadians from a Toronto company. In less than an hour most of the rebels fled after six were killed,
twelve wounded and 34 captured. The column then destroyed commandeered stores, collected arms and
ammunition from Douglas and returned to Belmont. Marthinus Lotter said they were 60 rebels against
1,400 troops, and one of the local men, Jacobus J Cloete died from a heart attack attempting to escape.
The affair was the first success for the British after the defeat at Magersfontein, and the first occasion the
Canadian troops were in action in South Africa.227 The Douglas rebels were later found guilty of High
Treason in the Cape Supreme Court on 23 April 1900. Of 37 rebels traCed, the Court convicted three to
five-year terms of imprisomnent; 21 rebels were gaoled for three years, and the rest received sentences
ranging from two years to six months.228 The convicted men were transferred to the Tokai Convict Station
near Cape Town in November 1900.229
After the skirmish the Boer forces formed a new laager at Zulani with Theunis Hotzhausen as
commandant. The rebels who fled were ordered to rejoin, and those that refused were forced back into the
laager.'30Cmdt Scholtz of Douglas regrouped his men and moved to the left bank of the Modder River
where they joined Gen Christian de Wet's force. It was an uneasy existence as the Free Staters,
Transvalers and Griqualanders were irritated with each other and failed to integrate. De Wet ordered
Scholtz to patrol between the Koedoesberg and the Swartrand, a terrain neglected by Gen Cronje. The
Scouts reported to Cronje that a large British force was advancing along the Riet River in the direction of
the Koedoesberg on 3 February. Cronje dismissed them saying they were to catch the warthogs
(presumably a derogatory description of the British troops) and to bring them to his laager.231 De Wet,
with only 350 men at his disposal, attempted without success to dislodge the British who were soon
strongly entrenched. Lotter at Koedoesberg, wrote in Groot Gevecht Bij de Koppie that after Jan Hendrik
226 Mqfeking Mail, Special Siege Slips, 'In Pretoria Gaol- Mr Hellawell's Narative', 19 April 1900.
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Combrink and Frans de Jongh of Middelplaats, Kimberley were killed, some of the burghers fled at a
critical moment and leaving only 25 mento defend the position.232
Scholtz, who had been ordered to fetch ammunition, returned to De Wet's camp with 200 rebels
on 7 February, only to [md the burghers were ignoring the British cavalry in the vicinity and the Free
Staters and some rebels were accusing the Transvalers of cowardice. De Wet even warned them that if
they left their positions again they could be shot. Discipline had collapsed totally, and the rebels at
Kalbasdrift then looted a house and store and then q~elled further over who owned a herd of COWS.233
Luckily the cavalry pulled back from Koedoesberg, which was a feint, to distract attention from their
strategy of breaking through at Ramdam.234
On 12 February Scholtz, with 200 Griqualand rebels and some burghers, and armed only with a
gun was ordered to advance through Jacobsdal and occupy the hills on the left bank of the Riet River in
an attempt to halt the British advance through Watervaldrift. From their position they stared with unbelief
at a force of cavalry totaling 5,000, plus seven batteries, riding with impunity to relieve Kimberley. When
the small commando was sighted, French diverted some of his men, who drove the Boers back to
Jacobsdal. Conradie complained that had De Wet been able to deploy 1,000 men with three or four guns,
they would have had a chance, at least to defend the drifts. As it was half of Scholtz's men fled. They
were now paying the price for Cronje's obstinacy.235 Lotter's verses give a glimpse of how Piet de
Villiers kept his head in the shock and confusion. A loose translation reads: "De Villiers who was by my
side 'said to me that this strong force will outflank us and we can't stay here. So we retreated to our
horses".236
The Douglas rebels later fell back to Zulani laager, and then joined the retreating Vryburg and
Kuruman rebels under VIC Visser, who, using the route through Schmidtsdrift, retreated to Fourteen
Streams as the British forces swept forward.237 The Long Tom gun that had shelled Kimberley for a week
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fired its last shell on 15 February 1900, the day the siege was relieved by Gen French. In the chaos of
retreat the Boer forces could not find a team of oxen to pull the gun, and the Warrenton rebels spanned
themselves into the traces and pulled the Long Tom until a team of oxen was found and inspanned, and it
trundled away to the north.
Bart van Aswegen was later praised as a 'stout-hearted rebel' when he did not retreat, but held the
laager at Dronfield and fought off the guns from three batteries. Van Aswegen kept up such a rapid fire
that French ordered his men to pull back. Twelve rebels were captured and the remainder were forced to
abandon the Krupp gun, but slipped away in a dust storm. Three rebels J Bester, WH Kruger and HJ van
Zyl were killed two days later in a sharp fight around Felstead's Kopje?38
Cronje retreated from the exposed Magersfontein to Paardeberg in the Free State where he was
bombarded into submission and surrendered on 27 February 1900 with 4,105 persons of which 3,955
were republicans?39 Among the men that surrendered were about 124 colonists; while 84 of these
admitted that they were British citizens, at least 40 others gave false addresses for fear of reprisals.240
Despite the massive defeat and lost morale of the Boer forces, the Grlqualand West rebels would not
begin laying down arms until May and June 1900 when Vryburg and Mafeking were back in British
hands.
Rebellion south of the Orange River
South of the Orange River the Colonial Burgher Force of each division had been an integral part
of village life, and its commandants were" influential men. Cmdt Petrus Steenekamp of Albert had been
appointed Field Comet in 1886, and, according to Sir Henry de Villiers, thanks to him there was almost
no crime in the BurghersdorplMolteno area.241 Cmdt Gustav van Aardt of the Aliwal North commando,
presented a loyal address from the Dutch farmers to Sir Alfred Milner in 1898, and as late as July 1899
organized a parade of 150 mounted men, with 200 on foot, through Aliwal North to celebrate Queen
Victoria's 80th birthday.242 Probably Cmdt Christoffel Myburgh of Barkly East and the leaders of the
Dordrecht Commando and the Colesberg Mounted Rifle Club held similar parades for the Queen's
birthday.
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The good relationships between border towns and the Colonial Government soured when the
news spread that Schreiner had allowed arms and ammunition passage to the Free State.24J The border of
the Orange River was not defended except for a small number of Cape Police at Norvalspont, Bethulie
and Aliwal North, who were normally deployed doing their usual duties.244 Once the republican forces
invaded Griqualand West in October the news that half a ba.ttalion of the 2nd Berkshires had been
deployed at Stormberg and Naauwpoort was reassuring, as the inhabitants of the border districts felt
vulnerable. G Steevens, a correspondent who had visited Aliwal North on 15 October, commented that its
position was quite humiliating as the townspeople on the Orange River were unprotected?45
When Gen Sir Redvers Buller, newly appointed commander of the Army Corps in South Africa,
arrived in Cape Town on 31 October 1899 and servicemen started disembarking, the public expected
more troops to be sent to the Orange River. Instead because Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith were all
besieged and fearing another disaster, he' ordered the Stormberg and Naauwpoort garrisons to pull back to
Queenstown on 3 November, leaving only De Aar railway junction under guard by British forces.246
German military observers condemned the action as premature and disastrous as it cut off all
communication between the eastern and western sections of the Cape Colony.247
The rebellion south of the Orange River actually began with an escalating series of protest
meetings on the state of the government by discontented local leaders, ironically all members of the
Afrikaner Bond. David Nicolas de Wet of Buffelsvlei, retired MLA for Aliwal North, Johannes Breed of
Broedersbank and local Commandant Gustav van Aardt and even the Mayor, Nicolas Everhardus Smuts,
boiled with indignation at the dilatoriness of their government who were ignoring Aliwal North's
vulnerable position on the border with the Orange Free State. Once war was declared there were fears that
Schreiner about to abdicate power on this frontier as well, confidence fell and businessmen began to leave
the district.248
Aliwal North's position deteriorated further when arms and ammunition, held in the local
magazine, were moved to Stormberg Junction. On 20 October 1899 when the troops were withdrawn to
Queenstown this ordnance went with them.249 Next proclamations signed by Schreiner and Milner,
appeared at the Magistrate's Courts ordering all colonists to abstain from acts against Her Majesty, that
they were not to enlist or engage in Military services, nor to aid and abet; those who contravened the law
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would be prosecuted and convicted. The Prime Minister, stating he did not doubt they were loyal
subjects, sent similar telegrams to all Field Cornets, Ministers of Religion, and Magistrates?'O The Prime
Minister's telegrams and proclamations aroused anger among colonists generally who said proclamations
must be backed by force.'5l The townspeople sent a resolution to the government in Cape Town
"regarding with contempt the insinuation of disloyalty against colonists of Dutch decent; considering
such charges not only insulting but calculated to increase the rupture that existed and enlarge hostilities in
the countty".252 A rumour then spread that each district's Burgher Force would be called out to protect the
district and Aliwal North's G van Aardt would lead the local defence. In Albert Piet Steenekamp would
lead the Burgher Force.
Meanwhile a Free State force of 2,500 under Gen Elias Grobler of Philippolis, Cmdts Johannes
Hendrik Olivier of Rouxville, Hans Swanepoel of Smithfield and FJ du Plooy of the Bethulie Commando
remained camped north of the Orange River in the vicinity of Aliwal North, Bethulie and Norvalspont.253
Olivier entertained Aliwal North's leading men lavishly, including Nicholas Smuts, Nicholas Bekker of
Vlakfontein, all members of the Town Council, and leading farmers such as Pieter Jacobus (Blou Oog) de
Wet of Oorlogsfontein and Pieter Wouter de Wet of Wyngaardt, many of whom were friends and
relatives?" Dr P Luttig of Aliwal North described the men in laager under Olivier as "a jolly lot who
were all doing nothing while their horses Were fat and rested. The farmer's wives Were sending good
things to eat and drink to the laager".255 The Cape Police stationed on the Frere Bridge had ordered the
local leaders not to cross the bridge, but they ignored them and visited the Free State commando.256
A tense situation developed, but it was all talk until the Magistrate, J Hugo, posted up "An
important notice to all colonial burghers" at the Magistrate's Court on 11 November 1899. It read "An
impression has got abroad that it is the intention to call out the colonial burghers in the field, that is not
the case. The Imperial Forces will be quite adequate to meet all requirements".257 Van Aardt and the local
forces lost face and the colonists were left in the lurch. The pro-Boer section of Aliwal North was ripe for
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rebellion. Camus described rebellion as "action witbout planned issue, a spontaneous protestation... he
rebels because he refuses to submit to conditions he considers intolerable".258
Historians have puzzled over why tbe Free State forces delayed a montb before invading tbe Cape
Colony. Breytenbach said that Grobler was nervous of a surprise attack from tbe south, and Scholtz
dismissed tbe delay as inexplicable. Had tbe colonists been hardened revolutionaries tbey would have
joined tbe Boer forces when war broke out. But tbe colonists were spurned and angry?59
President MT Steyn issued a proclamation on 14 October 1899 informing tbe colonists tbat as tbe
Cape Colony was being used as a base for operations against tbe Free State, he had ordered his officers to
cross tbe border in defence ofthe Free State and in order to maintain tbeir independence. The Free State
was not waging war against tbe burghers of tbe Cape Colony, he assured. They were waging war against
tbe soldiers of Great Britain. Therefore colonists would enjoy perfect liberty of person and property so
long as tbey were not hostile to the Orange Free State forces. Steyn also assured Schreiner tbat he was
commandeering colonists as a safety measure to keep order in tbe occupied districts against a possible
invasion by blacks armed by Imperial forces?60 Steyn ignored tbe issue tbat it was tbe Free Staters who
were invading a sovereign state, and tbat British troops were duty bound to drive tbern back and invade
tbe Free State in return.
Schreiner was fmally shaken out of his inertia when tbe Free State forces invaded tbe Cape
Colony proper a month after Kimberley had been invested. He protested tbat Steyn had annexed colonial
territo!y, and he objected to tbe commandeering of colonists on pain of confiscation of tbeir goods, and
the exiling of civil servants and tbe public from tbeir homes. He reproached Steyn, saying he could not
believe tbat he, as President, approved of tbe actions of his commandos. He did not tbink tbe colonists
deserved such treatment. People were being led into ill-considered actions for which tbey might have to
pay heavily. The fault would lie witb Steyn if he did not bring tbe matter to an end.261 Steyn was not tbe
least penitent, and fussed tbat Schreiner had used tbe word 'annexation' when he, Steyn, had used tbe
word 'occupation' in his proclamation. However as 'annexation' means 'incorporation' or 'addition', and
'occupation' means 'invasion', 'capture' or 'seizure', tbis semantic dispute might have significance for a
pair of lawyers but tbe reality was tbat once tbe Free State forces invaded tbe Cape Colony proper tbere
was no going back.
This splutter of words was Schreiner's swansong as a military commander. From tbe moment the
army corps arrived and after Lord Roberts took command on 10 January 1900 he faded into
Z"Albert Camus, The Rebel, penguin edition, pp 8,19.
259 Scholtz, Waarom die Boere die oorlog verloor het, p59; Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede
Vryheidsoorlog, I, p443.
260 CAR, CO 48/543, Steyn to Schreiner, 20 November 1899.
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insignificance. According to Sir Davi,d Harris, Schreiner had placed too much reliance on the.promises of
his relatives and was left in the lurch and deceived. With his legal mind he thought of applying to the
High Court for an injunction to restrain the Boers from advancing into colonial territory. His theory was
rudely shattered.262 But Schreiner, always right, shifted the blame onto the Imperial forces for not taking
'effective measures', and would say sorrowfully there was "no opportunity of establishing a special
defence at every post along the frontier".263 But the two months debacle he created on the frontier would
not easily be undone.
There was a festive air when the Rouxville Commando, led by Cmdt Olivier, crossed the Frere
Bridge at Aliwal North on 13 November 1899. The nervous Olivier insisted that Magistrate Hugo and his
clerk, Van Renen remain on the bridge to ensure that it wouldn't detonate under them. Prominent local
men, including David de Wet, rode into Aliwal North as escorts to the Free Staters.264 Olivier led a
commando of 500 Free Staters, wagons loaded with arms and ammunition plUS two nine-pound Krupp
guns into the town square and read a proclamation proclaiming Aliwal North part of the Orange Free
State. Olivier said he was invited by the people of the northeast to enter Aliwal North, and renamed the
place Oliviersfontein?65 Both the Free State flag and the Vierkleur were raised before an excited crowd.
The Free Staters had persuaded the leading disaffected Dutch colonists to join them, arguing that they
would all be in Cape Town long before the British could arrive in any numbers. But they dallied too long
over the river; three days later Lieut-Gen Sir William Gatacre disembarked at East London, arriving in
Queenstown on 16 November 1899. Crowded troops trains followed with contingents ofKaffrarian Rifles
under E Brabant and two companies of Cape Mounted Riflemen who commenced patrolling from
Penhoek.266
The occupation of Aliwal North by the Free State forces went smoothly. The Magistrate and
other civil servants left according to instructions and the administration changed over. Nicholas de Lange
of Dwarsvlei said David de Wet then addressed a meeting in the Court House, saying their Government
had abandoned them and they had now joined the Free State?67 The Municipal Council was disbanded,
but virtually the same people then took over the Dorpsbestuur. Nicholas Smuts became the
261 CAR, CO 48/543, Schreiner to Steyn, 17 November 1899.
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Burgermeester and with Nicolaas Bekker of Sonskyn, Jacobus S de Wet of Vaalkop and Philip Wege
guarded the ammunition stored in the Courthouse.268 Johannes Christoffel Joubert of Olievenfontein,
Stephanus Naude of Kalkoenkraal and Andries J Fourie of Lemoenkloof, former Field Comets, kept their
positions under the new administration.269
About 44 leading farmers in Aliwal North led the rebellion that was mainly driven by the De Wet,
Joubert and Naude families. While David de Wet remained at Buffelsvlei, Piet de Wet of Oorlogsfontein
and Pieter Wouter de Wet or 'Bolander' with Johannes Christoffel Joubert of Olievenfontein and former
Field Comets Gideon David Joubert of Patrysfontein and Pieter Johannes Naude of Naudesfontein
became the organizers of the rebellion. These leaders organized; commandeered and provided recruits;
they also supplied provisions and bought stock for the Boers, received arms and ammunition and
generally took orders from the Free Staters. The most important military position of rebel commandant
went to Gustav van Aardt who was furious about his treatment under the Colonial Government. The
election was held with Andries Jacobus Wagenaar of Vischgat, who was acting Landdrost of Jamestown,
in the chair. The unsuccessful candidates were Jacob Venter of Witkop and Johanes Hendrik Lubbe,
senior, ofDriefontein.270
Once Olivier controlled Aliwal North he permitted the English-speakers to leave or sign oaths of
neutrality, but insisted that all Cape Dutch had become Free State burghers, and commandeered every
white man between sixteen and 60 years as well as numbers of black voters. He had never warned the
Dutch "colonists they were going to be commandeered into the Free State forces.271 Now they discovered
that if they protested they were threatened with fmes of £37-10-0 and banishment to Delagoa Bay.272
The compulsory commandeering was resented, although few opposed it as colonists realised that
sympathy with the Boer cause had forced them into armed insurrection. Fervour for the Free State cause
cooled. A pattern developed that men would return home and would have to be repeatedly commandeered
and forced back to the laager. An example was the case ofNicolaas Herbst of Marshallskraal, who stated
he was commandeered under Free State Martial Law by Nicolaas J Steyn of Groenfontein to appear at
Aliwal North in 24 hours, failing that the law would deal with him. He and three brothers-in-law went to a
rise near the racecourse and Martini-Henrys were issued to a couple of hundred men by the Free Staters.
268 CAR, AG 3388, Preliminary Investigation into Charges ofHigh Treason ons de Wet, statement by RS Dawe, 26
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Herbst deserted after accompanying the commando to Jamestown. He handed in a medical certificate and
returned home. Cmdt Gustav van Aardt commandeered him at the end of January and forced him to go to
Stormberg, but as soon as he could he deserted and returned to the farm.273
While there was a hard core ofkeen people who believed in the Afrikaner cause, the rank and file
was uncertain from the start, especially as rumours spread that trainloads of Khakis or Tommies were
pouring into Queenstown. When Andries Fourie of Lemoenkloof, Lady Grey was elected Veld Cornet, he
addressed the recruits274 and said while they were all aware the English troops were massing at
Boesmanshoek and Penhoek near Queenstown, but they were not to be afraid.27S
Cmdt Hans Swanepoel of Smithfield and 300 free Staters occupied Burghersdorp on 15
November 1899. As armed burghers patrolled the streets, and 300 or 400 others lined the kopjes of the
town the Magistrate, JG Gie, protested when Swanepoel announced that the Albert division was annexed
by the Free State. He was informed that the proclamation had only to be read in public once for it to be
law. Commandeering of the Dutch colonists began; while some joined willingly other anxious Dutch
colonists tried to establish if the proclamation was an official act carried out with President Steyn's
permission, and many older farmers refused to hand over money or sheep on demand and returned home.
Professor Jan Lion-Cachet, at the Seminary, warned them of the dire consequence of rebellion, as did the
Rev James Ross at Lady Grey.276 About 25 farmers led the rebellion in this district, but it did not take as
much of a hold in the birthplace of the Afrikaner Bond as had been expected, even though Albert was the
largest division in the Northern Cape, consisting of Burghersdorp, Venterstad, Steynsburg and Molteno.
The leaders of the Albert rebels were Hendrik Bernadus Kruger of Ezelshoek, Venterstad and Johannes
Zacharias Pansegrouw, an influential man in Burghersdorp, who were members of the war council. Abel
Oosthuizen of Berseba, Steynsburg was the leader of that area, and Cmdt Piet Steenkamp, who had been
the head of the Burger force, now became military leader under the Free Staters. How much influence he
had on Olivier is unknown. The tasks of the war council were the same as in other districts: to recruit, to
arm, to commandeer and to collect provisions. Gie estimated that the Free State forces commandeered
half the Dutch voters and two thirds of the non-voters, but that many wealthy men left the district with
their stock for Queenstown rather than allow their sons to take up arms.277
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Jotham Joubert, MLA for Albert for twenty years, joined the rebellion and was made Veld
Cornet, to the shock of his colleagues in the Cape Parliament.278 It split the family as Jotham's son,
Gideon Joubert of Rietfontein, asked Cmdt Swanepoel if he could swear an oath of neutrality, but was
told that was for Englishmen only. He was allowed to go home, but was commandeered a month later and
informed if he refused he would be put over the border and all his stock would be commandeered. He
asked for leave to gather his crops and went to the laager unwillingly and surrendered at Steynsburg at the
fIrst opportunity.279
At Lady Grey CP van der Merwe, the Field Cornet, his assistant Andries de Wet and Christoffel
Petrus Hendricus Myburgh of Karmelkspruit, Lady Grey, formerly head of the colonial Burgher force,
pasted copies of the Free State proclamation on walls.280 Rebels demanded arms and ilmmunition from the
magistrates at Lady Grey and Venterstad, and one of them threatened to shoot Assistant Magistrate, Frank
Geddy. Geddy tried to read a loyal proclamation but was ignored. The Magistrate, J Smellerkamp, was
forced to hand over rifles and 600 cartridges to the Veld Cornet of Bethulie and was told to leave
Venterstad on 21 November 1899. Clerks and loyalists were given seven days to leave for Queenstown.
Molteno district was the only division in Albert, that was not mentioned when Swanepoel proclaimed the
division Free State territory as it was a loyalist stronghold. The Magistrate ofMolteno, JCP du Toit, stood
fIrm and circulated notices that commandeering was not permitted in the Molteno district. It was then
proclaimed a division, and during the fIrst invasion few men joined the republicans from there.281 When
the Free Staters occupied Albert, the leading loyalists, the Strettons and the Brosters, trekked with their
stock to Queenstown.282
Barkly East's leanings towards the republics had been an open secret for months. In this
mountainous district of about 285 small farms, on the edge of the Drakensberg the influence of a former
Magistrate, George Munnik, remained strong. He was now Landdrost of Boksburg and was in continuous
correspondence with the townspeople. He had told Kruger months before war broke out that he could
count on a friend who would come from the Colony with 300 men to help?·3 The avuncular Munnik was
an excellent recruiter, and Jan Hendrik Jacobus Greyventein of Bosch Hoek was among those who
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explained later that they rebelled because their old Magistrate had asked them to join as the British did
not have a chance?84
The leaders of the rebellion were Jan de Wet of Mosheshsford, a cousin of Christian de Wet, Carl
van Pletzen of Cloverley, Hermanus Jacobus Potgieter of Lyoness and Johannes Coenraad Dormehl of
Benmore. They confronted the Magistrate on 10 November and accused him of despatching 450 rifles and
about 80,000 rounds of ammunition stored in the magazine to Herschel to arm the Basuto. Dormehl said
that the Basuto chief Mollezi had threatened that he would fight the Boers, and this boast would be their
chance to capture the ordnance and then they could not be charged with rebellion. The Magistrate, DA
Campbell, complained to Schreiner saying he did not intend to submit to the farmers. It was degrading for
officials to remain quiet while rebel Dutchmen could do all they liked. It was his duty to report the matter
to the High Commissioner, he said. Schreiner then reproved Campbell, and told him to show forbearance
and not to loose his head and neither was he to contact Milner. Schreiner asked Merriman to contact Van
Pletzen, Pptgieter, De Wet and others on 21 October and requested them to keep the people quiet, as the
greatest harm could be done with anything that could be construed as sedition. The conspirator wrote
back blandly three days later saying there was no sedition among the farming population.285
Olivier had already occupied Aliwal North when the police in King William's Town and the
Secretary to the Law Department discovered the extent of the ordnance in the Barkly East magazine.
Campbell asked for police protection and the local sub-inspector requested extra men to guard the arms
and ammunition.286 On 15 November Gen Buller, via his Military Secretary, sent orders to Campbell that
if he could not get the ordnance away he was to destroy it. Inspector Halse of the Cape Police also
requested the arrest of VIC JG van Aardt as he was commandeering local burghers and could be in Aliwal
North, and warned if he was not stopped soon the local Dutch would throw their lot in with the
republicans.
On 21 November Gen Buller again ordered Campbell to get the ammunition away, but not to get
himself into danger. On the same day Schreiner sent a hopeful telegram that a meeting of loyal Afrikaners
was going to be held in the village. By that time Campbell had left the village and Van Pletzen, De Wet
and others removed the arms and ammunition that would be used against the unsuspecting Gatacre at
Stormberg.28?
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Olivier, who had raised the republican flag at Jamestown on 18 November, entered Barkly East
and commandeered every able-bodied man who had not fled to Herschel, as well as horses, oxen, wethers,
wagons, tents, flour, sugar and cash. After looting stores, Olivier took"over 350 rifles and most of the
ammunition from the rebels?88 About 100 rebels from Barkly East were later classified as Class 1 rebels
due to the ammunition heist and the widespread 100ting.289 They included Hercules Johannes Botha of
Mostyn, Gert Frans Botha of Castle Mahon and Abraham Johannes Buitendag of Willowleigh. Leonard
Fredienthal, a German Jew and a wandering photographer had arrived from the Free State earlier that year
and became an influential man on the war council and Messenger of the COurt.290 Willem Johan Sauer of
Mount Newton was appointed an inspector of camps under the authority of the republican forces, to the
embarrassment of his brother who was Commissioner of Lands in the Schreiner Ministry.29! Ten Free
State families from Bloemfontein, Smithfield and Rouxville had also moved into the Barkly East district
and taken out British citizenship. More than half of them were active in rebellion.292
Capt DB Hook, administrator of Herschel, quelled the threat of a tribal uprising and then held a
diplomatic meeting with Cmdt Olivier. Here they agreed that the blacks and the Boers would not interfere
with each other. Hook allowed Barkly East farmers and refugees from surrounding districts to move to
HerscheL293 The rebel districts were always P?rous: Abram Wynand Cronje of Kopshoom,
commandeered under duress, offered to hold Barkly Pass where he quietly acted as a go-between, passing
letters between farmers who had fled to the Elliot district and their workers in Barkly East. He protected
loyalistcattle and prevented lawlessness?94
Colesberg
North of Colesberg, the Free Staters, unde: Gen Grobler also lingered on the other side of the
Orange River even after a premature announcement in the papers that Colesberg had surrendered on 2
November. The camp on the banks of the Orange had been there so long that the village were taken by
surprise when the Boer forces encircled the town on 14 November, and Grobler's and Schoeman's
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Commandos occupied the town. There were no forces to oppose them. The Vierldeur was raised on
Market Square, and the Free State proclll1I\lltion read. Gen Grobler said the war had been forced on the
Boers. Cmdt Schoeman appealed to mothers and sister for their prayers, which would stand as an angel
between them and the bullets of the enemy so that they would not be harmed.295
An influential Divisional Councillor, Nicholas Albertus Janse van Rensburg of Rietfontein, who
had decided to support the Free Staters, said angrily that they_had asked for protection and not received
anything. He had no words to express his feeling in the matter of the English withdrawing their protection
and refusing them permission to purchase ammunition.'96 The Free Staters were poorly equipped as only
300 men were properly mounted, and they were short of transport oxen.'97 Nevertheless they could have
established themselves at Arundel without opposition if only Grobler and Schoeman had not been
overwhelmed by their position.'98 The republicans said they were expecting half the white males of the
district (800 men) to flock to the flag.'99 Consequently when only a handful volunteered, Ignatius J van
der Walt, MLA, and William Hofmeyr Louw of Achtertang proposed that colonists be commandeered.30o
That Van der Walt had changed sides created a sensation as he had represented the constituency in the
Cape Parliament for the past fifteen years, was a prominent member in the Afrikaner Bond, and had been
urging the colonists to remain loyal. According to Scott, a local headmaster, he said he joined the Free
State forces because England was unable to defend them, and he hoped that the European nations would
intervene in the war.30!
,. A commandeering committee was organised under Van der Walt, his brother, C van der Walt,
Rudolph Badenhorst, Gideon Jacobus Jooste, and Nicholas Albertus Janse van Rensburg, who issued
commandeering letters to Dutch farmers. It operated until the end of February 1900.30' These prosperous
farmers, angry with the Government, did not expect to fall foul of the law later on.
Later the Magistrate, WC Wrench, estimated that about 200 colonists were commandeered at
Colesberg. Like other districts the English-speaking colonists fled and their houses were looted. Wrench
described the method used to force Dutch farmers to join them the Free Staters. Men who refused to join
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296 CAR, AG 3400, Preliminary investigation into cbarges ofHigh Treason, statement by N Levenkind, April 1900.
297 Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, I, p442.
29. Oudtshoorn Courant, 2 November 1899, 'Colesberg Occupied'.
299 Cape Times, 12 April 1900, fiterview with Arthur Scott, Colesberg Headmaster.
300 Grocolt's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 18 November 1899, 'Boer Demonstration' and 'A Loyal MLA!!!'.
301 The Colesberg Advertiser, 12-4-1900; Cape Times, 21-11-1899; CAR, Cd 264, Correspondence relating to affairs
in the Cape Colony, p2.
30' Breyteobach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, I, p448; CAR, Cd 261, Further correspondence
relating to South Africa, commandeering letter issued by RJ Badenhorst 26 December, 1899; CAR, AG 2062,
Correspondence Anglo-Boer War and High Treason, Miscellaneous, Return of fivestigation on charges ofHigh
Treason, Albert, June, 1903.
Chapter I 62
were fined £37-10-0. Paying the fine immediately on demand on did not prevent the farmer being fined
repeatedly until he capitulated and signed up. In this manner men were coerced into joining.'03 A few
days later NF de Waal, secretary of the Afrikaner Bond, telegraphed Merriman that Colesberg was
unprotected, and there was no chance of resistance in town or district.304 The Free Staters commandeered
men, stock, stores and horses, and equipped their force. The 200 Colesberg rebels were scattered through
the Free State and later the Transvaal commandos. Frans Jooste of Boschvarkfontein accepted the
position of commandant of rebel forces at Kraaifontein.305 Hendrik Willem Lategan of Driefontein, a
landowner, and voter no 263 in Ward 2, Lower Hantam, operated within the Free State forces under
Cmdts J du Toit and JP SteyL Adjutants were Evert Nicholas Badenhorst and Hendrik J van der Walt, of
Twyfelpoort, son of Ignatius van der Walt, MLA. Other keen rebels were Roelf Lategan, Hendrik's
brother, Danie and Ockert Oothuizen of Ratelpoort, Pieter Albertus Botha, the Magistrate's Clerk and Jan
Hendricus, Adriaan, Daniel and Koort van Zyl/Zijl ofVluchtfontein.
Records of arms carried by the Colesberg rebels indicate they carried a varietY of weapons,
mostly the Martini-Henry, while a few carried Whitworth, Wesley Richards or sporting Mannlichters.
Very few carried Mausers. Other colonists flatly refused to serve in the Boer forces. These included four
men who returned home after telling Gen Schoeman that he could lead a horse to water, but could not
make it drink. Many of the men commandeered later returned home and the Free Staters avoided
commandeering in Murray Ward where English-speaking colonists owned the majority of farms.306 The
commandeering notes included one signed by Petrus Jan Pienaar, Veld Cornet, who was the Sexton and
the Field Cornet of Ward 1.307 Newspapers also reported an exodus of young men from Colesberg who
handed in commandeering notes to the British forces, who had occupied Naauwpoort four days after
Colesberg was invested. Here they were'also building up supplies, men and equipment.308 Meanwhile Gen
John French had taken over command of Naauwpoort on 20 November 1899 and was already probing
northwards.309
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On 26 November 1899 Free State forces under Grobler occupied Stormberg Junction, which was
handed over to Cmdt Olivier in December 1899. Grobler, who had orders to drive back a rumoured
British advance from Naauwpoort, quarrelled with Olivier over the control of the Krupp gun. They
referred the matter to President Steyn and were waiting for his decision. Meanwhile the Rouxville
Commando of 400, with 350 Smithfield men and the Krupp gun, laagered in the Kissieberg near Cmdt
Hans Swanepoel. With Olivier were 150 Aliwal North rebels under Cmdt Gustav van Aardt. The Bethulie
Commando under Floris du Plooy, and the Albert rebels under Piet Steenekamp, laagered at
Kalkoenkrans west of the railway line.3l0 Cmdt Jan Christian van Wyk ofBroekspoort and 100 Venterstad
rebels arrived at Stormberg the following day. The Albert Vecht Kommandant was Johannes Cornelius
Strydom of Blaauwkrantz. Lourens Wepener de Wet was Adjutant to the commandant, and Jasper Martin
Venter of Honingkrans, Louis Johannes Venter of Cypherfontein, Jan Frederick Coetsee ofWeltevreden,
and Christian Aucamp were the Veld Cornets.3ll Small parties from Cradock and Middelburg also joined
the rebel forces, some of them who wanted to be in at the fight and others to avoid arrest, like Jan
Stapelberg of Grootkom, Cradock who was wanted for forgery.312 The British forces attacked at dawn on
10 December 1899.
Lieut-Col Sir William Gatacre had landed at East London and camped at Putterskraal and later
Boesmanshoek, south of Molteno, from 27 November 1899. A day later he got news that the Boer forces
had occupied Stormberg junction, and the Boers had ridden into Molteno to buy supplies. Gatacre then
commandeered trains and removed 100 trucks of meal from the Kafi.Tarian Steam Mills at Molteno, and
later put the mill out of order.313 On 8 December 1899 Lieut Davies of the Frontier Mounted Rifles wrote
home saying they could see the enemy about three miles (five kms) off this side of Molteno, but had strict
orders not to fire. Gatacre would not attack the Boer forces until he had 18,000 men, Davies wrote.314
Meanwhile on 27 November, Sauer, Member for Aliwal North and Commissioner of Crown
Lands, addressed a meeting at Dordrecht attended by 200 Dutch colonists, all very anxious to know what
action their government was going to take about the invasion. Sauer's speech was described as
'miserable'. He asked the division to remain loyal and not join the rebellion. He said it was not for him to
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say if the war was just or unjust, but he never thought that Aliwal North, his constituency, would be
proclaimed Free State territory. He did not think the Boer forces would visit Dordrecht. But if they did
they were all to keep quiet and the Ministry would pay compensation later.31S Sauer telegraphed Schreiner
that the meeting has passed a unanimous resolution: "This meeting of Afrikaners residing in Wodehouse
Division deplores the existing war and expresses an earnest intention not to take part in it". A committee
was elected to interview Olivier, consisting mainly of rebel suspects, except for SJ Marais of
Smoorfontein, and included Rev IF Marais, PJ de Wet, and Octavius S Vermooten, an attorney and
Dordrecht Bond Secretary. They drove out to fmd Oliver, who took little notice ofthem.316
Sauer visited Queenstown where he had a very angry reception from 200 better-off Dutch-
speaking farmers who had moved out of the annexed districts with their stock. Philip Botha, a Field
Comet, condemned the proclamations issued by Schreiner. He asked Sauer what the Dutch were to do.
Were they to sit tamely on their farms and get themselves commandeered? Sauer assured the meeting that
everything would come out all right, and, though blood was thicker than water, they should not forget that
they were British colonists. He went on to say that he was convinced that "the invasion had neither the
sanction nor concurrence" of President Steyn. An angry leader in the newspaper conunented that Sauer
must either possess a treacherous memory or be blind to the fact that Steyn had ordered his officers to
cross the border. The paper asked if Sauer was pro-Boer or pro-British, and said that the farmers had left
the meeting without singing the customary God save the Queen.317 Merriman wrote to Pieter Jacobus
(Pony) de Wet, MLA of Waschbank, junior colleague in the Wodehouse constituency, for "patience,
which is our only hope of peace in the future". De Wet was playing a double game as he played a
prominent part in meetings and took a lead in the rebel forces, distributed ammunition and was in the
laager with the Boer conunando.318
It was obvious that Gatacre was going to attack the Boers at Stormberg; the only question was
when and with how many men. It appears he became impatient and decided to use 2,600 men, the
Northumberland Fusiliers, the Royal Irish Rifles, two field batteries and some Cape Mounted Riflemen,
to make a night attack on Stormberg on 9 December 1899. His casualties were 627 killed, wounded and
taken prisoner, and also two guns. He was at a total disadvantage, as he did not know where he was; he
had not reconnoitred the area prior to the attack, his guides lost their way. He had not sent out patrols or
315 Oudtshoorn Courant, 27 November 1899, 'Dordrecht meeting'.
316 Oosthuizen, Rebelle van die Stormberge, p70.
317 Grocott's Daily Mati Weekly War Summary, 24 November 1899.
3/8 Lewsen, Selection from the Correspondence ofJXMerriman, 1899-1905, Van Riebeeck Society, XLVII, pi03;
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scouts in advance of the column, and his troops, who. had marched in the dark with fixed bayonets from
Molteno were exhausted, as their last meal was· at 4am the previous day.319
The Boer casualties were five killed, including the rebels Jan Harm Labuschagne Olivier of
Ruigtefontein, Burghersdorp and Jan Petrus Gericke of Aliwal North, and the 26 wounded including Jan
van Rensburg, NJ van der Westhuizen and Piet de Wet of Dordrecht.320 That afternoon the Boers held a
thaflksgiving service at Stormberg wheri a photograph was taken of them. A good many of the rebels
returned to their farms feeling they had no stomach for war.321
Instead of the unexpected stunning victory uniting the burghers and the rebels, they quarrelled
over the spoils. Pieter RouX, a teacher at Toomnek, Dordrecht said resentfully that they returned from
Stormberg with sore shoulders as the old Martini-Henry kicked when fired from a prone position, but
Olivier ignored their complaints and took the Lee-Metfords for his own men.322 Gatacre's defeat by the
Boers on 10 December became part of 'Black Week' when the British were not only defeated. at
Stormberg, but also at Magersfontein and Colenso. But the British did not sue for peace; instead they
called out their first class reserves.323
Lord Frederick Roberts, who arrived at the Cape on 10 January, succeeded Buller as Commander-
in-Chief in South Africa. He started by creating the Colonial Division in January 1900 under the Senior
Colonial Officer, Col EY Brabant. The force of over 4,000 mounted men, was composed of 563 Cape
Mounted Riflemen, I" Brabants, 568 Kaffrarian Rifles, 420 Border Horse, 1,063 Nesbitt's Horse, 492
Mar.shall's Horse, 180 Eastern Province Horse, 432 Queenstown Volunteers and 300 Driscoll Scouts
(Frontier Light Horse).324 The colonial troops eventually arrived at the front, and now had to campaign,
due to Schreiner's neutrality policy, not only against the Free Staters but also against their own colonists
in a divisive civil war.
Between Gatacre's forces at Sterkstroom and Brabant's force at Bird River, the threatened
advance of the Boers into the Colony halted. Brabant, using the branch line from Sterkstroom to the
Indwe coalmines, reconnoitred in force towards Dordrecht with the Cape Mounted Riflemen and
Montmorency Scouts, under Capt R de V Montmorency, probing rebel defences.325
319 Carver, The Boer War, p41. Account by Second Lieutenant John Preston; Meintjes, Dorp van Drome, pp93-100.
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Pieter Roux said that from their laager they watched with apprehension as the English camp at
Bird River and Putterskraal expanded, and old Gen Brabant and his Brabant's Horse appeared, followed
by 4,000 Volunteers. They were colonial farmers who were good shots and fIrst class horsemen. Brabants
was a really sharp regiment, one of the best the English had, and there were men in it that only aimed for
the head, said Roux. The rebels now had to fIght against colonials who knew the terrain as well as they
did, and who would not lose their way. As operations expanded against them, the rebels wryly nicknamed
Brabant's Horse Kopskoot manne. 326 The reality was that Brabant's Horse had equal respect for the
rebels, and after the Stormberg debacle was nervous of them.
Cmdt Olivier and 450 men occupied Dordrecht two days after the fIght at Stormberg and
continued commandeering. But the Laager Commandant, 1M de Beer of Bamboesfontein, complained
that three days after being commandeered, men began deserting the laager. The newly elected
commandant, Daniel Wilhelmus Schoeman commandeered 38 men from Ward 3 and ordered them to
arrive with a horse, saddle, 30 cartridges and food for eight days. Meanwhile ten other farmers were
ordered to supply three horses, four buck-wagons, 28 draught oxen with gear, as well as fIfteen goat
wethers and a tarpaulin.327 The colonists were discovering that rebellion was a ruinous business.
Pieter Frederick Anderson of Koffiefontein was appointed acting Landdrost of Dordrecht,
Christian James Barnard of Mavisbank, who farmed at Rouxville and had only recently been naturalized,
Laurence Anderson of Bothashoek and August Klee ran the War Council. They sent local loyalists to
Bloemfontein as prisoners-of-war on the slightest pretext.328
However as the colonial forces gained strength, Olivier's efforts to commandeer further rebels
began to wane. The colonists ignored his threats and said they wanted to shoot Carel van Pletzen and Jan
de Wet for having invited the Free Staters into their districts.329 The realisation grew that the Free Staters
had only occupied the Stormberg region in order to create a buffer zone for the Free State. Among the
problems between the allies was that Olivier refused to hand over the smokeless Mausers to the rebels,
and consequently the Free Staters did not want to fIght with them as the smoke that erupted when a
Martini-Henry was fIred gave their position away. Olivier also favoured his own men with tents and extra
food.330 He disregarded pleas from the rebels for more food for their families. In the Steyn collection is a
letter from Stormberg from burghers of Albert, OFS asking for a larger food allowance for their families
326 Oosthuizen, Rebelle van die Stormberge, p202. Translation reads Men who aimed/or the head.
327 CAR, AG 2133, B18. Note found in the Boer laager at Dordrecht, 16 February 1900.
328 CAR, AG 3421, Preliminary Investigation into charges ofHigh Treason ofDJ Schoeman; July 1902.
329 Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 10 February 1900.
330 Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, lV, p454.
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in January 1900, saying that two buckets of·meal per adult per month was too little. It was signed by J
Kruger, JD Coetsee, ill Coetsee, R PeIser and eleven other Albert rebels.331
Dalgety launched a succession of attacks on Dordrecht, beginning on 22 December when the
CMR and Brabant's Horse occupied the town; the rebels falling back to Labuschagnesnek. Shortly
afterwards Brabant ordered their withdrawal. Olivier then informed Schoeman that the 600 rebels from
Barkly East, Dordrecht and Aliwal North were to protect the Dordrecht district, and he pulled back to
Stormberg Junction.332 Truckloads of livestock, grain and forage were consigned virtually on a daily basis
from Aliwal North to feed these men.333
On 3 January the police station, two miles (three kID) south of Molteno, held by 250 men, was
attacked by a Boer force with the two guns captured at Stormberg. One was positioned on the Loperberg.
Gatacre despatched reinforcements by rail and road from Bushmanshoek and Sterkstroom. The 79fu Field
Battery then opened fire from 4,500 yards (4100 m) resulting in the withdrawal of the Boer force and the
gun. The police station was then reinforced by 120 mounted troops, with adequate supplies of
ammunition.334 The rebels withdrew to a valley east of the Loperberg, but not before many of them had
been recognised by the colonial forces who then made detailed statements before a local magistrate
identifying those they had seen.
Wodehouse rebels captured by the Colonial Division early in 1900 near Dordrecht were all found
guilty of High Treason before the Eastern District Court in May 1900. Laurence Anderson of Botha's
Hoek, was sentenced to a year's imprisonrilent, a fme of £500 or an additional sentence of twelve months
in gaol. George Annandale ofAnnan Water was sentenced to two year's imprisonment or a further year's
imprisonment; Cornelius Johannes Greyling of Schilderkrantz was fmed £50 or one year's imprisonment
and Octavius Septimus Vermooten, an attorney who was arrested in January 1900 when he went to
Queenstown on legal business for a client, thinking that gave him immunity from prosecution, was
sentenced to a lengthy four year's imprisonment.335 At Vermooten's preliminary investigation, Corporal
Marais of the Cape Police stated that he had been captured by the Boers on 15 December 1899 and had
been interrogated by Vermooten at a Krygsraad meeting at Snyman's Hotel in Dordrecht on the
movements of British troops at Queenstown. Landdrost J de Wet was present as well as PJ de Wet MLA.
The following day Vermooten, who acted as clerk, read out a long charge to Marais, and as a result, he
331 FAR, A 156 1/1/257, MT Steyn Collection, 8 January 1900, Request for a larger food allowance.
332 Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly WI11' Summary, 10 February 1900.
333 CAR, AG 3389, Prelimloary Investigation into High Treason, Stephanus van Aardt, statement by W Branfield, 15
March 1900.
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335 CAR, AG 2117, Class I rebels charged with High Treason before the High Court in Grahamstown, May 1900.
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was sent to Bloemfontein Gaol from where he and four others escaped and later reached the British lines
at Modder River.336
Action in tbe Colesberg district
When Kruger urged Steyn to destroy the railway line between Naauwpoort and De Aar, Steyn
asked for reinforcements, and as a result 800 Transvalers under Gen Hendrik Schoeman arrived in
Colesberg on I December 1899.337 Scboeman and the Free State commandants feared a major advance by
the British to relieve Kimberley, and after consulting Steyn, Grobler was ordered to occupy Stormberg
Junction.338 Schoeman then took command of the Boer forces holding Colesberg, and was later
condemned by his officers for failing to advance into the Cape Colony and for the slackness of his
command. Manie Maritz, a member ofthe ZARP. police, also complained of a lack of order, organisation
and discipline in the Boer camp.339
There were not many accounts of the rebels in action. One of the most detailed was about
Hendrik Lategan of Driefontein's, plan to capture a Rimington Guide. He suggested that Van Zyl
(probably Jan van Zijl) wear khaki uniform as disguise. In this way, Frank Weakley, was trapped and
captured. Weakley said Lategan threatened to shoot him, but changed his mind when the Guide warned
him about the penalty for murder. He was sent to the prison camp at Waterfall.340
, The Bloemfontein, Winburg and Senekal Commandos, plus the rebels, occupied the hills east and
southeast of Arundel with two guns. Lategan became increasingly daring and attempted to outflank a
British force at Arundel on 12 December 1899, and cut it off from its base at Naauwpoort. The Boers
were driven off when the British were reinforced, and were forced out of their position by British
Armstrongs. The rebels demonstrated that they had skill and daring, and could become a formidable force
if they were better armed and better led.341 A rebel who felt the poor leadership and lack of action was
Jacob Neser of Modderfontein, Colesberg, a member of GH Gravette's Germiston Commando. Neser,
with Brazelle, went scouting in the Steynsburg and Middelburg districts, and returned with letters for
Schoeman from men who pleaded for him to advance south into the Cape Colony but Schoeman did not
move. Neser was also involved in the skirmish on New Year's Day when an attacking force under Maj
33. Grocotl's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, IS February 1900, 'Queenstown'.
331 Breytenbach, Die Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, I, p437.
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FWN McCrachen was driven back, and was on sentry duty when the Suffolk Regiment attacked at
Graskop on 6 January and Gen Piet de Wet's men inflicted heavy casualties on them in the hand-to-hand
fighting that followed.'42
In the cemetery at Colesberg the war graves of JA Venter of Loksfontein and J van der Walt of
Wildefontein, both of Colesberg, and of H Lategan of Tarkastad, are a reminder of the time when the
colonial rebels fought and died for republican ideals.
342 Wessels (ed), Die Oorlogsherinneringe van Kommandant Jacob Petrus Neser, p27-28.
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At New Year 1900 Gen Olivier returned to Stormberg with 300 Free Staters, and anned with
the Krupp gun strongly entrenched his position. A week previously rebel forces had clashed with Capt
Henry Lukin, commanding the Artillery of the Cape Mounted Riflemen, near Jamestown.' The result
was that Olivier, once so arrogant and energetic, had lost any initiative he once might have had. His
confidence had certainly dwindled as he told people in Barkly East he once thought the English
soldiers could not shoot, but after fighting in the Cape Colony had changed his mind?
Olivier's rebel force totalled just over 3,000. But the fire had gone out of the rebellion and
rebels were deserting, drifting away, dissatisfied with his leadership as the Colonial Division
continued to entrench itself and, backed by CMR Artillery, was becoming bolder.' Arnoldus Greyling
of Winterslow, Dordrecht was in the deputation that went to Olivier and asked him why they were not
Ocerailing the railway line north of Queenstown and blocking the advance of troops and supplies to
Putterskraal and Sterkstroom. The general reacted and ordered that 300 rebels occupy Kromhoogte in
the Steynsburg district. However when they asked Olivier for a strong force ofFree Staters to support
them, he refused to weaken his guards around Stormberg. Without the support of the Rouxville and
Smithfield men the rebels refused to advance unsupported, and Olivier dropped the plan.' The rebels
then pleaded for a guarantee for their safety. Olivier replied that he, Jan Olivier with his blood, was
their guarantee.'
May Johnson, wife of the Burghersdorp headmaster, writing a continuous letter to her sister
which she eventually posted in March 1900, wrote that Olivier, who had complained that the English-
speaking inhabitants in Burghersdorp had been treated too lightly, ordered his men to search for arms
and ammunition throughout the town and location in January. Unable to find anything, he allowed his
, See Chapter 5: When the rebels needed leadership.
2 Orocol/'s Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 10 February 1900. 'Deserted by 'Sneak' Rebels'.
3 CAR, AG 2133, Rules ofLaager CommandantLll7/10, signed GC de Wet; FAR, A 156 All/1/2, MT Steyn
Collection, Request of fifteen burghers of Albert, Orange Free State, 3 January, 1900. They complained their
families received only two buckets of mea! each per month and asked for meat and coffee.
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men to ransack the houses of local people and the Free Staters pilfered anything they could find,
including £30 worth of jewellery from a Mrs W Knight. Meyer, the local barber, and his two sons,
who had refused five or six times to be commandeered were again threatened with expulsion, but he
wired the President and Olivier's orders were countermanded. Rumours of Boer losses circulated,
although Johnson said it was difficult to discover precise details. Rebels were certainly returning
home ill; both her Dutch neighbour's sons contracted typhoid; one died and their sister, who had
nursed them, died from the disease as well.' Very few people were then aware that typhoid was a
water-born disease, and that drinking boiled coffee was an important reason why many Boers did not
contract it. Drinking water from polluted streams was one of the many ways why so many soldiers
and civilians contracted typhoid during the South African War.
Olivier left it to Cmdts Danie Schoeman of Dordrecht, Gideon Cronje of Barkly East and
Amoldus Jacobus Greyling of Lady Grey to defend the Dordrecht district. On 7 February Dordrecht
rebels led by Schoeman attacked the Cape Mounted Riflemen's camp at Bird River under Lieut DA
Hare-Bowers, opening fire at 6,000 yards (5,486 m). They were using of the Krupp gun because they
shelled the camp for some hours, hitting the guard tent and fatally wounding a Trooper and severely
injuring another soldier in a gun pit. The rebels advanced along the bed ofthe Bird River in force, but
were kept in check by maxims and rifle fire and a sally from the Royal Scots. Gen Gatacre appeared
with reinforcements from Sterkstroom that included the CMR guns. Capt Lukin fired 52 shells that
drove the rebels back. On the same day another rebel group fired on the camp at Penhoek, but they
pulled back when their fire was returned.' The colonial forces communicated by telegraph or
'.
heliograph and reinforced each other when needed. In contrast only the Albert rebels were with the
Free Staters at Stormberg, the remainder operated in a separate group with little co-ordination
between them.
There were colonists who all along had serious doubts about the legality of the Free State
occupation even though letters, telegrams and commandeering letters were now all addressed to
Dordrecht, Orange Free State. Stephanus Strydom of Leeuwplaats, Albert and George William
Aldrich of Grootvlei, Knapdaar had refused to be commandeered. They then asked for a pass and
travelled to Bloemfontein and were granted an interview with President Steyn in January 1900. They
asked for his protection as British citizens as Gen Grobler promised. Steyn then informed Strydom
and Aldrich that they were no longer British colonists, but were private burghers of the Free State.
, BMJ Greyling, Grey/ing Boerehelde Geskiedenis, p7.
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Chapter 2 72
Strydom asked Steyn if annexing a district and commandeering its people was in accordance with
international law. Steyn insisted that the occupation of the northern Cape was legal, and Albert was
part of the Free State, but he would ouly give them protection if they went to the front. Aldrich
reported later that when Strydom, who was a colonial Field Cornet, said he could be shot if he joined
the Free State forces, Steyn laughed and said that if that happened they would shoot six of the best
English officers.' The men returned to their farms in Albert, furious as they did not believe Steyn.
The Free State president wrote to the Secretary of State on 30 January 1900, that he had been
informed that the British authorities had arrested Afrikaner inhabitants of the northern Cape Colony
on a charge of High Treason. He stated that as these persons had joined the Free State forces, and
were citizens of that state, they should be treated as prisoners-of-war: Cape and Natal rebels captured
under arms by the British were in fact sent to prisoner-of-war camps on St Helena, Ceylon and India
However when they returned after the war they appeared before the colonial courts as British citizens
on charges ofHigh Treason.
Dordrecht reoccupied
On 14 February 1900 Cmdt Schoeman commandeered fourteen snits, 35 pairs of trousers and
28 hats from Morum Bros at Dordrecht and divided them out between his men, requesting that the bill
be sent to the Free State Government. That was possibly the last handout they would receive, because
a few days later the Colonial Division under Brabant reappeared, determined to drive them out of
toWn.'"
On IS February 1900, French who had broken through at Ramdam, bypassed Gen Cronje at
Magersfontein and relieved Kimberley. On the same day, further south in the Cape Colony, in a far
more modest fashion, the Colonial Division also outflanked Olivier who was entrenched at
Stormberg. At dawn 1200 men of Brabant's Horse with contingents of the Cape Mounted Riflemen,
as well as its artillery, made a general advance eastward from Penhoek towards Dordrecht, using the
farm tracks that ran along the top of the mountain range. A halt was made on Jakhals Kop and the two
regiments divided into sixteen squadrons. The scouts came tinder fIre at Jakhals Kop from the rebels
who were thought to number about 600 and were blocking the route to Dordrecht with two guns. The
CMR guns were then pulled up to a vantage point where they took advantage oftrenches built built by
8 CAR, Cd 261, Enclosure 9 of51, Statements by S Strydom ofLeeuwplaats, Albert and OW Aldrich of
Grootvlei, Knapdaar, 12 April 1900, Enclosure 10 of 51, Statement of William Brandt, 11 April 1900.
9 CAR, Cd 261, Enclosure 5 of30, January 1900. President Steyn to Joseph Chamberlain. The claim was
rejected.
10 Williams, The Record ofthe Cape Mounted Riflemen, p68. CMR casualties were seven killed and seven
wounded; CAR, AO 3421, Preliminary Investigation into charges of High Treason, Cmdt DWJ Schoeman, copies
of receipts commandeered.
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the Boer forces previously. The attackers broke into skirmishing order and made good progress across
the open ground.
Later that afternoon the Boer gunners fired with such accuracy that the colonial forces pulled
back some of the guns. The Boers held off the Brabant's through steady firing, but they retired to the
laager at nightfall while the colonials remained in position in the veld. The next morning scouts
discovered that the Boer forces had withdrawn to the ridges behind the village. When Maj CF
Sprenger led his men into Dordrecht the foJlowing day they came under a fresh attack from the 9-pdr
Krupp gun and marksmen positioned in the hills above the town. After the IS-prds had disabled the
carriage of the Krupp gun, the Boers retreated to Labuschagnesnek, a huge rocky formation north of
Dordrecht. 11
The Cape Police continued their drives through the Stormberg region in February, rounding
up cattle from rebel farms, leaving just enough stock behind to feed the families. At one of these sales
on 20 February the Deputy Sheriff of Queenstown auctioned off rebel cattle for £3,600. The Boer
forces made no attempt to intercept the drives.!2 When the Free State forces invaded the Cape Colony,
many pro-Boer Dutch colonists, angry with the Schreiner Government, had bent to their mixture of
persuasion and coercion. Now the rebels realised they would have to continue the fight or surrender
and face charges of High Treason. It was becoming apparent that if the Free State forces remained
inactive in their Stormberg stronghold, the commandos would be driven out of the new districts.!'
Once Gatacre received information that the Dordrecht rebels were holding Labuschagnesnek,
he moved from Sterkstroom to Molteno intent on launching a second attack on Olivier at Stormberg.
He went out a strong forces to reconnoitre the Boer position at Stormberg with 1,000 men on 23
February. On his right was Captain Montmorency leading his 80 scouts. The Boer forces at Stormberg
saw the British forces approaching when they reached Zwavelkrans, six miles (ten kms) from
Molteno. Between them was a long narrow hill, steep on the one side and with a gentle slope on the
other. Montmorency and his scouts recklessly stormed up the steep side of Schoernanskop, unaware
that the Boers had reached the summit from the other side. The burghers frred down at them from
point blank range, killing Montmorency and five of his scouts, some of them local men. One of them
was the well-liked Frank CoJlett, who worked for the Albert Times. CoJlett's death was much
regretted and made a lasting impression on the rebels. Many of them, including Louis Wepener De
Wet of Modderfontein and Jan Frederick Coetzee ofWeltevrede, both of Albert, referred to the fight
later, not as where Montmorency, the VC died, but called Schoemanskop instead "the place where
!1 Williams, Record ofthe Cape Mounted Riflemen, p66; CMR casualties were one killed and one wounded;
Capt Robert George Mullins of Brahauls Horse, letter of22 February 1900, Cory Library, Ms 17.015.
12 Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 20 February 1900.
t3 Scholtz, Waarom die Boere die Oorlog Verloor het, p75.
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Collett was killed".14 After an indecisive skirmish in a downpour, Gatacre returned to Molteno
discomforted as the capture of Stormberg had again evaded him.
The Free Staters began building drifts through the Orange River in the vicinity of Barkly East
and Lady Grey. Herds of commandeered cattle and sheep, as well as wagons loaded with stores, were
driven through to the Free State. ll Almost 1,000 claims were later submitted for compensation for war
losses incurred by the forces of the Orange Free State, totalling £211,083-2-4. The claims were
restricted to damage to crops, fences, livestock, merchandise, household and other goods, farm
produce, damage to lands and buildings and miscellaneous damage, and were submitted in the eight
divisions of the north-eastern districts after the first invasion between November 1899 and March
1900.16 In the republican forces war booty was legitimate, and large quantities of commandeered
stock and goods were taken from loyalist and rebel alike.
The Colesberg front
In contrast to the Stormberg region the morale of the Boer forces on the Colesberg front was
far higher. The Boer forces improved as a fighting unit after Gen De la Rey arrived and stiffened the
men, sometimes driving them back to their positions with his whip.17 Under the dynamic De la Rey,
the Boer forces planned to drive the British troops back to Naauwpoort and De Aar. Cmdt Lategan,
leading 150 men on 5 February forced the British back to Slingersfontein from Potfontein.
Throughout February the Boers, under De la Rey's, held the British advance back. A lively Gen Piet
de"Wet replaced Grobler. I ' The British abandoned Colesberg Koppie as they were massing to relieve
Kimberley and on 20 February, after another successful skirmish at Rietfontein, the Boers drove the
weakened British forces back to Arundel.19
At this crucial juncture De la Rey was recalled to help extricate Gen Piet Cronje's men
encircled at Paardeberg.2o The fight went out of the Boer line. Lategan and his rebels departed with
the Boer forces from the Cape Colony. The 6,000 to 7,000 retreating burghers took with them about
600 supply wagons and 10,000 oxen, forming a convoy 25 miles (40 kms) long. Much of the stock
14 CAR, AG 2062, Correspondence Anglo-Boer War and High Treason, Miscellaneous, Return ofInvestigation
on charges ofHigh Treason, Albert, June 1903; Meintjes, Stormberg A Lost Opportunity, ppl32,134; AV
Oosthuizen, A Guide to the Battlefields, Graves and Monuments o/the Anglo-Boer War in the North Eastern
Cape, 100 Hundred Anniversary 1899-1999, p20, contains a photograph ofthe Montmorency Scout Memorial in
Molteno.
15 Grocotl's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 22 February 1900.
16 Cape ofGood Hope, Official Publications, G 60-1904, Report of the War Losses Compensation Commission,
p26. Losses claimed and assessed by inhabitants ofseven divisions as a result ofthe first invasion ofthe Cape
Colony by the forces of the Orange Free State (Colesberg losses will be dealt with separately).
17 Maritz, My Lewe en Strewe, p19.
I' Johannes Meintjes, De la &y, Lion o/the West, ppI45-149.
19 Amery (eds), The Times History, 1lI, p467.
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had been taken from the Colesberg district. Later 362 claims were submitted to the War
Compensation Commission totalling £102,358-2-4, of which £52,337-12-0 were claims submitted for
direct losses of livestock as a result of the first invasion of the Cape Colony by forces of the Orange
Free State. British forces under Gen RAP Clements occupied Colesberg on 28 February 1900.
Clements ordered the arrest of numerous 'Colesberg Dutch' when he arrived?' Clarence de Jager,
who was articled to the lawyer Schultz, arrived in Colesberg in June 1900 to take up his post. He
wrote that the first thing he saw in the main street was a dead horse. "It was an awful place, no
amusements and no cafes. Very bad feeling between the English and Afrikaans; when the Boers took
Colesberg they arrested nine English-speaking people and kept them in a guardhouse; the local
Afrikaners did nothing to get them released. When the British took the town the tables were turned
and many Afrikaners were then arrested on trivial matters and their plight was igoored by the English
speaking:""
Expedition to the northwest Cape
In Gordonia and Kenhardt the news of the invasion of the Cape Colony had spread like
wildfire, and contact was made by pro-Boer colonists with Gen Cronje who organised an expedition
to proclaim the northwest as part of the Free State. Lane, who was in Cronje's laager, reported "great
talk of 6,000 colonial Boers at a place called Prieska, waiting to join the Boer forces"." On 26
January Gen Cronje sent 200 men off from Magersfontein and told them to return with 2,000
~olonists. The Transvaal Government, who financed the expedition, instructed that the inhabitaots
were to be commandeered for war service as a burgher force." On 8 February 1900 the expedition left
Douglas under Assistant Hoofd Cmdt Lukas Petrus Steenkamp of Venterstad, and Cmdt PJ
Liebenberg, promoted Combat Genera!." Kumman rebels, Frans Petrus van Kradenburg of Neyland,
George Simon Pearston of Rooiwal and Jan Hendrik Boshoff of Lynputs looted stores and farms for
supplies as they went.26 AP Roos of Klerksdorp, who was in the rear of the commando, arrived at a
20 Amery (eds), The Times History, III, p487.
21 Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, "Rensburg', 2 March 1900; Cape of Good Hope, Official
Publications, G 60-1904, Report oflbe War Losses Compensation Commission, p26. Losses claimed and
assessed by inhabitants ofColesberg as a result of the first invasion oflbo Cape Colony by lbe forces of the
Orange Free State.
22 Clarence De Jager, 'Memoirs', private archives ofJulian de Jager, Beaufort West, p27.
" Lane (ed), The War Diary ofBurgher Jewk Lane, p73.
" CAR, Cd 261, Nos74,74b, Instructions to Assistant Head Cmdt Steenkamp by JS Ferreira, Head Commandant,
31 January 1900.
25 M Cleaver and De Fenton, The War Letter ofan English Burgher, p86.
26 CAR, AG 2033, Folio IS, Details oflater Treason charges.
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farm that had been looted and found that "everything had been ruined", wrote he could not thank God
sufficiently that the war would never come to their part of the country.27
Steenkamp proclaimed Prieska, on the Orange River, Boer territory on 16 February 1900, and
300 colonists were commandeered while in a mass exodus 420 English, loyal Dutch and 'natives'
trekked to Carnarvon, Britstown and Victoria West. Liebenberg trekked on to Houwater, near
Britstown where he received support, and Kenhardt was proclaimed Free State territory on 28
February after a short-lived opposition from the Basters collapsed." A commando, led by Jacobus P
Jooste of Worcester, arrived in Upington on 3 March. Ockert and George Van Scha1kwyk, who had
been missing from the village, returned with thern.'· Jooste held meetings at the Court House in
Upington, at Neimollers and in the church that belonged to the Basters. They were disarmed and had
their firearms smashed. Jooste said he had come both on business and on invitation, and those who
wanted to be burghers of the Free State could attend his meetings, while the British subjects were to
leave the country within eight days. The Town Clerk, Barend Jacobus Burger Van der Merwe, the
missionary, Rev Christian Wilhelm Schroeder, two farmers, Gert Johannes Kotzee and Christian
George van Scha1kwyk, and a wagon maker, Pieter Jacobus Jacobs, were elected members of the war
council and signed an oath of allegiance to the Free State.'o Small local armed commandos rode
through the district, more intent on looting country stores than anything else."
Roberts, alive to the danger of further Boer expansion, detailed forces to drive the republicans
out of the northwest Cape. Col Sir John Adye's Column clashed with Gen Liebenberg at Houwater on
6 March 1900 and afterwards the Boers spread reports that The City of London Volunteers had lost
i'70 men, but the figures proved to be hopelessly exaggerated as the South African Field Force
Casualty List for that regiment listed six wounded and five missing near Britstown." Jooste assured
his supporters that the Boers were looking for a port on the west coast to bring in arms and
ammunition as they were expecting 25,000 trained French soldiers, disguised as mechanics or
miners." At the same time HMS Niobe was despatched from the Cape to Walfisch Bay, where the
ship remained a few weeks because the German Government feared an attack by a commando of
27 Roos, AP, unpublished diary, I October 1899 to 31 January 1900, K1erksdorp Museum, 31 January 1899. It
was difficult for many rebels and republicans to believe that the colonials would retaliate when they got the
chance.
28 Cleaver and De Fenton, The War Letters ofan English Burgher, p88; CAR, CCP 1/2/1/111, The Occupation
by the OFS ofthe Cape Colony, Magistrate's report.
2' CAR, AG 3404 Regina versus Van Scha1kwyk and others, statement by BJB van der Merwe.
'0 CAR, AG 3404, Preliminary Investigation into Cbarges of High Treason, GordoniaKrygsraaa; Statement by
JTA Vers1luur, Assistant Magistrate.
31 CAR, AG 3404, Regina vs Van Schalkwyk, statement by Daniel Turpin.
32 Cleaver and De Fenton, The War Letters ofan English Burgher, p91; South African Field Force Casualty List,
Section from II October 1899 to 20 March 1900, pp95-96.
33 CAR, CCP 1/2/1/111, The Occupation by the OFS of the Cape Colony, Magistrate's report; Grocott 's Daily
Mail Weekly War Summary, 11 March 1899.
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Boers inside German South-West Africa and had asked Britain defend the port.34 Nothing came of
either story, but this was a typical rurnour that flourished because there was no hard news.
The pattern of the invasion in the northwest Cape was identical to that in the Stormberg. An
armed commando would make its appearance in an isolated village, and before the astonished
inhabitants the Cape Police, the magistrate and civil servants would pack their bags and leave the
colonists behind, apparently forever, to a changed nationality, a new flag and to life as part of the Free
State.
When a Boer despatch rider arrived with news that three British columns were converging on
Prieska, the bubble burst. The republican forces fled when they learnt of the disaster that had befallen
Cronje. In Kenhardt and Upington the war councils disbanded in panic, and many surrendered after
the Magistrate and Clerks returned while others decided to fight ou." Cmdt Lukas Steenkarnp fled to
German South West Africa, and arrived some months later as a refugee in The Netherlands. At
Prieska Andries de Wet abandoned orders to proclaim Fraserburg as Orange Free State territory, and
joined Gen Liebenberg, Cmdt Jooste and Advocate Mostyn Cleaver and trekked back to the Transvaal
with a party of fleeiog rebels. 36 Although this expedition appeared to be of little military value, it had
considerable significance as the area over which the Anglo-Boer War was waged expanded. Three
columns under Gen H Settle, Sir Charles Parson and Sir John Adye were also diverted from the main
theatre ofwar to the Cape Colony."
After the capture of Cronje, President Steyn recalled his burghers from the Cape Colony to
defend the Orange Free State, and the worst fears of the rebels were realised. Olivier and his men
~ithdrew from Stormberg; some left by train and others trekked towards Aliwal North via
Burghersdorp, avoiding Dordrecht. TIle Free Staters drove stock and heavily laden wagons
northwards. Behind them parties of local Burghersdorp rebels slipped away to lay down arms, hoping
for leniency from the British."
On the Natal front morale was also low. Frank Hill of Kroonstad, now io charge of the
commissariat for the commando on the northern side of the Tugela River, commented sadly, "It's 23"'
February and today is Independence Day! It's been 46 years since the OFS became an independent
state. One feels sad to know that perhaps this will be the last birthday we shall keep. Perhaps when the
next birthday comes round we shall see this state abolished and be in process of forming a united
34 McKenzie,The History ofthe Duke ofEdinburgh's Own Rifles, p41.
35 Cleaver and De Fenton, The War Letter ofan English Burgher, p93.
36 CAR, Cd 261, Report of Sir Alfred Milner, Further Correspondence Relating to South Africa, 6 June 1900, No
74 and Enclosure I; PHS van Zyl, Die He/de A/bum van OtIS Vryheidsstryd, p107; Kommandant A de Wet,
Adjutant Hvan Doomik und GC du Plessis, Die Buren in der Kopk%nie im Kriege mit Enge/and, IV, of1m
Kampfum SUd-Afrika, pp68-85.
37 Headlam, The Milner Papers, I, p34.
38 May Johnson, letter from at Burghersdorp 18 November 1899 to 7March 1899, Cory Library, MS 10.581.
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South Africa. Whatever happens to us, it is to be hoped peace and joy will be throughout the land.
The war still rages with all its bitterness":-
Labuschagnesnek
While the Colonial Division built up supplies and annaments in Dordrecht, Schoeman and
Van Aardt struggled to control their men, whose morale and discipline reached rock bottom. Ignoring
Michael de Wet, a senior Free Stater, Van Aardt sent an urgent telegram to President Steyn on 22
February requesting a Combat General and 300 men as reinforcements only to recceive the unlikely
reply that Gen De la Rey would be contacted and sent down.40 .
The Dordrecht, Jamestown and Barldy East men held onto Labuschagnesnek until 6 March
1900. Mullins of Brabants wrote that they learnt to fight the rebel way and take every bit of cover
possible. If their legs and arms stuck out from behind the rocks they were more than likely to be hit .
The fighting however remained spOradic until the Colonial Division, led by Maj C Maxwell of the
Cape Mounted Riflemen, left Dordrecht before dawn on 4 March, and making a detour of ten miles
(sixteen kms) the column arrived at the foot of the ridge commanding the Boer position from the east.
Maxwell and 100 men, not waiting for stragglers, plus 100 men from Brabant's Horse climbed up and
occupied a high point east of the main rebel position, which they had held during the day but vacated
each night when the men went down to the laager. Next morning the CMR gunners had moved into
position and were waiting for the Dordrecht rebels, led by Van Aardt, as they climbed up the rocks,
and fired down on them when they were only 250 yards off. The rebels regrouped and the firing
continued. However that night the Royal Engineers pulled the two 15pdr guns to another vantage
point in the dark. Their fITst shells fired at daybreak put the Boer gun out of commission. It is
probably at this point that Cmdt Arnoldus Jacobus Greyling of the Lady Grey rebels was fatally
wounded. The Barldy East rebels on Pappasnek began to withdraw when they saw they were in
danger of being cut off. Although they kept up a 'brave and plucky fight', the exhausted rebels, who
had little to eat or drink during the last couple of days, fled Labuschagnesnek by midday 6 March
1900."
Hendrik Francois de Wet o[Vaalkop, Lady Grey said they lay behind the stony ridges and
were still shooting the English, unaware that Olivier and his Free Staters had already crossed the
bridge at Aliwal North into the Free State. He said it was hot and he was so thirsty that he chewed the
,- Hill, long letter to his wife, 23 February 1900, Private Archives ofMrs J Muller ofRondebosch, Cape Town.
40 CAR AG 3421 Preparatory examination of Daniel WJ Schoeman charged with High Treason, 23 June 1902;
Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 30 March 1900, quoting documents found abandoned at
Labuschagnesnek.
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suurpol to get some moisture into his parched mouth.·2 Pieter Roux ofToomnek, Dordrecht wrote that
three of the rebels, all friends, d.ied ofhead wounds on Labuschagnesnek. Theunis van der Merwe,
Nicolaas de Bruin, Hans Labuschagne and A Lubbe of Dordrecht were killed, and about seventeen
other rebels were wounded.43
The Dordrecht rebels then took the road to Roodehoogte and Aliwal North, while other local
co=andos surrendered and withdrew towards Barkl~ East. A large number of Martini-Herny rifles,
numerous cattle and sheep and a trunk of incriminating docnments were discovered abandoned in the
camp."
The situation was uncertain, and, as the majority of rebels were ready to surrender, a meeting
took place with Maj Hook at Lady Grey three days later. N Smuts and PJ de Wet represented Aliwal
North; F Venter spoke for the Barkly East and C van Heerden for the Dordrecht rebels. Smuts
explained that they had spoken to Olivier near Aliwal North and asked him what protection he was
going to give them because he and the other Free Staters had dragged them into the present situation.
Olivier said that the only protection he could now give was that they crossed the Orange River and
fight for the Free State in the Orange Free State. Smuts discussed the commandeering with Hook and
said there was no other way open to them [but rebellion] as they were not given protection by either
the Colonial or Imperial Governments. Hook said the meeting decided that as the Free State forces
were still in the Cape Colony, rebels should surrender their weapons at the nearest military post.
Brabant and Gataere had issued various proclamations, and while clarification was being sought on
them Hook suggested they lay down arms, obtain a permit and return home until summoned to appear
by the authorities'"
The annexation of the Stormberg region ends
Olivier returned to Aliwal North still leading the Rouxville and Smithfield Commandos,
trailed by a few hundred rebels. He crossed the Frere Bridge and established his laager on the Free
State side of the town while his men looted shops and sheep were driven through the streets as the
retreating Boers snatched supplies. Hundreds of rebels milled around, waiting to surrender, expecting
4JOosthuizen, Rebelle van die Starmberge, pp 92-93; Williams, Record if the Cape Mounted Riflemen, pp67-68;
Mullins, letter, Cory Library, MS 17.015, 7 March 1900.
42 Oosthuizen, Rebelle van die Stormberge, p94, 'Suurpol' or 'copper wire' is a very a tough grass.
•, Oosthuizen, Rebelle van die Stormberge, pp 93,239; Eight Boers were killed and seventeen wounded, South
African Field Force Casualty List, section from October 1899 to 20 March 1900.From the CMR eight were
killed and seven wounded.
44 CAR, AG 2133, Letters and Documents intercepted by the British at Dordrecht 16 February 1900 and March
1900 included the Electoral List of Ward 4 Wodehouse.
4S CAR, AG 3387, Annexure C 482, Notes by Hook on a conference held at Commercial Hotel, Lady Grey, 9
March 1900.
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that an announcement that peace had been signed would be issued shortly. The Colonial forces under
Maj Henderson of I" Brabant's with two 205in guns appeared on the outskirts of Aliwal North on II
March, found the Frere bridge intact, and raced over it to a ridge on the other side. They came under
attack from the Free Staters and the PartY was hard-pressed. The Boer guns opened up and they tried
to rush the IS-pounder guns, but were driven back. Henderson heliographed the CMR under Lukin for
help, and he raced over and reinforced them. Eventually the CMR Artillery re-crossed the Bridge to
the colonial side, with one killed and ten wounded, as they received orders from Gen Brabant that
they were not to enter the Free State. This order was later countermanded and the colonial forces
crossed the bridge for a second time into the Free State. The Boer forces withdrew along the riverbank
and dug themselves in, firing sporadically at the town until the Border Horse under Maj CP Crew
appeared and drove them off." In 23 days the Colonial Division had cleared the Free Staters from the
northeastern Cape Colony, and the annexation was at an end.
About 30 rebels, who had read a proclamation from Lord Roberts nailed to the bridge and
giving them generous terms, refused to fight on. When Cmdt Olivier drove them out of the laager with
his sjambok, Gideon J Steyn of Welbedacht, Albert said they then took shelter behind a ridge and
surrendered at the first opportunity.47
Olivier and his commando rode north early on IS March in a sorry state, while 300 rebels
remained behind to lay down anns at the Magistrate's Court.'s The rebels had wanted to surrender on
9 March, but Cmdt Van Aardt had persuaded them to keep on fighting. They all lost confidence in
him when they found out that he had received excellent surrender terms from Brabant before the
" 49Labuschagnesnek fight, and had not consulted them. A further reason for surrendering was that PJ
(pony) de Wet MLA had an interview in Bloemfontein with President Steyn at the end of January
1900, and he had given him what was at best an ambiguous letter. On the one hand the letter appeared
to assure De Wet that the republicans would not make peace without consulting the rebels and
securing their rights; they would be treated exactly the same as burghers as fur as the exchange of
prisoners and compensation was concerned On the other hand the message that Steyn encouraged the
rebels to fight on could also be read into the text. It all depended on whether peace was imminent or
not.:50
.. Wessels (ed), The Anglo-Boer War Diary ofHerbert Gwynne Howell, pp33-34; Williams, Record ofthe Cape
Mounted Riflemen, pp69-71; Mullins, letter, Cory Library, MS 17.015, 12 March 1900; South African Field
Force Casualty List, Section 1, pplOI, lOS and 107.
47 CAR, AG 2008, Part I Folio 1, Surrender Statement ofG J Steyn ofWelbedacht, Albert, 25 May 1900.
48 Mullins, letter, Cory Library, MS 17.015,7 March 1900; Du Plooy, AJiwal-Noord EenhondredJaar, I, pplll-
H2.
• 9 Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 30 March 1900; Oosthuizen, Rebelle van die Stormberge, pp99-
100.
50 Oosthuizen, Rebelle van die Stormberge, p84; Northern Post, 29 May, 1902; CAR, AG 2010, Part 1, Special
Courts, telegram to Sec ofLaw Department.
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Van Aardt asked friends in Aliwal North for advice on his future and fled when they warned
him that he might face a firing squad. Dr Luttig commented wryly on the difference between the self-
assured Free State forces who had occupied the Cape Colony five months before, and the chaos, lack
of discipline and the looting in their panic-stricken flight. He thought the victories of Colenso and
Magersfontein had made the Boers overconfident, and when setbacks occurred they thought only of
their own safety. He said that David de Wet, the ex-MLA for Aliwal North (later his father-in law)
said he was sure that the Boer republics would probably have handled the War with greater skill if
they had not got involved in annexing the Cape Colony."
Steyn and the Free State Government made a strategic error in distracting themselves at the
outbreak of the war by creating a mass of documentation aimed at manipulating the Cape colonists so
that they could join them with a clear conscience - even down to the text of the commandeering note
that had the appearance of a legal document. Albert was styled Albert, Orange Free State and the Free
State flag flew over all the magistrates' courts in the occupied territory. May colonists believed too
that the occupied districts would become an independent state, or they would be represented in the
Free State Volksraad whenthe war was over."
Steyn's expediency and manipulated of the Cape rebel did succeed for a while when he could
have recruited staunch allies to his cause. In the aftermath of the rinderpest, the rising tide of anger in
the Afrikaner community against the Cape Ministry, coupled with family loyalties, were sufficient
reasons for many colonial sympathisers to join the Free Staters in order to bnild an Afrikaner
Republic. However commandeering on a pretext hardly bnilt long-term loyalty. The result was that
Steyn, once so popular, lost support from the colonial rebels once the Free Staters withdrew across the
Orange and they blamed them for leaving them in the lurch.
Rebel forces enter the Orange Free State
The rebels were bitter about Olivier's and the Free Staters' desertion, and all the more when
they found that Olivier removed as much livestock and supplies from the Cape Colony as he could.
The rebels who followed him were locked in an angry confrontation with the Free Staters at
Beestekraal near Rouxville. Olivier was blind to the reality that the Free Staters needed all the help
they could get to continue the war. According to PieteiRoux ofToomnek, Dordrecht he threatened to
shoot them like dogs if they turned back. After a day or more of quarrelling many rebels returned to
the Cape Colony, while only a few, including himself and Cmdt Danie Schoeman, followed Olivier."
51 Luttig, 'Mediese Loopbaan van Dr P Luttig', Fransie Pienaar Musewn, P13.
" CAR, Cd 261, Enclosure 10 of no 51, Further correspondence relating to South Africa, Milner to Chamberlain.
"Oosthuizen, Rebelle van die Stormberge, p102.
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When Olivier quitted Smithfield, just ahead of his pursuers, his conunando had dwindled to 150
men.54
According to Japie Bosman, Cmdt Frans Vilonel who had replaced the wounded Cmdt Floris
du Plooy at Stormberg in contrast showed genuine concern for the rebel's situation. He warned those
who wanted to keep fighting that the longer they remained in the veld, the stiffer their punishment
would be. After some debate the majority of the Albert Commando returned to Burghersdorp to lay
down arms while Cmdt Petrus Steenekarnp led the group of those that wanted to fight in the Free
State, to Bethulie. Here they split up; those rebels who had family in the Bethulie Conunando joined
their relatives and the remaining 27 trekked to the Bloemfontein show grounds where they hung
around, spectators in a confused situation."
The Albert rebels under Steenekarnp, were kept away from the war because "the authorities
did not think they had joined the fight with open eyes". It was only on 12 March 1900, with Lord
Roberts on the outskirts of Bloemfontein, that they were called upon to take up a defeasive position
close to a Transvaal commando. Bosman, with Tjaart Steenekarnp, probably the son of the
conunandant, hastily made a sangar and they sheltered in it. They discover the following dawn that
they were on their when the Transvaal burghers vanished 10 the night. When the sangar was hit by an
Armstrong gun, Bosman was nearly buried under debris. He was appalled to realize how easily the
Free Staters had surrendered their capital.'·
Followlog the defeat of Gen Cronjc! at Paardeberg an atmosphere of defeat pervaded burghers
and rebels alike. All over the southern Free State burghers were laying down arms in response to Lord
Roberts' surrender proclamations. Grundlingh states that 4554 burghers from the vicinity of
Bloemfontein and the southern Free State districts laid down arms between the 15 March and 5
June.'7 Most of the original leaders in the rebellion surrendered, with the exception of Cmdt Hendrik
Lategan of Colesberg, Cmdt Danie Schoeman of Dordrecht and Cmdt Gideon George Cronjc! of
Barkiy East.
The names of 477 rebels from Albert, Aliwal North, Barkly East, Dordrecht, Colesberg and
Wodehouse later appeared in what was referred to as an 'absconded rebel list' , compiled in December
1900." Absconded, in this context, meaning that these rebels had left the Cape Colony without
permission. The rank and file leaderless and confused entered the Free State and wandered about in
extended family groups on the fringe of the fighting. A typical case was the surrender of the Besters
on 7 May 1900. Johannes Adrian Bester, senior, 59 years old, surrendered at Hoopstad together with a
" Grocotts Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 22 March 1900.
"Bosman, Sloan en Vlug, p12.
56 Bosman, Sloan en Vlug, pp13-14.
57 Albert Grund1ingh, Die "Hendsoppers" en "Joiners ". Die Rasionaal en Verslcynsel van Verraad, p35.
"CAR, AG 2109, Absconded Rebel list.
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son of the same name, aged 27, about the time virtually all the Hoopstad Commando laid down anns.
The Besters gave the false address of Niekerk's Kuil; Hoopstad and were ostensibly Free Staters.
However they were unable to supply the name of their Veld Cornetcy, and this led to the discovery
that they were rebels from Barldy West. They spent the remainder of the war in the Simon's Town
. f '9pnsoner-o -war camp.
In contrast the Colesberg rebels under Cmdt Lategan left the Cape Colony in far better order
than those under Olivier. Among them was VIC Jan van Zijl of Ebenhauser, whose wife Anna and
their children accompanied him to the Colesberg Bridge in a Cape cart. The exact spot where they all
said farewell and where they watched him ride off into the Free State is a special place in the family
history as he never returned, explained his grandson, JP van Zijl.60
According to Davitt, De la Rey hastened up from Colesberg with all the burghers he could
muster when he received news that Cronje was in danger of being captured at Paardeberg. The group
comprising the Ficksburg, Ladybrand and Winburg burghers, were with De Wet and Philip Botha.
The third Free State burgher and rebel force, which was retreating to Kroonstad, was under Gens
Olivier, Lemmer and Grobler. This force, slowed by a train of 500 to 600 wagons, only reached its
destination some weeks after the fall ofBloemfontein" l
The invasion of the Free State from 11 February 1900 brought chaos to the region and
resulted in a confused historiography. Bradford writing in 'Gentlemen and Boers' referred to the
Rimington Tigers, stating that they targeted homesteads; that at the first halt a farmhouse and African
quarters were gutted and the men scrawled 'Tigers' over the front door and rode on.62 Trooper Percy
Lukas of Rimington's writing to his sister Belle in George, threw a different light on their activities.
He wrote how they had to search the Free State villages for food, horses and stock looted from the
Cape Colony and abandoned when the pursuit became hot. If they did not know where the goods carne
from, stuff recovered was sent to the nearest military post. Among the good recovered he said that in a
single day he found a horse, livestock and general supplies including two wagonloads of sugar hidden
in the yard ofa private house in Philippolis'"
Olivier's and Grobler's Colesberg Commando, consisting of burghers and rebels, was the
strongest unit remaining in the Free State after Cronje's surrender. Davitt said, however, they found it
'·FAR, SOIPOW, see POW 7158 and POW 7157; CAR, AG 3553, gave the correct address as Pniel Barkly
West. Both Besters were sent to Simon's Town.
60 Pers com, JP van Zijl, Oudtshoom, January 2004.
61 Michael Davitt, The Boer Fight/or Freedom, p399, the statement that the third Free State force (given as
between 5,000 and 6,000) was composed mainly ofCape Volunteers is exaggerated, the official number for
absconded rebels as ofDecember 1900, is less than 500 according to CAR, AG 2109.
62 Helen Bradford, 'Gentlemen and Boers: Afrikaner Nationalism, Gender, and Colonial Warfare in the South
African War', in Greg Cuthbertson, Albert Grundlingh and Mary-Lynn Suttie, Writing a Wider War, p40.
6' Percy Lukas, letters to his sister, Belle Taule, Private Archives ofErrol Zondagh ofBishopslea, George, March
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impossible to hold 'Roberts' legions' back. Hundreds of Free State burghers went back to their flums
and it was left to the younger Boers, the rebels and the foreign brigades to do the fightiog. 64
In the midst of the chaos of the movement of men into the Free State food became a desperate
necessity, and everybody caught up in Roberts' march to Bloemfontein, or who was racing ahead
trying not to be captured, grabbed wbatever they could find to eat. Roland Shone of Avondale,
Bedford, a farmer and a recruit in Nesbitt's Horse, said Oen Roberts thanked their Maj J Currie
personally for ensuring that 200 wagons of food for the army had got through to Jacobsdal, as he had
heard a Boer commando had snatched it. Even so the regnlar soldiers got quarter rations, but the
colonials got nothing and Shone was told to get a Boer goat and kill it, which he did and shared with
his pals.
Shone said their rations improved but were hardly interesting. He was out scouting twenty
mHes (32 kms) from camp sometime later when he saw a small farmhouse in the distance and decided
to ask for some tea. The men with him warned him that an army order had been read out to all the
regiments that anyone who interfered with Boer women would be shot. To Shone's surprise the
farmer's wife begged him for food, saying that their own Boer forces had cleaned them out as they
retreated and they were keeping the children alive by grinding mealies and making porridge. Shone
explained to the woman that general army orders were that Boer women and children were entitled to
rations. Their Commissariat officer sent a load of food to the farmhouse, he said~"
After the fall ofBloemfontein Bosman led a wandering existence for six months, with little to
do with war. He had parted from Cmdt Steenekamp (who fled to The Netherlands) at Kroonstad early
in'May, guarded forts in Pretoria for some weeks, and when the capital fell, trekked with a group of
Cape rebels, to Machadadorp. There he met President Kruger, went on a walking tour, and from June
to September hunted game at Komatipoort only to contract malaria so badly that he would spend three
months in the Barberton hospital.66
The Colesberg Commando broke up after a few weeks, and those who now thought the war
futile rode back to the Cape Colony and 78 rebels surrendered between 22 and 24 March 1900 at
Philippolis. It was clear that they had been under investigation for some time and the magistrate
accepted the surrender of 52 rebels, classified them as Class 2 rebels and allowed them to return to
their farms. Thirteen others appeared in court at Naauwpoort on II April and were allowed out on
bail pending further investigation. Hendrik R Vorster of Derdepoort, Peter and Barend H Swart of
Colesberg, and Frederick L van Drag! of Blaauwkrantz became awaiting trial prisoners at
64 Davitt, The Boer Fightfor Freedom, pp407-408.
65 RD Shone, 'Diary of Roland Dudley Shone', p3, Private archives ofRK Shone, Avondale, Bedford.
66 Bosman, Sloan en Vlug, pp17-24.
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Naauwpoort. Joseph Snyman was moved to Philipstown to await triai on a murder charge.
Infonnation is lacking on five ofthe rebels."'
Olivier's Commando operated under Gens De Wet and Prinsloo for three months falling back
steadily into the northeast Free State under pressure from the advancing British columns. Gen
Hunter's forces later surrounded a large number of Boers that had retired towards the Wittebergen
Hills in the Brandwater Basin. Subsequently Gen De Wet and President Steyn, with 1,500 men broke
through the cordon, leaving behind Prinsloo with 4,500 burghers and Cape rebels, who decided to
surrender - except for Olivier and his two sons who slipped away at the last moment." Six days later
thousands of Boer fighters laid down arms at Ficksburg and Fouriesburg. Among them were nineteen
Albert rebels who, fearful of being identified as Cape rebels, gave false addresses, claiming to be
from Smithfield, Bethulie, Rouxville or Reitz, anywhere but Albert or Aliwal North.69 They were sent
to Ceylon as Free State POWs, but eventually anxious relatives infonned each other of the
whereabouts of lost family members, never imagining that the postal censors reported the infonnation
and revealed their identities.'0
Rebels then regrouped under Cmdt Hendrik Lategan and fought on when many Free Staters
had laid down arms. Lategan's Commando became part of the defensive action along the main
railway line to the north as the Boers fell back before Lord Roberts' advance. During April and May
they fonned part of the Boer forces in action along the eastern boundary. Rumours abounded that the
Cape rebel was fighting with a noose around his neck. That and the terror of going to gaol probably
led to so many concealing their home addresses.
According to the Gennan Official History the number of men under arms at the end of May
1900 Was as follows; the Transvaal forces numbered 25,411, the Free Staters were 14,843, there were
8,923 "other inhabitants of both states mixed with the commandos", 2,359 Cape colonists and 734
foreigners in corps of between 25 to 200 men. The total Was 52, 270" The situation was fluid in May
1900 as Vryburg and Mafeking were retaken; whether these figures take the surrender of those rebels
into account is not known.
Cmdt Lategan and his men took part in the weeklong engagement at Dalmanutha in the
eastern Transvaal. President Steyn's laager of 250 men on the Crocodile River fell under Lategan's
67 FAR, Volume A 245, HH Harmsworth, List ofColonial subjects who surrendered at Philippolis on 23 March
1900.
68 Malan, Boere Ojfisiere, p48; Davitt, Boer Fight for Freedom, p449; FAR, SO/POW, Oen Jan Hendrik Olivier,
POW 11569, captured 27 August 1900.
69 FAR, In the general SO/POW list there are surprisingly few Cape Rebels for 1900. It is only when AG 3558
'Register ofCape Rebels who are paws' is consulted that the numbers ofCape Rebels who gave false addresses
after capture becomes obvious.
'0 CAR, AG 2008, Part 2 Folio 40, Absconded Rebel re Danie Roux's anival at Peniche, Portugal.
'I General Staff, Berlin, The German Official Account ofthe War in South Africa, October 1988 to February
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control, and he accompanied Steyn when he visited President Kruger at Machadadorp.72 At
Komatipoort' OT de Villiers, a Paarl rebel who had deserted the Western Province Mounted Rifles,
met up with Lategan, Willie Hofmeyr and VIC Jan van Zijl, all of Colesberg.73 He heard President
Steyn urge his followers once more not to be downhearted; and he promised that as far as the
'colonial brothers' were concerned, peace would not be signed without their freedom being assured.74
Reassured that their future was secure in Steyn's hands, the rebelS fought on. Lategan and his men
acted as bodyguards to Steyn when he returned to the Orange Free State. Among them was Bosman,
who said they had left their horses behind at Machadadorp, as they had died of horse sickness, and
they walked back all the way behind Steyn's wagon.
Return to the Free State
To avoid British forces, the commando took a huge detour through the northern Transvaal,
trekking as far north as Pietersburg where they met up with Gen De la Rey in the vicinity of
Rustenburg, who escorted them to the Free State." Steyn met up with Gen De Wet again on 31
October 1900 near Ventersdorp where they joined Gen CC Froneman's commando.7• On 6 November
1900 the Boers and rebels under Lategan laagered at Doomkraal near Bothaville. At this stage many
rebels were quite exhausted from the incessant walking, according to OT de Villiers. They Were still
asleep when they were surprised at dawn by a force under Lieut-Col PWJ Ie Gallais and fighting
erupted in the farmhouse, around the dam wall and a kraal where 80 unmounted Boers were captured
De Wet wrote later they could have made a stand if some of the men had not panicked.77 Lategan's
losses were VIC Jan van Zijl of Colesberg and Ben Pienaar of Uitenhage killed, and 48 rebels were
captured, including Cmdt George Cronje of Barkly East. A total of 35 of rebel prisoners were sent to
Ceylon.78
The rebels captured at Bothaville carne from allover the northeastern Cape, indicating that
Lategan had become the de facto rebel leader in the Free State.79 Lategan escaped with 120 men, and
72 DS van Warmelo, On Commando, p72.
73 De Villiers, Met De Wet en Steyn in het Veld, p23; CAR, DID 4/173, Enrolment list of Western Province
Mounted Rifles, 17 January 1901; NAR, FK 795, Milner to Kitchener, 25 March, 1901 states De Villiers
deserted from SA Light Horse.
74 De Villiers, Met De Wet en Steyn in het ·Veld, p35.
75 Bosman. Slaan en Vlug, pp25-28.
7. Wessels (ed), Anglo-Boer War, Diary ofHerbert Gltynne Howell, p78.
77 Amery (eds), The Times History, V, pp15-21 states British casualties were 38 killed and wounded and the
Boers seventeen killed and 100 captured; Christiaan Rudolf de Wet, The Three Years War (October 1899-June
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78 FAR, Renier Collection, 119.1398723 letter from Martiens Havinga ofColesberg, 18 November 1949.
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joined De Wet's expedition to the south; playing a part in the evacuation of Dewetsdorp on 23
November 1900. He was still fighting under De Wet at the end of the year who he was planning an·
invasion of the Cape Colony."'
Kheis Island and Fabersputs
Returniug to the rebellion in the northwest Cape after the Free Staters withdrew from Upington
and Prieska, about 24 Gordonia rebels trekked with their families and livestock to Kheis Island on the
Orange River, west of Prieska. Their leader was a Jewish shopkeeper, Herman Judelewitz, and there
were three prisoners-of-war, Maritz, Bosman and Van Rooyen, who had escaped from the Simon's
Town POW camp. On 28 May 1900 Col Adye surprised the laager, his forces killing Judelewitz and
capturing an unknown number of rebels and their fiunilies, livestock, arms and ammunition. In a
second skirmish at the drift to Kheis the rehels defeated the Warwick Yeomanry, ki1led Maj Orr
Ewing and two others. The rebels had wounded the doctor attending to Ewing and the troopers were
forced to abandon an attempt to rescue a man swept away in the current when they came under heavy
fire. s1
Lieut-Gen Sir Charles Warren was ordered to secure Douglas, Campbe1l, Griquatown and
Kuruman. His force consisted of Imperial Yeomanry and the Duke of Edinburgh's Own Volunteer
Rifles (DEOVR), plus Canadians led by Lieut-Col Sam Hughes, who had driven the rebels out of
Upington." At the end of May Warren camped at Fabersputs and waited for supplies. De Villiers
attacked the camp," and killed 26 of Warren's force, notably Lieut-Col WA Spence ofthe DEOVR.84
Rebels ki1led were Gert Agenbach, Theunis Britz JJ1son, Willem Burger, Gert Cloete, Abraham Jan
de Klerk, Frank Desbe, Willem Monk, Petrus Muller snr, Alwyo Petrus Smith, Jacobus Swanepoel,
Liep Swiegers, Jacobus van der Westhuizen and Johannes Weideman Rison." De Villiers was praised
for his daring, the Volunteers for standing their ground, and Warren was criticised for not taking
precautions to see that his camp was not surprised.s6 De Villiers with 300 rebels from Herbert and
Hay was reported to be ready to surrender at Kuruman. Warren sent Hughes over, but warned him on
no account to approach the laager or to negotiate terms of surrender. Hughes ignored the order and
captured over 220 rebels at Koning and Blikfonteio. When Warren arrived he found that Hughes had
given generous terms to the rebels, but De Villiers, Jan Vorster and 50 top fighters had vanished into
80 DW Kruger and CJ Beyers (00,), Dictionary a/South African Biography, III, pp498-499.
81 Grocoll's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 31 May 1900.
82 Reid, Our Lillie Army in the Field, p86.
83 See Chapter 5.
84 Snyman, 'Poslmasburg en die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog', Military History Journal, p204-208.
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the Transvaa~ where they joined Gen De la Rey. Vorster decided to fIght under Gen Liebenberg and
was captnred on 29 July 1900 near Potchefstroom and went to Ceylon under the alias of Jan Retief
from Johannesburg.'7
At this time Hughes' indiscreet letters to friends, blaming the British for incompetence appeared
in Canadian papers. Warren was furious at De Villiers' disappearance. Hughes was in hot water and
Lord Roberts dispensed with his services, but his terms to the rebels stood." Warren restored peace
for a short time. Postmasburg changed hands and a local loyalist, Thomas Green, a volunteer in
Warren's Scouts, was put in charge ofthe village. Postmasburg was in a bad way due to the rinderpest
and now, due to the war, conditions deteriorated even further. The leaders of the rebellion were
indicted, and some ofthem were allowed out on bail'9
Vryburg falls and Mafeking is relieved
Although Kimberley was relieved in mid-February by Gen French, the British outpost
remained for some time only six miles (ten kms) north of the diamond fields at Osfontein, and
frequent skinnishes were reported east of the Koedoesrand, north towards the Modder, and around
Petrusburg, which remained in Boer hands for a few weeks.'"
Remnants of the Griqualand West Commando, mostly Vryburg and Kuruman rebels, had
laagered on a series of ridges at Rooidam, not far from Fonrteen Streams, blocking the route to the
north. A column under Col TB Mahon left Kimberley on 4 May, determined to relieve Mafeking. Maj
'Barton drove the Vryburg and Kuruman rebels off, and among the fatalities was Cmdt Baart van
Aswegen of Barldy West.9l On II May 1900 the column arrived in Vryburg and arrested prominent
rebels fleeing to the Transvaal, and took them on to Mafeking, from where they were sent to Cape
Town via Beira, while others reached the border with their families and their belongings. Large
quantities of arms were seized when Gen Hunter arrived in Vryburg, and rebels who had surrendered
were allowed to return to their farms until summoned by the Magistrale.92
When rumours reached the rebel laager at Rietfontein in May 1900 that a British column was
set to relieve Mafeking, David de' Koker and about eighteen others fled to the Transvaal but over the
following months they were nearly all captnred and sent to camps in Ceylon and India. Mafeking was.
relieved on 17 May 1900 after a siege lasting 216 days. After the rejoicings were over a public
87 J Vorster, 'Komrnandant Jan Vorster, alias Jan Pister Rolief, Kaapse Rebel', in Military History Journal, VII,
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meeting was held in the town on 30 May to discuss the "Future of the Republics and the treatment of
rebels".93 The relieving forces made a clean sweep of tbe farms in the Mafeking district, and the
rebels that remained in the vicinity were arrested and gaoled while undergoing preliminary
investigation. The surrender of a number of Class 2 rebels was accepted, and some of them were
allowed to join the Bechuanaland Rifles and served with the SA Field Force for the remainder of the
conflict. Five Mafeking rebels only laid down arms at the end of the war."
Lukas Groenewald of Zoutfontein, Vryburg, said that only a few of the Vryburg men
remained on commando once the news of Lord Roberts' surrender terms spread. The terms were that
any man who wanted to surrender wonld be allowed free and safe passage to his home. Many laid
down arms. Those who stayed in the field begged the others to give them their good Mausers and
hand the old ones to the English instead. When they refused to hand them over, Groenewald said they
got so angry that they fired at their former companions, who then escaped during the night. The few
who would not give up the fight trekked over the frontier and fought under Cmdt CM Douthwaite
with the Transvalers:'
Refugees
Kruger had long feared that the British Goverrunent would punish captured rebels harshly,
especially those who once held official positions under the Colonial Goverrunent. As early as
February 1900 he ordered a former Cape Policemen, Solomon Johannes Oosthuizen of Burghersdorp,
to·, move to Pretoria, as he feared that he could be executed if he were captured. Melt Marais, on
behalf of the Transvaal Goverrunent, offered rebels a free passage to Europe, plus £75 for expenses,
and Jotham Joubert, MLA for Albert, and Ignatius van der Walt, MLA for Colesberg, were among
those who took advantage of the scheme. Not everybody wanted to go. Guillium Andries Schoombie,
ofWagenmakersvlei, Steynsburg refused the passage money, and became a despatch rider for De Wet
instead:'
Other refugees fled by train in open trucks to the Transvaal. However Benning's statement
that a caravan of over 6,000 refugees arrived in Pretoria on 5 April from the Cape Colony is
exaggerated as Bechuanaland and Vryburg in Griqualand West were still in Boer hands as Mafeking
was only relieved on 16 May,97 On 18 May 1900 erstwhile leaders such as Joubert, MLA for Albert,
9' Mqfeking Mail, 30 May 1900.
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Van der Walt, MLA for Colesberg, Cmdt Pier Steenekamp and Rev JD (Totius) du Toit sailed with
other rebel colonists on the Bundesrath as exiles to The Netherlands.98
By 16 September 1900, 3,000 men, mainly foreign volunteers and Cape rebels under Gen FJ
Pienaar, were in the vicinity of Komatiepoort. Of the 3,000 that crossed into Portuguese territory,
2,000 were without horses, destitute, or had contracted malaria.99 Delagoa Bay was rife with disease,
and accommodation and food were very scarce. The Netherlands Red Cross ran a tent hospital and
volunteers cared for a never-ending stream of patients. Christoffel Rudolph Annandale of Annan
Water, Wodehouse, who assisted the overburdened staff, was commended for his work. Among those
who died of disease in Delagoa Bay was Jan Albertus Kroukamp (20) of Vryburg who died on 8
January 190\.100
Due to the unhealthy conditions and the shortage of housing, the Portuguese authorities
decided to ship the internees to camps in Portugal. Among the 153 Cape rebels were thirteen married
men with their families. Another 129 colonists that also sailed for Portugal had lived in the Boer
republics for some while and had not taken part in the rebellion in the Cape Colony.IOl A group with
private funds went to the United States of America, including Philip Wege of Aliwal North, who
studied dentistry and later returned iIi 1906 to practise in the Transvaal. lo2
Rebels snrrender
The majority of the rebels under arms south of the Orange River decided to return home
dUring March 1900 hoping they would all get off lightly. Clutching their Free State commandeering
letters, they came in to surrender. For some the crux came after they read a telegram from Lord
Roberts to Brabant, pasted on the Frere Bridge at Aliwal North. Newspapers reported that Gatacre had
recalled a proclamation issued by Brabant on 22 February 1900, but issued another proclamation
asking the rebels to surrender and give up their arms, and they would receive passes to go to their
farms, where they were to remirin until called to account later. 103 Both proclamations were aimed at
getting the rebel home and subdued under Martial Law in order to leave the army time to mop up the
legitimate belligerents of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.
In the twmoil that followed the rebels surrendered in family groups, as they had gone on
commando - the head of the family having the say. Hundreds of Aliwal North rebels began layiIig
down arms before the Magistrate, JD Hugo, who, back at his post, was giving written permission for
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them to return to their farms, which they were not to leave on pain ofbeing arrested. Of the 44 Class I
rebels, about five followed the Free Staters, and two of!\lese were later interned in Portugal. I04 Of the
23 leading Wodehouse rebels eighteen surrendered. Of the eighteen Colesberg Class 1 rebels, who
Were fewer in number than those that fought at Stonnberg, about ten continued to fight in the Free
State and Transvaal. On 17 March 1900 300 Albert rebels surrendered in a single day and left for their
farms, clutching their passes. Lord Wolwerton, representing Gen Brabant, infonned them
patronisinglyat Burghersdorp,
"You have been guilty of a great crime for which, in any other country, you would have been shot.
But the great British General, Lord Roberts, with the sanction of Her Most Gracious Majesty the
Queen, has dealt leniently with you, knowing you are ignorant men and have been misled. Your
leaders will be called to account. You are to go home and remain there, and by your future conduct
try and expiate the great harm done."lOs
At Lady Grey a colonial Field Comet, Mr Edward Steriey, had persuaded the wavering local
rebels to lay down arms and then asked Maj Hook at Herschel for assistance: Hook said the Lady
Grey rebels had grown weary of the war and were surrendering steadily to the local· loyalists. He
received a further report that rebels at Barkly East were prepared to surrender. Maj Hook, escorted by
seven police and a telegraphist, rode over. The reoccupation of Barkly East took place in a festive
mood. The Free State officials remained to hand over the keys of the courthouse, and rebels poured in
to surrender. By 14 March 1900 over 1,000 frrst class arms had been handed over.!06
Of course the Magistrates all complained of the parlous state of their divisions when they
returned to their villages after the Free State withdrawal in March 1900. If the long-suffering British
citizens reproached !\lem for !\leir flight in November 1899, nothing of this was mentioned officially
by the magistrates in their reports made on their return. The appalling state of the Residencies and the
mess and chaos of the Magistrate's Courts were widely commented on. Kidwell at Jamestown said it
was July 1900 before business began to resume its nonnal condition. 107 The general complaint was
that trade had been suspended, many commodities were short; crops were not gathered properly as the
men were away, roads were neglected and stock had not been attended to, At Griquatown the health
of the people was poor as malaria was prevalent, but there was no medicine to treat them. At Douglas
it was reported that when the Free State forces left the rebels reined supreme, were arrogant and
oppressive. Offences committed by blacks were punishable by lashes. The rebel officials were chosen
from the better classes. The rank and file of the rebels were sqUatters and labourers. The only
103 Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, "Dordrecht', 8 March 1900.
104 Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, Reuter's Special War Service, Aliwal North', 13 March 1900.
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magistrate who mentioned the reaction of the women when the rebellion came te an end, was from
Prieska; he said that the women nnderstood only too well the result of their husbands' rebellion;
ruination te the family and severe pUnlshment of their husbands. At Griquatewn Landdrost Perry
performed tbree marriages and entered them inte the register.108
AJ Kidwell, Special Justice of the police, returned to Jamestown in March 1900 after an
enforced absence of four months. He was accompanied by a force of 600 Volunteers and officers to
assist him, and accepted the surrender of 150 men, whom he described as 'forlorn and dejected'.
Kidwell interviewed the rebels, making a preliminary examination. He sent them each home with a
permit giving them permission te return te their farms. The rebels had to remain there and not leave
without an order that was signed by the Resident Magistrate or Special Justice of the Peace. 100
The suddenness of the collapse of the rebellion caught Milner and the weak Colonial
Government nnprepared. Milner wrote te Chamberlain at the end ofMarch, saying that adminlstrative
chaos had arisen from the conflict of civil and military authorities, the latter trying to suppress
rebellion and the former to screen rebels, as well as from the eternal chopping and changing by the
military themselves. Milner spent five days trying te introduce some nniformity into the procedure.
The procedures of the Chief of Staff's circulars of 30 January and 3 February were being followed. It
would take time te get through the preliminaries, which would give plenty of opportunity te consider
the best form of tribnnal for the final trials, he said. llo The sheer numbers of rebels to be processed,
over 5,000 by May 1900, increased clerical difficulties.
Martial Law circulars oUanuary and February 1900 stated that where Martial Law was in
force persons resisting the authority of the Government, or aiding and abetting the enemy, were to be
arrested and punished. The offences nnder Martial Law included treasonable or seditious acts,
enlisting or engaging in the military forces ofthe enemy, aiding or abetting the enemy, or volnntarily
carrying on trade or supplying goods to the enemy; destroying railways, bridges or telegraphs and
endangering the safety, or hampering the movements ofHer Majesty's forces. Fines could be imposed
and persons removed from a proclaimed district to another. l1l
Class 1 and Class 2 rebels
From the end of March rebels were divided into two classes. Class 1 was defined as the
ringleaders and those who had been actively engaged in assisting the enemy, or in planning and
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propagating rebellion in the Cape Colony, or had held a position under the Colonial Government.
Class 1 offenders were to be arrested, preliminary investigations were to be held and a record of
evidence sent to the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Cape Town. ll2 Hundreds of people were
gaoled, and 29 leaders of the Aliwal North rebellion alone were lodged in the Queenstown GaoL They
included the Mayor, NE Smuts, the ex-MLA member, David de Wet, and three field cornets, ill
Lubbe, AJ Fourie and Hendrik: Naude. The myth arose later that rebels were convicted and sentenced
to long prison terms on the strength of the fabricated evidence given by ignorant blacks and Cape
coloureds. In reality the dubious method of commandeering men and forcing them into the laagers
now came back to haunt those in the dock. A long drawn-out process, beginning with a preliminary
investigation by the local magistrate, commenced in the northeastern Cape.
The English press in every part of South Africa took up the subject of the mistaken kindness
to rebels by Lord Roberts, and with the exception of those few papers that sympathised with the
rebels, there was a unanimous outcry for the employment of more drastic measures in dealing with
those found guilty of treason. 113 The military had little to say officially against the Schreiner ministry
after Mafeking was relieved. Not so the Mafe/dng Mail that had given a great deal of space to all the
messages of congratulations received from all over the world, starting with a message from Queen
Victoria. No message came from the. Prime Minister. The Mafe/dng Mail said they did not want a
message from him. About WP Schreiner they said sharply "we always regard him as a man with no
knowledge of men, and therefore easily misled and made the tool and puppet of astute plotters .....
Mafeking wants no communication with a man who either wilfully corrupt or stupidly befooled, was
eq~ally guilty of endangering his country's interest".114
An extraordinary number of affidavits were recorded implicating Class 1suspects. Among the
nineteen affidavits collected against Johannes Hendrik: Lubbe of Driefontein, Aliwal North was a
sworn statement by L James, manager of Bailey and Co, Jamestown that Lubbe was Deputy
Commandant of a group of rebels. He first selected a spot near the location at Jamestown for his
camp, but because of rumours moved it to Witkop, near Jamestown. HG Peiser stated that there were
about 100 rebels in the camp. Lubbe was a candidate for election as commandant of the Aliwal North
forces, but Van Aardt was eventually elected, said Jacob Venter who deposed that A Wagenaar, the
acting Magistrate, held the election in the presence of 100 '1'bels. Six witnesses saw Lubbe armed at
Stormberg according to numerous sworn statements .115
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In the inquiry into Christian van der Merwe of Osso, Lady Grey it came to light that the
accused was appointed a Veld Comet and Corporal under the Orange Free State Government and bore
arms at Stonnberg, Dordrecht, Jamestown and Labuschagnesnek. He was accused ofbeing leader and
spokesmen of the rebels who arrested F Gedye at Lady Grey and forced him to surrender his keys. He
took possession of the stock of police clothing at Rooinek. He arrested the Cape Police on duty at
Labuschagnesnek and took them to Cmdt Olivier who took their arms, horses and saddlery. Vander
Merwe retreated with the Free State forces, but afterwards surrendered. Among the many affidavits
implicating him was one from Gordon Harris, later private ofthe Dordrecht District Volunteer Guard,
who said that Van der Merwe had 25 men under him when he arrived at Rooinek. He carried a black
waterproof that he said he took from an English officer at Stonnberg.1I6
After a preliminary hearing at the end ofMarch 1900 an indictment was also prepared against
Peter Jacobus de Wet, a member of the Legislative Assembly and farmer of Waschbank, Wodehouse.
He was charged with taking up arms and joining the military forces of the republics, and acting as a
member of a Court that dealt with priso,,;ers captured by the Military forces of the republics. He also
wrongfully conununicated with the President of the Orange Free State and forced a member of the
Cape Police to join the Military forces of the Boer Republics. An affidavit came in from James Louw
who had met Pony de Wet on the Kraai River Bridge, and said he was taking his family to the Free
State for safety as the English troops had entered Dordrecht. De. Wet showed him the letter he had
received from President Steyn, said Louw. U7
There were three charges in the indictment against Johannes Francois de Wet of
Mosheshsford, Barkly East. They were that he joined the military forces of the republics at Stonnberg
and that he assisted in levying war at Stonnberg and at Wodehouse and elsewhere; that he acted in the
capacity of a Veld Comet, and that he advised JP Jenkins, a private in the Cape Police, to join the
military forces ofthe republics.us
When the statements against Class 1 rebels are studied there is considerable prima facie
evidence. It is difficult however to fmd explanations on what motivated the leaders of the rebellion.
Theophillus Tylden Shepstone, a special Justice of the Peace in Rhodes does shed some light. He said
that when Cmdt Olivier arrived at Rhodes he watched Hugo, a teacher, handing out papers to various
people and heard that he was commandeering them. Shepstone said he went around and warned the
Dutch that the day would come when they would shed tears over their disloyalty, but the majority of
116 CAR, AG 3388, Preliminary Investigation of Christian Petrus van der Merwe, ofOsso, Lady Grey. He was
eventually found guilty in April 1902 and sentenced to one year's imprisonment and a fme of£500 or a further
one year imprisonment.
117 CAR, AG 3388, Indictment against PL de Wet, MLA. A largenumber ofAliwal North rebels including David
de Wet and their families were sent to Beaufort West where they were out on bail until the end of the war.
118 CAR, AG 3391, Indictment against Joharmes F de Wet ofMosheshsford, Barkly East.
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those who joined the Free Staters were under the impression that the English had no chance.
Shepstone then suggested that people might hand in their names to him so that if they were pressed
into the Free State service the list might avail them in the end. The Dutch would not sign a list, but
some men did come forward and say they would do nothing except under strong pressure. Shepstone
also stated that some people were afraid they would be. shot by British troops if they crossed over the
borders into the Barkly East district. 119
The same standard of care by the Clerks of the Magistrate's Office to collect incontrovertible
evidence is seen in documents relating to these preliminary hearings of Class I rebels. All Class I
rebels (whose preliminary investigations were completed) were released on bail, except for Members
of War Committees, Members of Municipalities and Divisional Councils, Justices of the Peace and
Field or Assistant Field Comets."o
The Class 2 rebels were the rank and file who had been commandeered, or otherwise induced
to join the enemy, or had taken up arms against the Government unwillingly. Class 2 offenders were
sent home after lists had been compiled, and statements were sent to the GOC Cape Town. 121 These
surrendered rebels, who now carried permits allowing them to return to their farms, were ouly
allowed to visit their nearest market town by a direct route in order to sell their goods, to buy
necessities, or to attend Nachtmaal. On arrival in town they had to report to the Magistrate, who
issued a permit for them to return home. No rebel living in town was allowed to leave it without a
permit. There was a general curfew between lOpm and Sam, when everybody had to be indoors. All
letters had to be scrutinised by the censor before being posted. 122
Many farmers returned home knowing full well that as things stood they would never collect
payment for livestock commandeered by the Free State forces. The Aliwal North farmers could have
appropriated the livestock the Free Staters had driven over the Orange River to get better grazing.
However under Martial Law the Army Transport Department soon made a clean sweep, collecting up
all the Free State livestock for their own use. In May, according to Memoranda No 4, the stock of
rebels who had absconded or were under arrest and admitted to bail was auctioned, and payment made
to the Field Paymaster. The receipt went to the Magistrate so that the information would be available
for the Commissioners appointed to deal with compensation. The regulations for the auction of stock
were amended in July, and a new ruling was introduced that sufficient livestock to maintain the
families should be left on the farms. 123
119 CAR, AG 3391, File of Johannes F de Wet, Mosheshsford, Barkly East. Statement about G Hugo, signed by
IT Shepstone on 23 Fehruary 190l.
120 CAR, Cd 981, Inspector-Genera!'s circular Memorandum, Nos 16 and 17, July 1900. It stated that older men
r,;0ducing Medical Certificates would be admitted to bail.
21 Grocott's Daily Mail Weekly War Summary, 21 April 1900.
122 Du Plooy, Aliwal Noord, Eenhonderd Jaar, I, pp1l4-115.
123 CAR, Cd 981, Inspector-General's circular Memorandum, Nos 2, 3 and 4, 9 May to 9 July 1900.
Chapter 2 96
A game of cat and mouse developed between the authorities and the colonists as the anny
tried to call the rebels to heel. In April 1900 Lord Roberts issued a proclamation reminding the
inhabitants of Albert, Steynsburg, Molteno, Wodehouse, Aliwal North, Baddy East and Colesberg
that he had treated them with great leniency, as, with the exception of the ringleaders, he had allowed
them to return to their fanns. He then warned those who joined or assisted the enemy that if they
committed any further acts of hostility they (themselves or their property) would be treated with the
utmost rigour, and the extreme penalties ofMartial Law would be enforced against them.l24
However the proclamations issued by Lord Roberts, although widely publicised, really had
little bearing on the thorny issue ofa suitable punishment for surrendered rebels. The legal crux of the
matter was that the Cape rebel was a British citizen, and as the Cape of Good Hope enjoyed
responsible government, it was the Cape Parliament's duty to promulgate legislation, which would be
. handed down to rebels convicted ofHigh Treason by the justice system.
Because it was a crown colony, the Schreiner ministrY could not disregard the advice of the
Secretary of State. In April 1900 Chamberlain had put pressure on the colonial ministrY, requesting
them to pay compensation for losses sustained by loyalists as a result of the invasion or rebellion.
Schreiner supported by the Attorney General, Richard Solomon, fmnly resisted, stating they had no
money and could only deal with cases covered by their own proclamation.125
Crisis in the Schreiner Ministry
The Schreiner ministrY was to split on the thorny issue of an appropriate punishment for the
Cape rebel. When 5,000 rebels surrendered it became obvious that the office of the Cape Attorney
General lacked the organisation to process these numbers. Both Ministries agreed to the appointment
of a statotory Special Judicial Commission that should visit the districts under Martial Law to hear the
cases. In the meanwhile preparatory examination of suspects by magistrates could proceed, and this
could later be validated once the Commission was established. l26
The crisis developed after a Draft of the Amnesty Minute by the Treasurer, John X Merriman,
was signed by the Cabinet and submitted to the Governor. In it the Ministers submitted that justice
would be served if a limited number of principal offenders were brought to trial in order that the
punishment act as a general deterrent for rebellion. For the remainder of the rebels the Queen was
asked to issue a Proclamation of Amnesty. The ministers supported the petition by referring to the
124 CAR, Cd 426, Proclamations of Lord Roberts, No 8 Anny Headquarters, Bloemfontein, 9 April 1900.
125 Walker, WP Schreiner, A South African, pp224-225.
126 CAR, Cd 264, Correspondence relating to the Affairs ofthe Cape Colony, Minute 1/33, Enclosure I in No 6,
Governor to Ministers, 14 April 1900.




















































































































































































































